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v INTRODUCTION 
The British Labour Party expresses its aims in 
foreign policy as guided by Socialist principles. However, 
when confronted with the application of them to actual 
problems in international relations, the Labour Govern-
ment finds that there are prior considerations which 
take precedence over Socialist principles. At this 
point the opinion of the party on foreign affairs becomes 
an issue both as to the guiding principles of that policy 
and as to the means of implementation of policy. In this 
paper we shall examine the views of the several diverse 
opinions within the Labour Party, in particular the views 
of those groups considered to the "Left" on the political 
scale of values, in order to determine their effect upon· 
the official foreign policy of His Majesty's Government 
since 1945 and to evaluate the suggestions made by these 
groups in the light of reality in the sphere of inter-
national relations. 
An investigation of Labour's international program 
and of the plans advocated by the Left Wing within the 
Labour Party must provide for careful consideration of 
each important voice within the party group. Thus, in 
order to determine the influence of the Left in foreign 
policy, the study is divided into the following major 
sections. The first chapter deals with the problem of 
-v:r--' 
defining a Socialist foreign policy within the setting of 
a realistic international situation. In Chapter II there 
is a brief history of the Labour Party foreign policy 
since the days when it was first formulated in a serious 
way. In addition, the background of the attitudes and 
development of Left foreign policy in the various factions 
within the Labour Party is presented. Chapter III des-
cribes the policies advocated by three important sections 
of the Labour Party. This is limited to a consideration 
of five British foreign policy problems which reveal the 
principal tenets of each group. Then, Chapter IV treats 
the actual conflict between the Left and the Government. 
Finally, conclusions as to the influence of the Left on 
British foreign policy and the relation of Left ideals 
to reality appear in Chapter v. 
The chief sources of primary material are.the 
Parliamentary Debates, Labour Party books and pamphlets, 
the New Statesman ~ Nation, and Fabian Society publica-
tions. The political pamphlet occupies a much more 
important place in British politics than corresponding 
literature in this country. Therefore, emphasis upon 
pamphlets is proportionate in this paper. Some were 
issued under the auspices of the Labour Party or the Fabian 
Society, but others were written independently. Access to 
them was limited to those available in Harvard University's 
J 
li 
I 
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1 Widener Library and Industrial Relations Library, and 1 
from the British Information Services. 
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LABOUR'S FOREIGN POLICY: 
A PROBLEM IN IDEALISM VS. REALITY 
In the recent past what amounts to a revolution in 
world power has taken place. The inter-war period was 
marked by the failure to recognize (on the part of most 
nations) that Europe's day had slipped by after World 
War I. The predominance of Europe in world affairs has 
faded and passed on to non-European nations which possess 
a formidable combination of resources. At the end of 
World War II only two countries--the United States and 
the Soviet Union--qualified as world powers, with Great 
Britain a poor third. This is a most relevant factor in 
\, 
II 
II 
international relations today. Moreover, one writer sees 
the British Empire and CommonwiUh .as a sort or neutral 11 
area between the super-powers. To many Englishmen today's · 
most important national problem is redefining Britain's 
world position in accordance with power realities and 
ideological preferences. One of the most acute problems 
for the British is changing the national psychology to 
meet this new situation. 
Further, there is sharp concern over the degree of 
reality or unreality in the proposals offered by the Left 
groups in relation to the Official or National foreign 
policy. In general the ideas of the left are idealistic. 
1herefore, they provide incentives and often utopias 
1. -~Fykman _ N. J., Then Gfo~~@L_of the P;ace _ ~~~~ln_~~i;_ E?_._ ___ _ 
' -~fl~~' ~~~H?apter~,--pp-;-14~~~-tij-,lt~~~---- - ~----- ---- __ , 
2 
toward which to work, but \'lhich in the immediate future 
are unattainable or unrealistic. In English home affairs 
the Left propagandized itsideals for more than half a 
century before achieving success in the realm of practical 
politics when the Labour Party won office with power. 
Even so, these ideals have not been translated into every-
day life as fully as their original protagonists hoped. 
In transferring to the international scen~the difficulties 
of attaining such ideals increases greatly because of the 
vast economic and political diversity between the various 
nations. While the Labour Party is avowedly socialistic 
in its ideals and has attempted to translate those ideals 
into everyday life in England, Labour's Left contends that 
the Government has gone ahead with plans for a social 
democracy at home, but has abandoned socialism in relations 
abroad. The definition of socialist foreign policy there-
fore becomes an issue. 
A. Definitions of a Socialist Foreign Policy 
The Labour Party has delivered several official 
statements on principles of socialist foreign policy. 
2 
The first one was The International Post-War Settlement 
of 1944 which said nothing about socialist foreign policy, 
but listed party policy as: 
2. Labour Party, National Executive Committee, The Inter-
national Post-War Settlement, London, 1944. ~~~~ ---- ---
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
To prevent war, and if war comes, to crush 
the aggressor; 
To ensure economic wellbeing in all lands; 
To ensure democracy and political freedom in 
all lands. 
3 
While socialism is stated to be fundamental to all these 
aims, they could be achieved without socialism. The 
3 
second statement, Cards ~ ~ Table, while referring 
to "a socialist foreign policy", does not define one, 
but vaguely states that the policies followed by the 
Government are socialist, despite criticism of them by 
a number of Socialists. 
4 
The third pamphlet, Approach to Foreign Folicy, 
states that the basic aims of the Party in foreign policy 
are to guarantee security, independence, prosperity, and 
peace. In addition, it is declared that the United 
II 
I 
I 
I 
t 
I 
I' 
I 
I 
I 
disarmament must be the basis of world security, and jl 
Nations is the "keystone of Labour foreign policy", that 
that British power should be utilized uto protect socialist! 
-
governments abroad or to overthrow Fascist regimes." Again 
these principles are not predominantly socialist, for they 
have been the basis of British foreign policy under many 
Foreign Ministers since Gladstone. 
"They were in fact the principles of early 
Gladstonian liberal policy, and historically the 
3. IAbour Party• =oe;Eae~.QB the Table: An !nterpretation 
of Labour'~ Foreign Policy, London, 1947. 
4. Labour Party, Approach to Foreign Policy, Labour 
Discussion Series, No. 11, London, January, 1947. 
4 
Labour Party inherited its foreign policy from 
Cobden and Bright through Gladstonian liberalism."5 
On the grounds that the Labour Party is not specif-
ically socialist in its international aims, many criticisms 
have been made from the socialist left, and a few alter-
natives offered. Leonard Woolf, preeminent in internationa 
programs of the Labour Party and Fabian Society since the 
first World War, sets out his ideas in a pamphlet entitled, 
6 
Foreign Policy: The Labour Party'~ Dilemma~ While he 
places the primary aims of British foreign policy to be 
those of peace and collective security, as put forward by 
the Labour Party, he does believe the secondary aims of 
that policy could be determined by 11 socialist beliefs and 
principles" in the following manner: 
1. Foreign policy should do all possible to 
establish socialism at home on a firm basis. 
2. Encourage and protect socialism abroad. 
3. Aim at the extension of international government. 
4. Although Governments are dealt with, the 
common people should not be forgotten. 
Mr. Woolf's thinking coincides with that of a majority 
of the socialist critics of the Government. A basic 
assumption in their thinking is that Britain can no 
longer afford to participate in another major, atomic war. 
Beyond this, they are motivated by an internationalism 
"in its wider sense." 
5. Woolf, L. s., Foreign Policy: The Labour Party'~ 
Dilemma, London, Fabian Publications, Ltd., and 
Victor Gollanez, 1948,p'7.This pamphlet is highly 
relevant to the topic and serves as a basis for some 
P-arts of the thesis. 
~-'~~~~~ '~-~~-~,~~~~2~~- _7_ ~~=. ~'- _ c 6-~-~--JiQQl.:r, ~ ~~, -~~-~-- ~2 ~-~ -~~--'- ~ ~~'' '-~~,~=c=~ccC2.~ ~ "-- ·-·- ,~ -- c c ~~~- '~- -~=c '~ = ~~~~~-~= o=~ ==~ 
5 
The late Harold J. Laski arrived at a different con-
clusion on the basis of his analysis of socialism and 
internationalism. Socialism to him means a society in 
which the means of production are owned publicly and 
operated democratically for the whole society, so that 
exploitation of man by his fellow has been stopped. 
Internationalism means 
"the spirit which, when expressed through 
institutions, sacrifices the sovereignty of any 
given nation-state to the wider interests of that 
civitas maximas which looks upon states as pro-
vinces in a world-order. •'7 
It is his finding that socialists are nationalists firs~ . 
They regard enlightened self-interest as the test for 
acting in the sphere of internationalism. He regards 
self-determination as a parallel principle to socialism 
rather than internationalism. However, he considers 
Socialist parties and governments as more likely to be 
international-minded than non-socialist ones. 
In order to elevate internationalism from upious 
aspiration" to a practical stage, the nation must be 
separated from the state by "functional federalism" which 
raises step by step the standard of living in nations 
where standards of living are relatively low, while at 
the same time maintaining the high standards in the states 
which are better off. Mr. Laski's plan requires socialism, : 
democracy, and international planning. I 
I 
J 
6 II 
However, socialist foreign policy may be interpreted 'j 
in yet another way. Hugh Dalton, a member of the Labour I 
Party National Executive Committee, sums up the Official 
view as follows: 
"But there is anot.her sense in which a soc-
ialist foreign policy is right and has been 
followed by us in the last four years.. By that 
I understand a socialist foreign policy which 
shall apply the same principles and the same 
ethics to international relations which it 
applies in the domestic sphere. 'From each 
according to his capacity and to each according 
to his need• is an old Socialist principle. 
We have put-it increasingly into operation in 
our domestic affairs. And we have do~e the 
same in our international relatio:ras. 11 
In attempting to follow such a program, the Labour Party 
recalls its socialist teaching, the Fabian maxim of 
the "inevitibility of gradualism", and falls into the 
typical British pattern of letting the solution fit the 
need. 
While adhering somewhat to Dalton's view, Prime 
Minister Attlee is more concerned with a "national" policy, 
mindful that a large sector of England is non-socialist. 
He therefore argues that the Government must not act as 
"representatives of an ideological abstraction, but as 
9 
representatives of the people of this country." As a 
practical politician, he is mindful of realities which 
must be considered in the formulation of policy. 
8. Report of the Annual Labour Party Conference, 1949, p.l9 • 
9. Parliamentary ,Debates. Ss. H.C., vol. 430, November 
12-29, 1946, c. 581• 
7 
Actually, there are probably as many definitions 
of socialist foreign policy as there are socialists who 
think about one. Yet, each one includes the hope of 
genuine betterment for the peoples of the world through 
international socialist action in the political and the 
economic spheres. To a greater or lesser degree these 
protagonists desire peace through collective security, 
prosperity through a controlled economy, and social 
democracy through peaceful means. It is in the difference 
of degree on one or more of these factors that the var-
ious points of view are evident--and which provides the 
main area covered in this thesis~ 
B. The Meaning of "Left." 
Before proceeding to discuss "Left" foreign policy, 
it is necessary to define what is meant by "Left"in this 
paper. In the first place it must be noted that we are 
concerned only about those groups within the Labour Party. 
While there are other Left groups articulate on foreign 
affairs, such as the Communist, the Socialist, and the 
Independent Labour Parties, they have not been accepted 
into the Labour Party and will not therefore be treated. 
Within the Labour Party, however, there is a climate 
of opinion which on the political scale of values is 
10 
generally considered to be the nLeft." The people 
embraced by such a term include active political thinker~ 
10. See Appendix I. 
---
8 
writers, and speakers who are beyond the general body of 
the party in respect to visualizing social, political, and 
economic ideals and values. The present-day "Leftists" 
are the lineal descendants and heirs of the Socialist, 
vanguard so important in the early days during the for-
mation of the Party itself--namely, the old Fabian Society, 
the I. L. P. While the broad base of the Party lies in 
the "Trade Union body", it is the "Socialist head" which 
supplies direction. 
Until the fruits of the Socialist propaganda were 
realized and the Party acknowledged its Socialist aims, 
the Labour groups langu!shed. After World War I a 
reorganization of the Party was effected, mainly through 
the efforts of Arthur Henderson, Philip Snowden, Ramsay 
MacDonald, and Sidney Webb, members of the Fabian Society 
11 
or the I. L. P. Labour 1 s aim was expressed in its new 
Constitution: 
11 To secure for the producers by hand or by 
brain the full fruits of their industry, and the 
most equitable distribution thereof that may be 
possible, upon the basis of common ownership of 
the means of production and the best obtainable 
system of popular administration and control of. 
each industry and service." 12 
vfuereas the former Left leaders urged the adoption 
of a national program which they believed in, so the 
present leaders agitate for international plans they feel 
11. Williams, F., Fiftx Years 1 March: The Rise of the~~~ 
Party, London, Odhams Press Ltd., 1949~ Chapter 3. 
12. Quoted in Cole, G. D. H., A History of~ Labour Party 
~ 1914, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1948P i 
I 
9 
are morally right. While the former felt the need for 
promoting Socialist ideals inside Great Britain, the latter 
wish to see them propagated throughout the world--at the 
least to such an extent that British Socialism will be 
able to flourish without outside interference from another 
world war or a general economic collapse. Although there 
are differences of opinion within the Left as to the means 
of attaining the end of maintaining and extending the 
gospel of Socialism, it is this which is foremost in 
their considerations. 
c. Conclusion 
The general aims of British foreign policy are 
security, independence, prosperity, and peace--principles 
to which most people and governments agree. Generalities, 
however, are not a proper basis for a foreign policy. 
Rather, the administrators of foreign policy draw upon 
the total resources of the nation, including geography, 
productive capacity, and military preparedness. After 
weighing known factors about their own country, the 
leaders must then attempt to determine how effectively 
the nation's aims and needs can be fulfilled in relation 
to the desires of other members in the sphere of inter-
national politics. 
The Left (as described above) acknowledges these 
factors, but places beside them socialist ideals and 
---~ 
10 
methods. To Labour•s Left such ideals are peculiar to 
socialism because of the spirit of their application--
in accordance with democratic socialism, the furtherance 
of international government, and the material needs of 
the common people. 
Admittedly, the project of defining a socialist 
foreign policy is difficult, if not nebulous. The Labour 
Party does not attempt to set out explicitly an official 
foreign program which is socialist in character. The 
Labour Government indeed finds it necessary to remind 
enthusiastic party members that 11 national foreign policy11 
relies on many factors, socialism being merely one of them. 
Mr. Woolf even states that socialism belongs in the area 
of 11 secondary aims" in foreign affairs. 
Nevertheless, to British socialists the conduct of 
international affairs is an activity subject to the same 
socialist principles they believe in at home, as Mr. 
Dalton points out. Many Leftists, by the process of 
identification, seem to omit from consideration ideologies 
and economies which differ from their own conception of 
democracy and socialism. In order to overcome this defect 
in their logic, the late Professor Laski suggested 
"functional federalism" as a means of achieving a united 
world and better standards of living for all peoples~ 
DEVELOPMENT OF LABOUR'S FOREIGN POLICY 
AND ATTITUDES BY THE LEFT 
Previous to the first World War Labourites, having 
developed no particular solutions to problems of inter-
national relations, relied on those resulting from Liberal 
Party and working-class international traditions. 
Generally, the members of the working-class party favored 
the Liberal policy of free trade and the political creed 
of pacifism and humanitarianism as symbolized by such 
men as Bright, Gladstone, and Campbell-Bannerman. Most 
of the early members of the Labour Party once belonged 
to the Liberal Party and, while the new party represented 
a different outlook and faith in domestic affairs, the 
Liberal tradition remained dominant in the international 
1 
sphere, where Labour's interests did not extend, as yet. 
The other tradition inherited by the Labour Party 
was the international labor and socialist movement, with 
its faith in working class unity and its distrust of 
2 
capitalism. Such slogans as "The proletarians have nothi 
to lose but their chains ••• Workingmen of all countries 
3 
unite!" made a strong international appeal, but the 
failure of the Second International to prevent war in j 
1914 and the split between Social Democrats and Communists I 
1. Tracey, H., Ed., The British Labour Party: Its History~~ 
' Growth, Policy, and Leaders, Vol. I, London, Caxton, i 
1
1 1948. PP. 75-b; 101-6. I 
i 2. Maddox{ W. P., Foreifin Relations in British Labour Poli ice, '~-~~~f~~e}- 14~~~x~~ec~~m ~mm: Press, I934._chAp. 2. 1 
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12 
after the Russian Revolution struck serious blows to 
international solidarity. Thus, while made up by minority 
groups with little hope or power, professions or the 
brotherhood or man by Socialists were easily indulged in. 
But, later with the advent of increasing strength and 
governmental responsibility, socialist consciousness or 
4 
nationalism intensified. 
A. Early Foreign Programs 
of the Labour Party 
Labour's interest in foreign policy stems from World 
War I and the post-war period. The economic disorganizatio 
of Europe brought international policy into the spotlight 
and attention was focused on solving problems which 
affected English working men. 
11 The most effective of propagandists as to 
the importance or foreign policy has been in 
England an unemployment percentage rising from 
3 per cent in 1920 to an average of 15 per cent 
in 1921 and 1922. To the miner who saw his 
continental market partially destroyed by rep-
arations coal and, later, his seven hours threat-
ened by the reversion to ten hours in the Ruhr, 
to the engineer who found that the demand for 
his services had ceased because there was no 
market for agricultural machinery in Russia, 
to the cotton operative who found that the 
East could not buy because it could not sell 
to Europe, the economic unity or the wor~d 
ceased to be a phrase and became a fact. 
Through the realization that peace was a. requisite 
II 
i 
I 
to furtherance or the working-class movement, the Labour /I 
! 4. Parker, J., Labour Marches On, London, Penguin Books, 11· 
I! 1948, Chapter 14. - J' 
I; 5. Tawney, R. H., The British Labour Movement, New Haven, 1 
.::.·=-=-------..:-....:--~=-
I· Yale University Press, 1925, p. 97. 1/ -~=--..:--~ r---- 0......-~ == ~~--==~----===-===----= -----0 --=-=--= --=--~-'=~---=======--===-=_c-~=-~~=--=-=-===--o=--c..==~-=-~~c~ 7 _ =~--==--
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1 Party made that condition one of its main planks in every 
li 
1
, program from Labour and~ New Social Order (1917) to 
I! Let Us Face ~ Future ( 1945) • Up until 1914 the Labour 
Party had as its only aim the preservation of peace. It 
was nominally committed to the Stuttgart resolution or 
1907 of the Second International, whereby cons~ituent 
organizations of the International were to do all they 
could to avoid a war, and should one start, to see to it 
that the class war was advanced. Only the first clause 
was accepted in Britain, in accordance with which several 
demonstrations were staged before the actual declaration 
6 
of war by Sir Edward Grey. 
Internationalism was reduced to a resolution passed 
by the party executive on August 5, 1914,to the effect 
I 
I 
i 
I
ii 
that Labour should work for peace at the earliest time 
on such conditions as would provide for friendly relations ~~ 
II 
II 
i 
among the European workers. During the war the Labour 
Party split, its major portion backing the Liberal Govern-
ment and approving participation in the Coalition Cabinet. 
However, those to the Left of the majority were more 
critical, deploring secret diplomacy and capitalist motives 
Ramsay MacDonald, then the leader or the Parliamentary 
J Labour Party, Phillip Snowden, and others could not find 
I in their consciences reason to support the World ~ro7 I 
L
1 6. Brand, c. British Labour•~ ~ !2 Power: Eight Studies' 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1941, pp. 56-8. 'I 
7. Ibid, Chap. 2. 1t 
=c.=--=-"--"'----=--=:- -;__·=-:_-,. ____ ... -- - - - -- - - -- ---- . - -- =======- --'--====-~ 
II 
I 
just because of the inherent dangers in German policy, but 
in looking ahead to the peace aims, favored non-punitive 
terms since the Allies still had to live with Germany in 
the post-war world, in which case it would be better to be 
generous. Leonard Woolf' wrote two reports for the Fabian 
8 
Society, entitled International Government and the Preven-
! 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
tion of' War, which were widely read and helped to crystal- 11 
II lize opinion in favor of' a league of' nations. 
I 
These investigations by Mr. Woolf were a comprehensive! 
I 
analysis of' past efforts at establishing international II 
machinery for government. They were also an attempt to 
solve the immediate problems of war and peace in the face 
of' realities. He proposed the inclusion in the peace 
treaties of' a league which incorporated an international 
I 
I 
I' 
il 
II high court for conciliation in non-justiciable cases, and " 
the employment of force 1n cases of resistance to economic II 
sanctions. 
The Independent Labour Party, although it stood with 
the Labour Party majority in the August 5 resolution, 
!I 
II 
I' 
I 
I 
I 
jl 
refused to give positive aid to the military effort, in ~~ 
recruiting, or in other war activity. Led by Keir Hardie, II 
Ramsay MacDonald, and Phillip Snowden, the I. L. P. majorit~ 
accepted the war without any enthusiasm for it or the II 
'I 8. Woolf, L. s., International Government: Two Reports II 
Prepared for the Fabian Research De:eartment, New York, :I 
=------~~'"-"~-~-=- l--~"'==-o }~-~~:r:~~~<:'~-S~-=-~?~~ ~~---=o======= u -~ ==c~c .. : '=-"~'-
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i 
official explanation of its origin, although some dissenter 
did withdraw from the Party Council in order to support 
the war. Still another I. L. P. section, which increased 
during the course of the war, was pacifist and internation-
alist, containing some conscientious objectors to military 
9 
service. 
The I. L. P. attempted to join the forces of socialist 
on both sides in an effort to end the war and to get worker 
::c:::i::~n:h:::o:0:~:;er:::::~r:e:::::di:::r~;::~:re I 
held towards these purposes, nationalism proved too strong 11 
:a::r;::r: c:~::ep::::rp::::; ~t:: :::l;h:~·t:·t:: war I 
was heeded, so that by 1918 I. L. P. influence was evident 
in Labour and the New Social Order, the new program of the 
--- 10 
Labour Party and in its War Aims. Labour also felt that 
in President Woodrow Wilson it had found its international 
spokesman, for Labourites too hoped for the world organiza-
tion which he championed, the self-determination of nation-
11 
alities, and a just peace with limitation of arms. 
Still another factor in the increased interest of the 
Labour Party in foreign affairs was the attendance by a 
number of influential leaders at various international 
conferences all over the world. In this way they became il 
9. Sacks, B., The !.~.P. and International Socialism durin5~J 
the World War, UniverSity of New Mexico Bulletin, 1936. p.9-ll. 
~e, !f· m· pp.23-6. 4 - . ; 
--nd ,. =• ~-Cha pt er~S-r=-espe.c ia lly pp. 1 9 53, , .. . . :=:~=--~, 
I 
I 
i 
=: ... =·~"-~"--"=-·=1~~"'--"'·=·~' -"'-'~~-----'--'-~"~''-'-'---'--''~=------=c.·:.. ------------------- ·--'""-'-='-"----''~~· . - .... ··-- ----'--""-"'16==-:"" -- =~=-'-'-· ~=----"-'.o.·oo .. 
II familiar with leading personalities in similar 
11 i 
i 
I 
I 
11 
• 
I 
movements 
in foreign lands. Incidentally, the delegates to these 
socialist and labor conferences were the people most 
12 
in the foreign policy affairs of the Party. 
The Labour Party's peace program was published as 
activ 
II 
I! 13 
The ~ of Labour by Arthur Henderson I and included the 
I 
following points: make the world safe for democracy; end 
war as an institution; democratization of all countries; 
abolition of compulsory military service; limitation of 
I 
I 
I 
II 
il 
I 
I
I 
armaments; abolition of private arms manUfacture; the 
establishment of a league of nations with an international I, ,, 
court of justice, international legislature, machinery for l1 
mediation, and backed by the joint, organized power-•milita1 , 
economic, and commercial--of all nations to be used on i 
recalcitrant members and in case of attack. However, 
economic warfare and boycott were denounced because they 
were means of exploiting labor. Healthy international 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
trade and development of resources was advocated as a means I 
I 
of improving working conditions. Labour wanted a just peac~ 
but felt there should be reparations for wanton 
I 
destruction ' 
I 
I and wrongs, and that the rights of all peoples should be 
II 
I) guaranteed. 
11 
ji Unable to obtain representation at the Versailles Peac1 
~~ Conference (as the Government had promised) Labour was happ I 
I
I 12. Maddox, .QE. ill• Chapter 3, especially section D. ) 
'[' 13. Henderson, A., The Aims of Labour, New York, B. U. Hueb~ph, 
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1, \1 
I I 
II I 
II I 
corresponded with those of Labour. However, when the treat 
was made public, Labour felt that the principles for which 
1
j 
Wilson stood were not fully incorporated in the Treaties 
II 
I 
I 
and that the terms imposed upon the losers were harsh. 
From that point Labour agitated for revision of the I 
II 
Versailles Treaty and inclusion of Germany in the League 
of Nations. Labour's leaders also felt that America's 
I failure to enter the League was grave and although there 1 
I 
was resentment towards Wilson for letting their hopes down, I 
he was respected, his main fault being that he raised hopesi 
14 I i 
too high. I 
A study group of the Fabian Society, analyzing Labour's! 
foreign policy during that period, states that the Versaill s 
Treaty ran counter to Labour's aims--"no territorial demand , 
no economic war, the abolition of secret diplomacy, and a 
'universal League or Society of Nations, a super-national 
Authority' 11 --and that the League of Nations was too power-
less to be effective. Labour's attack upon these dis-
crepancies was too late because Sociinsm had no influence 
15 
on the formation of the peace settlement. 
The report continues that if there had been any real 
Socialist influence in British policy, then there would 
have been some economic institutions created, some collabo- il 
II 
I
, 14. Brand, .QE. cite p. 164. !''I 
15. Fabian Society, Labour and Euro12e: The Need for ,, ~"~~~~r~~~~~ socialist stra te511:, London, Golbncz, 19li5." p:1i. _ ~"~~~ 
II 
II 
Russian revolution. 11 "But events were ahead of theories, 
at least of liberal theories," and the national principle 
insisted upon by the peace settlement "sabotaged" social 
revolution in Europe. Failure to master the economic 
crisis according to socialist principles is blamed for 
the conquest of Socialist and Peasant movements in Europe i 
t 
i by Fascist groups. j 
In public professions the Labour Pary expressed high 
1 
I 
idealism and worked for goals of international organization I! 
and revision of the Versailles Treaty. The League of Nationt 
,, 
became the keystone of foreign policy and the abolition of I 
I war the objective. The first two Labour Governments of 
1924 and 1929 proposed several international conventions 
such as the Geneva Protocol of 1924, the Optional Clause, 
Naval Conference of 1930, and the Disarmaments Conference 
16 
of 1931. "Risks for peace 11 were taken by cancelling 
I 
I 
II I, 
II 
naval orders and slowing up progress on the Singapore Naval 11 
Base in 1929. In spite of declarations in favor of col-
lective security, the Labour Party allowed British defenses 
to fall, in the absence of such an international police 
17 
force. 
Both Governments renewed relations with Russia, which 
II 
I· 
I 
l 
' 
the Conservatives had broken off, and attempted to find II 
I 
16. Medlicott, W. N., British Foreisn Polic~ since Versaill , 
London, I•lethuen, 1940, Chapters 5 and • , 
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19 
bases for trade treaties between the two nations. The 
Labour Party developed a tradition of friendliness towards 
the Soviet Union, despite tangles with the Third Inter-
18 
national and the British Communist Party. 
It was in this atmosphere the present Labour leaders 
received their indoctrination into international politics, 
constantly reminded of their duties to the international 
I' 
I 
I 
I 
II 
brotherhood of working men, the role of a supra-national I 
I 
authority to keep the peace, and the futility of arms. They I 
participated in action to block intervention by Allied 
Armies in Russia and went as delegates to conferences and 
to the League,headquarters at Geneva. Always they were 
inspired by the ideal of "The World Co-operative Common-
19 
wealth." 
Yet, according to a recent socialist explanation of 
this state of affairs, British Labour from 1919 to 1939 
" ••• instead of evolving a foreign policy 
through which the real conditions of peace could 
have been enforced, dropped back into what was 
in fact, either a liberal or pacifist attitude.u20 
Even when the Labour Governments were most successful 
in their cause for peace, they were "behaving as represen-
tatives of a capitalist country, not one in which they 
were building Socialism", because they did not follow 
I 
I 
II 
II 
through on the Socialist doctrine of the economic causes ofl 
,I 18. Ibid~ pp. 141-14~. 
of this i/ 
- il 
19. see-Appendix II for a typical foreign policy 
period, drawn up by Arthur Henderson. 
==_&_O._F:_?-bian Society~ Labour ~_Europe, p. 4. ======*''-=-==c~==~ 
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war, which should not mean merely individual pacifism or i! 
supporting the League of Nations as it was then consituted./j 
"Whatever its leaders said in theory, in 
practice Labour followed one or two courses: 
either it attacked the Tories for not standing 
by the League of Nati~ns, or it simply con-
demned war as suah. 11 2 
Leftists of today find that Labour failed to create 
a positive policy aimed at attacking the real causes of 
1: 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
li 
II 
They point out !,'I 
that British Labour did not conclude from its own doctrine 
I· 
,I 
war and building a "new internationalism." 
that "if the causes of war were not removed, war would 
come; it never really believed that war was an inevitable 
result of the capitalist system." Rather, British Social-
ists relied, as the Liberals had always implicitly done, 
upon the Conservatives for maintaining British strength, 
"so that they could have the easy job of criticising the 
22 
abuse of power when it became too obvious.u 
With the rise of Fascism in the early 1930's the 
traditional Left attitude of pacifism and negative criticis 
was shaken. It had been tacitly believed that the Right 
would defend British interests because class interests 
required the maintenance of imperialism. But Fascism 
led to a realignment of forces in the Right so that when 
,I 
II 
il 
II.  
1/ 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
faced with the choice between class or national interests, I 
it would choose class--or so it appeared to the Socialists, II 
I I as exemplified in the case of the Spanish Civil War, when 11 
'· 21. Ibid, p.5. ~~ 
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21 II 
II 
th ~ e Right appeased aggression rather than allow expression · 
to popular movements. This caused a reversal of the tradi-
11
i 
tional roles of the Right and Left in foreign policy. The 
1 Labour Party advocated war, attacking not the abuse of, but 1
1 23 1· 
the lack of British power. Clement Attlee replaced George! 
24 
Lansbury, the pacifist, as leader of the Party. 
While this interpretation of British foreign policy 
is subject to controversy, it may be accepted here as an 
example of the way in which the Left today sees its 
earlier history--regardless of rationalizations. Despite 
the fact that Socialist actions in the inter-war period are 
deplored, Labour's Left still believes essentially in the 
ideals professed by its former leaders, and in the light 1 
of this urges a somewhat mystical "Socialist foreign policytt 1: 
I 
of its own. 
The Left Groups 
In its attempt to define the outlines of a socialist 
foreign policy for Great Britain, the Fabian International 
Committee found various, even opposed, opinions over major 
principles in the Labour Party and the Fabian Society. 
Harold Laski, late chairman of the Fabian Society, wrote, 
"After long discussions, it became clear that no single 
25 
approach was universally acceptable ... Leonard Woolf, the 
- I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I! ::.1:::. of the Committee. then undertook the task of 
Ji 24. Cole, .2£• cit, pD. 307-8. 
i: 25. From Introduction, Foreign Policy, by Woolf, p. 3. 
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22 
setting out the various points of view, plus stating a 
policy of his own,which he published in a pamphlet, Forei 
26 
Policx: !h~ Labour Partx'~ Dilemma. From the discussion 
he delineated three major groups of contenders: those who 
wanted policy to be based on an orientation towards the 
I 
United States of America; those who wanted socialist action'' 
in international affairs to be oriented towards the Soviet / 
Union; and those who sought a middle or independent path. 1 
Woolf named the three groups the "American Camp", the 
11 Russian Camp," and the "Independent British Camp~, res-
27 
pectively. This method of dividing opinion is the most 
/, 
li 
'/ I 
I 
nearly accurate. While there are various shades and extrem s 
I 
of opinion within each grouping, this classification cuts I 
across other lines or categories, i.e., political affilia-1 
tion, occupation, or membership in particular societies. I 
Un1te~:t::::i;:: ::::l::::::t::a::::~r :::::1::saw:::_thel I 
torical basis for such a propensity, since Britain has 
always had close ties with the U. S. A. which were increase 
and strengthened during World War II. 
"Our commitments--to say nothing of the 
imponderable influence of history, institutions, 
and language--mean that we start already with 
one foot in the American camp, while the other, 
wherever it may be, is cer~§inly not in the 
camp of Communist Russia.n 
I 26. Woolf, L., Foreie;n Policy: The Labour Party'~ Dilemma, 11 Fabian Publ. and Gollancz, London, November, 1947. 
27. These terms will be used henceforth, since they are 
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Both the British and Americans have similar political i 
I 
objectives and ideals, for which they fought two world il 
wars. In the final analysis parliamentary democracy and 
civil liberties are social values which put America and 
:::::1:o0:e:::r:~:v:~::a::::~ t::m:0::::a:::::kj::: :::l- '1 
American Camp more because of their dislike and fear of 
I 
communism than their love of capitalism or America, however~ 
Since foreign policy does not operate in a vacuum, :I 
but is partially a reaction to the policy of other govern- jl 
menta, the people in this camp conclude that in the light 
of Soviet action being consistently hostile to Britain in 
the United Nations and Conferences of Foreign Ministers, 
the British Government is forced to co-operate with the 
u. s. A. The economic factor in Anglo-~erican relations 
is of great importance and the people in the American 
Camp argue that Great Britain should make the required 
political concessions on certain points in order to receive 
much needed financial aid, food, raw materials, and manu-
factured goods. 
This view is in many respects close to the official 
Government foreign policy and is not 
considered to be on the Left by a number of Socialists--
although many have supported this camp since the end of 
the wsr. Woolf regards this as a Tory policy primarily, 
28. Woolf, Foreign Policy, p.lO. 
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11 
••• its most out and out supporters are to 
be found in the ranks of the Tories and of 
those who, before the war, su~ported Chamberlain's 
policy of appeasing Hitler. 11 29 
With due respect to Mr. Woolf's opinion, it does seem 
that there has been a considerable respect and admiration 
of the United States among Socialists for some time. 
Woodrow Wilson's ideals corresponded to theirs in the 
I 
I 
II 
II 
,, 
II I 
international sphere. They applauded social measures 
30 
duced by Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. 
i 
I intro-
1 
I 
brought closer contact and ties between 
World War II 
1 the two peoples. 
The course of events in the post-war world has convinced 
more people to join this camp--and to draw closer to the 
national policy of the Government. 
The Russian Camp offers a second alternative--that 
Britain should side with the Soviet Union in the U. S. s. R 
I 
u. s. A. conflict, either by active co-operation or in open I 
I alliance. In its extreme form this is advocated by com-
munists, crypto-communists, and fellow-travellers, who feel 
that whatever Soviet policy is, it is right, while England I 
I 
and America are wrong. However, moderates within this I 
group do not recommend an alliance or co-operation with 11 
Russia to the extent of creating hostility towards the U. Sl 
Nevertheless, they do believe that a socialist Britain has I 
I 
more to lose by binding itself politically and economically I 
I 
II 
I 
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, with capitalist America. '1 
II According to this · group, British policy shoul.d be based II 
1
1 
on the United Nations Charter, the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, and I 
li II the French-Soviet Treaty. It should aim for the formation 
within the United Nations of 
11 
••• a European Regional Agreement for political 
and economic co-operation between a West 
European Group, led by Britain and France, 
and an East European Group assQciated with 
and led by the Soviet Union.n3~ 
I. 
II 
II 
I' 
Under such an arrangement these people believe that Europe I 
could then be rehabilitated along socialist lines, in col- I 
I 
laboration with communists all over Europe. When Russia 
II 
II 
I' 
II 
I' 
and communists see that Britain is friendly towards them, 
permanent agreements about the Middle East and the U. N. 
veto would be forthcoming. 
This plan is not considered feasible by most British 
socialists because of the many practical difficulties. 
Among important objections to this program is the fact thati 
I 
Soviet Russia is ruthless in subordinating all of the state 
Britain will be excepted. I 
in alliance with it--and there is no reason to believe 
The Soviets are realistic in 
the power politics sense. Also, in the economic sense, if I 
Britain had to be dependent on the U. S. S. R., she would 
be subject to even greater subordination to Russian policy 
than that required by the United States. 
31. Woolf, Foreign Policy, p. 13. 
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.I 
j/ The Russian Camp has its roots in the sympathetic 
1,1 n response by British socialists to the Russian Revolution of 
I! 
'I November, 1917, when there was a spontaneous enthusiasm for 
I 
the triumph of a socialist democracy. Labourites in Parli 
ment and in the press denounced intervention by Allied Armi 
in Russia. Dockworkers, led by Ernest Bevin, went on s 
32 
and refused to load ships with arms for intervention• 
Among the first measures taken by the Labour Governmen~l 
of 1924 was the extension of full diplomatic recognition to 
the Government of the Soviet Union, which opened the way to 
closer relations between the two countries. Out afthe Angl 
Russian Conference in the summer of 1924 emerged two draft 
treaties providing for settlement of outstanding difference 
between the two nations, designed to facilitate the grant 
of a British loan to the U. S. S. R. It was this last pro-
posal that resulted in the fall of the Labour Government, 
since both the Liberals and the Conservatives opposed it. 
An anti-Bolshevik scare was raised in the press, claiming 
33 
that the Labour Party was subject to orders from Moscow. 
The second Labour Government ~esumed diplomatic rela-
tiona with Soviet Russia, which had been broken off in 1927 
by the Conservatives because of the discovery of propaganda 
material at Arcos, the official Soviet trading organization 
in London. After 1929 Anglo-Russian relations were normal 
32. Cole, £E• ~.p.lo4; Evans, T., Bevin of Britain, pp. 
33. Tracey, £E• cit~pp. 135-7; Carr, £E• cit., p. 11. 
5. 
Actually, it was a change in the nature of Russian 
policy which made this possible, for with the expulsion of 
Trotsky and the world revolutionist~ the Soviet Government 
reverted from a policy of defense of working-class interest I 
to Russian national interests. The Nazi revolution was res11 
ponsible for the Soviet change from revisionism to support 
of the status quo, whereby Russia joined the League of Nati s 
and the Comintern launched a campaign for co-operation be-
tween the Communists and other Left parties in an "a.nti-
35 
Fascist front." The Labour Party was won over to this 
program of co-operation in foreign policy because of its 
traditional friendship for Soviet Russia and because of 
i 
II II 
I 
I 
I 
Fascist hostility to organized labor. Thus, Labour was amo~ 
those urging collaboration with Russia in resisting Germany j 
I 
and Italy. It was a shock to many socialists in 1939 to het 
of the Treaty between Germany and Russia. The attack on I 
Finland was puzzling. However, the socialists welcomed the Jl 
u. s. s. R. as an ally in 1941 and looked forward to con- I 
I 
tinued co-operation after the war. 
The Labour Party was unable to accept the precepts of 
Communism internally and has continually sought to exclude I 
Communists from its ranks. Since the Communists were sub-
ject to orders by the Comintern, they could not accept as 
}4. Cole,££· cit., pp. 196-7, Chap. 9; Carr,££. 
35. Carr, .2l2• cit., np. 143-7; Cole, .QE. cit., pp. 
cit., p.l
1 
• 
347-60. 1 
I 
l 
I 
i 
I 
.l 
II 
I' i 
I 
i 
'"'---=·- -- -- 1!--C c --C---'-'--C .. -----~-C-. ~-- c.-.C.~---=----=~~--=----· -· -----'~-~==-~~=~=-==c.:-~------- ---- 41=== 
28 
I 
i 
ii 
I! 
i) 
I 
final authority the majority vote by the Annual Conference.
1
l 
Communists believed the method of constitutional action to j 
be mistaken and accepted the thesis of an ideological 
aristocracy so ~t they could not become whole-hearted 
members of the Labour Party. The United Front proposals 
unity while the fundamental differences of aim existed--
36 
democracy vs. totalitarianism. 
Further evidence of Labour 1 s rejection of Communism 
may be seen in the "battle of the Internationals." 
forming the Third or Communist International. This was 
countered by the Two and a Half which declared in favor of 
Western Social Democracy. The Third International laid 
down uncompromising conditions for membership which the 
British Labour Party found intolerable. Despite efforts 
I 
I 
I 
I 
at friendly commercial and diplomatic relations with 
the Labour Party showed 
Russia! 
11
:._ • .an aversion to any course that would 
endanger its ideals of liberty and democracy 
for the sake of an alliance with those who 
uphold the necessity of violence and the prin-
ciples of dictatorship."37 
But the primary response of admiration for socialist con-
victions and purposes survived, despite differences as to 
I· 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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II 
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means among all but the most extreme of the British 
Socialists. 
The Independent Camp, fearing the dangers of both abov 
alternatives, favors an independent British policy. There 
are several varieties of independent policy advocated, 
ranging from neutrality or impartiality to isolation and 
withdrawal from the ranks of the Great Powers. In its 
extreme form this policy amounts to a refusal to participat 
in this camp are more moderate and regard such an extreme 
economic position. 
The moderates within this group do believe that securi 
peace should be the primary aim in framing foreign policy 
because "Britain cannot afford to fight in another great 
38 
war." Their second aim is for absolute impartiality in 
-the Soviet-America conflict. By this they do not mean 
neutrality or isolation, but independence from the power 
politics engaged in by those two super-powers. Where 
38. Woolf, Foreign Policy, p. 15. 
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r: British socialist aims coincide with the policies of either I 
II of those two Powers, then Britain will join with that one I 
J\ on a particular issue. For instance, in the cases of Spain' 
Greece, and Persia Britain, in being true to socialist prin 
ciples, should follow a policy which in all probability 
would be welcomed by the Soviet Union and opposed by the 
United States. On the other hand, Britain, under this soc-
ialist foreign policy would seek the internationalization 
of the Dardanelles, which the U. s. A. also seeks, but whic 
the U. S. S. R. might not approve. (But, the internation- I 
I 
i 
alization of both the Suez and Panama Canals is advocated 
in the same plan as a concession to Russia.) 
The origin of the independent group is fairly recent. \ 
Nevertheless, this point of view is the most popular !UJlOng 1: 
Leftists who are articulate on foreign policy. It sprang :I 
I· 
II 
up as an answer to the insecurity brought about by the 
international power situation whereby the former Allies 
II found themselves at cross-purposes a short time after hoe- \ 
tilities ceased. While peace has been an objective of the \ 
Labour Party since its inception, impartiality has not been\ 
I 
in evidence as a primary aim. Actually, this view appears I 
to be a revulsion against new weapons of warfare, atomic 
bombs, and a resentment against the economic straights 
facing England as a result of World War II. England has 
I 
I 
I 
!I il 
!I 
'I !I 
long been a leader among nations and it is hard for her to II 
assimilate her new role. The intellectual socialists =l=""==-=-'" 
II 
II 
'I 
I 
realize the extent to which British power has been damaged 
and wish upon her leadership of a new type. They urge that I 
I 
since England is second-rate in power, she must now lead 
I 
the way towards social democracy in Europe and in the world 
! 
In this interest they urge an independent policy to attract !1 
a following among smaller nations. 
c. Conclusion 
Labour's foreign policy before the first World War 
was the result of two traditions--the Liberal Party's I 
foreign policy, and the precepts of international socialism 
During the war several Labour points of view developed: 
the official Party attitude of co-operating with the Liu~~-~~ 
and Coalition Governments; the I. L. P. view of pacifism 
and work-for-peace-through-Socialism; and the median Fabian 
course of helping with the war effort, while doing all pos- I 
sible to obtain a just peace. By 1918 the Labour Party had 
evolved several aims and principles for a socialist foreign 
policy, including, peace, democracy, justice; collective 
security, limitation of armaments, and international 
government. 
In the ensuing period Labour Governments attempted to 
follow through on these high ideals. They also developed 
friendship with the Soviet Union. The rise of Fascism in 
the 1930's resulted in a change of policy from pacifism to 
a demand for war on the enemies of freedom and of labor. 
ll 
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Several divergent views on socialist foreign policy 
have come to light since the end of World War II. Each 
tries to evaluate what British policy should be in the 
light of a new international situation dominated by the I 
j, 
conflict between the two major World Powers. Sympathizers ·! for orientation of foreign policy toward the United States ,I 
emphasize the similarities in democratic institutions betwe~n 
the two nations, and their economic and strategic inter- l1 
::::::e::::n ::::et::: :::::l:a:o~:::a::r:::e:o::w::d~:: I 
by co-operation with a Government that has made great strid s 
in the objective of socialism than with capitalist America. il 
,I 
A third group wishes to retain independence of action from il 
ii 
subordination of policy to either Power. It would side witl 
I• 
the one it believes right in individual cases and would 
reserve for England leadership of the smaller nations 
toward the goal of social democracy. 
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THREE LEFT WING VIEWS ON FIVE PROBLE¥£ OF 
FOREIGN POLICY: THE INTERNATIONAL 
SITUATION, ''lESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, 
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, THE C01fMON-
WEALTH, AND UNITED STATES RELATIONS 
Each of the three groups outlined in Chapter II 
approaches the basis of a socialist foreign policy from 
a different quarter. In order to illustrate these views 
to best advantage five important and relevant problems of 
British foreign policy will now be reviewed in accordance 
with solutions offered by members of the various camps. 
These points are the international situation in general~ 
the unity of Western Europe, ~conomic difficulties facing 
England, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the 
relationship between the United Kingdom and the United 
States. 
A. The American Camp 
The American Camp accepts a U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. conflict 
as unavoidable and, viewing all that the United States and 
Britain have in common as opposed to Soviet Communism, it 
considers therefore of paramount importance that British 
li 
I! 
t: 
ll 
With il 
i! 
foreign policy be oriented toward the United States. 
the increase of Communist imperialism the number of Labour I! 
l 
I people joining this group has grown. This group appears 
to be close to Official policy on many points--and in fact, 
some writers in this camp sound like apologists for the 
Foreign Office. 
i' 
II i 
ii 
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The views of W .N. Ewer are typical of the ._merican 1: 
il 
in that his analyses lead to the decision that Britain li 
1: 
Camp 
should orient foreign policy in the direction of the 
United States. As the Diplomatic Correspondent of the 
Daily Herald, organ of the Labour Party, he is thoroughly 
familiar with international affairs, and as a member of 
the Labour Party's Advisory Committee on International 
Questions, he also knows well the considerations which 
affect Labour's deliberations on socialist foreign policy. 
In addition, Mr. Ewer is a member of the Advisory Committee 
1 
of the Fabian International Bureau and thus connected with 
li , 
the Left Wing by this association and by his contributions /i 
H 
to The Political Quarterly. In fact, he was chosen to jl 
II 
ii explain the American Camp's point of view in the pamphlet 1: 
li 
Foreign Polic;y:, The Labour Party'!! Dilemma, sponsored by I! 
I! 
the Fabian Society. !i 
2 I' 
Mr. Ewer sees Britain's international problema resulti~ 
II from Russian expansionist tendencies. The cold war is not li 
li 
simply a Soviet-American wrangle. One objective of British \1 
I' 
foreign policy for over one hundred years has been to oppos11 
Russian expansion--and actually resistance is an old Britis1 
policy which the United States has decided to support. Jl 
II Russian propaganda was first directed against the British, 11 
li 
-I 
for the Soviets saw the conflict as an Anglo-Russian affair~~ 
,: 
I 
1. Woolf, L. Foreign Policy, back of cover. 
2. Ibid, pp. 27 to 34. 
i; 
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li I! and was turned on the United States when the Russians saw 
l\ 
that Americans were no longer isolationists. Mr. Ewer says ii d j: 
\I 
the desire of some Leftists that Britain be independent from !I 
America is an escapism. It is absurd to think that Britain 
can be neutral. In case of a war, a British zone would not 
be side-stepped. Thus, he would direct policy toward the 
prevention of a Russian war. So far, Russia has been ag-
i; 
gressive, using World War II in order to reabsorb the Czarist!i 
Empire. Under the dictum that the governments of border 
states should be friendly to the U. s. S. R., acts have been 
committed which run counter to British ideals. There could 
be no end to the need for "loyal" states--a situation dan-
gerous to the security of all countries. 
There seem to be two explanations for Soviet motives 
which are not mutually exclusive. (1) The Russians are 
naturally expansionist and therefore aggressive, which could 
be explained by either an ideological desire to spread Com-
munism, or a Pan-Slav movement, or outright imperialism, due 
to czarist traditions and strategic-economic considerations 
for "warm water" outlets and oil. l: (2) Soviet acquisitiveness!! 
il 
is actually strategic and defensive because of the fear of 1l 
I! 
aggression by the West. 
Therein lies a hazardous dilemma, since the only 
!: I li 
li 
j ~ 
1! 
li 
alternatives between which Britain must choose are appeasement 
- I; 
,. 
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* 
away from expansionism and towards peaceable collaboration. 
A break with the United States would give Russia a free hand.!! 
ii 
I' 
Consequently, it should be made clear that until the Securit~i 
!I )! Council is effective, any aggression will be met by Anglo- 1' 
American opposition, in a close, defensive, association 
between the United States and England. Since this policy 
requires balancing and adjusting constantly, depending on 
the strength of Soviet aggression or collaboration, flexi-
bility of foreign policy is essential. 
Mr. Ewer sees a clear pattern of British foreign 
First it was conditioned by the desire and belief that 
i' policy:!l 
" I' 
there ii 
could be a community of policy between Russia and the Wester~ 
Allies. Then came a partial dis .. J.llusionment when British i! ,, 
I! 
socialism saw Russia doing in Eastern Europe things it could!: 
approve of partly in aims, but not at all in method. Since il ,. ,. 
,, 
II 
it was impossible either to condone or oppose these deeds, ii 
ll 
With the realizatio~ 
!i 
the outcome was an ineffective protest. 
that the system in the East was dynamic in quality, not stat~c, 
'I I, 
and was attempting under the double urge of Communist evan- i: 
gelism and Russian imperialism to overthrow the 11 capitalist !i 
I' 
li 
regimes" of the West, it became British policy to try to 11 
,, 
,, 
unite and organize Western Europe, with American support. I! 
II 
The policy of calling in the New World to redress the il 
balance of the Old World was dictated by events. 
To begin with in 1945 the Labour Government's foreign 
policy was shaped by the facts of the war. At that time 
- -+c-_ --c=cc-,=~~---- _ 
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r: . 
the first objective of British policy was to strengthen and 
develop the United Nations. However, it became apparent 
that there was no relation to reality in such a policy be-
cause it was based on the axiom that there was real unity 
of purpose between Russia and the Western Powers. The West 
had looked to a restoration of democracy, but Russia to a 
continuation of the revolution. The conflict began in 
Eastern Europe, the area in which Russia was supreme. While 
changes were due to come there, the Soviet Union saw that 
they were accomplished in accordance with its wishes under 
the dual purpose of spreading Communism and extending 
Russian influence. In addition, Western influences were 
removed. 
It was a Soviet military conviction that security could 
be achieved by extending the territory of the country. Pos-
sibly if Russian purpose had been realized while Western 
forces were still mobilized, Western opposition would have 
been possible~ but it is unlikely that such a policy would 
receive popular support. The other alternative of agreeing 11 
with the Russians as to a new basis of spheres of influence, !i 
which the Soviet leaders apparently had thought were already\! II 
agreed on tacitly at Yalta and other conferences, also would li 
have lacked support. Public opinion was not aroused until 11 
,; 
the "rape of Czechoslovakia", when it was too late to do f' 
,, 
lj 
anything about the faits accomplis. By this time the Russia~s 
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38 
reject the offer of :Marshall Aid to them "by Zhdanov 1 s 
proclamation at the founding of the Comintern that the old 
doctrine of the division of the world into two hostile camps 
3 
was again a fundamental article of Bolshevik faith." 
The turning point was reached during Molotov's visit to 
Paris to talk over the Marshall Plan with Bevin and Bidault, 
the last attempt at Four-Power Unity. British policy, which 
had been hesitant for two years, became positive and took 
on the purpose of linking a United West with America. Four-
1 
Power united rule in Germany never took place. Russia im-
mediately started ruling Eastern Germany as a part of the 
U. S. S. R. After the failure of the London Conference of 
Foreign Ministers in December, 1947, the Allies took steps 
toward organizing Western Germany as a separate unit. 
With the above discussion of the international situati 
I
I' 
1 
serving as a background, we may proceed to a surveillance 
I 
11 of the American Camp's foreign policy, or rather the points 
ll 
11 of the Government's program it approve~ and alternative 
II 
11 programs, offered. The reasoning of this group is keynoted 
[' 
:1 by its analysis of Russian motives, as well as by positive 
'II British needs in the economic sphere. While the internati 
il II situation is a broad term, it is highlighted by the apparent 
~ I division of the world into two blocs. In 1945 a division 
w I 
li of Labour's Left Wing such as has been described in Chapter 
I
I! II regardins foreie;n affairs would have seemed unlikely, 
3. Ewer, W.N., "The Labour Party's Record in Foreign Policy" 
11 y, Vol. 20, No. 2, April-June 1949, p. 7. -=~~---.·c~c~·-=~-=-~=·11'~·-'='c~·===~~~'-=~~~~~-~~::.~~~~=~~~==~~~=~~~~~-=====~ 
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for all elements of the Labour Party looked forward to co-
operation among the Allies and the Soviet Union. 
Yet, action by the United Nations, especially in the 
case of a Big Three disagreement was severely limited by 
the Russian misuse of the veto. The Russians ended the 
war "dizzy with success", but haunted by a traditional in-
security which led to the utilization of international 
institutions in order to secure national advantage, as in 
1945 exploiting America's reluctance to accept foreign com-
mitments to expand their defences. However, Soviet expan-
sion in Europe and the Middle East meant a contradiction to 
British security. Putting aside ideological reasons for a 
war between Communism and democratic socialism for simple 
power considerations, it would seem that Russia did not re-
gard England as a potential ally in a war with America 
because of Britain's dependence on American sea power and 
economic help, and believed the Empire was crumbling so that 
those resources could not be relied upon. As a result there 
were propaganda attacks upon the English both in the United 
Nations, where even favorable decisions were prevented from 
4 
being recorded, and by the Comintern elsewhere. 
Thus, the American Camp lends support to the Government 
~ I policies of developing the unity of the West, both in Europe 
- I 
1j and with the United States, and of using the machinery of 
i' 
I[ the United Nations to promote peace and unity whenever le. 
-~~~-~=~-Ji~C- ,~~-· -~g~r~!~JUJ~~;#o£¥ci~eL~r&~~! _§x~er~retatio~---~-~--! =--=~==,=== 
The Government received from this group some of its most 
enthusiastic support for such moves as the Dunkirk Treaty, 
the Brussels Pact, the Organization for European Economic 
Recovery, Western Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty. 
The affinity of Great Britain with Western Europe was 
stressed by pointing to the similarities in culture, the 
long history of Western Civilization, the common heritage 
of democracy, and the desperate need for peace and recon-
struction. There was a widespread realization that Western 
Europe and Britain had become inseparable economically as 
it had never been before. The West feared being swallowed 
up in the Russian bloc, not so much from actual aggression 
as from an economic collapse i'lhich might give Communism a 
foothold. Since Russia would not respect good-will, which 
British Labour offered after the War, but did respect force, 
the next course was to strengthen defenses. The unity of 
Europe was given expression in the field of defense and 
security against militant communism by the Brussels Pact of 
March 17, 1948 between the United K.ingdom, France, and the 
Benelux countries. Further security was sought by turning 
to America for military aid and equipment and culminated in 
5 
the North Atlantic Treaty. 
One of the chief reasons for which the American Camp 
supports such a defense policy is ideological. Britain, the 
II 
II United States, and many nations in Western Europe have evolv 
I 5. Ibid, passim; Labour Party, Feet .2E the Ground, London, 
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similar ideals around the basis of parliamentary democracy 
and the civil liberties--which are in effect challenged by 
the doctrines of communism and the practices of Soviet Russi • 
The attitude of this group is to stress the positive politic 
freedoms which these countries have in common, placing more 
emphasis on the democratic part of social democracy. With-
out cherished freedoms inherited from long traditions and 
struggles there would be little left but a "leaden uniformit • 11 
From all indications the Soviet Union does everything possib e 
to uproot Western institutions uncompromisingly. 
In the final analysis, economics underly the urgency of 
Western Union, for Britain cannot escape from any economic 
collapse of the area. Besides, an attempt at European econo 
cooperation was a condition of Marshall Plan aid so that 
Great Britain had to sponsor the 0. E. E. c. (not unwillingl ). 
The Continent is also one of Britain's best markets and 
customers. 
However, economic unity and cooperation cannot be 
achieved overnight. For a Socialist Britain it is difficult 
to work very closely with capitalist countries which are not 
committed to full employment and the nationalization of 
industries for the benefit of the people. In addition,Labo 
ites wish to supply inspiration to Continental social demo-
crats. Further, the British always have in mind other res-
ponsibilities of a World Power and a center of the Common-
wealth and Empire. Therefore, the American Camp urges co-
II il 
--- _:,__:_ ....:._ ;___=-__ ::=..:::: .. : .... ::::.::::;_ ::.... .... ....:...-__ _ 
operation on a functional level, as in the case of the 
European Customs Union, but prefers to wait when it is a 
matter of complete reorganization on supra-national lines 
(the Schumann Plan). 
The heart of the reason for which this group desires an 
orientation of British foreign policy towards the u. s. A. 
lies in the economic relations of the two countries. Bri 
is the debtor and has to adjust to the comparatively new 
relationship. Further, as a result of the war, she is de-
pendent upon America for food, raw materials, machine tools, 
and finished products. This dependence was revealed in the 
economic crises which led to withdrawal into the sterling 
area, a drive to increase production for export to dollar 
areas, and devaluation of the pound sterling. While people 
in the other two camps will admit the need for turning to 
United States for aid in reconstruction, for trade and money 
they feel that the price demanded by powerful groups in the 
United States is too great. The American Camp, nevertheless 
believes that the need for economic help is so urgent that 
there is not a need to be too particular about terms. 
British economic weakness in itself could be a cause of 
political consequences. In order to hold her balance and 
retain her position as the center of the sterling area Bri 
had to find help--which could come only from 
If it were necessary to align with the U. s. in political 
s. 
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questions in order to obtain economic help, then that would 
have to be done. 
other 
There are two main difficulties which/socialists find 
in such an orientation of policy, however, For one thing, 
a country attempting to transform "the obsolete capitalistic 
organisation of British economy into an efficient socialist 
economy" might find it embarrassing to be "bound to, or 
dominated by, the powerful and militant capitalism of the 
6 
U. S. A." The Labour Government has a different approach 
to domestic economic problems from that used in the United 
States, which is frankly capitalistic and prefers free-
enterprise with a minimum of control by the government. In 
England such an approach is regarded as reactionary. Even 
the Conservatives would not undo now most of what the Labour 
Government has done towards socialization and they actually 
effected certain of these measures when they were in office. 
Although mistakes were made in planning recovery, there 
has been a general approval of the pragmatic approach to the 
problem of social well-being while retaining essential 
liberties. Some measures, such as coal allocation, food 
rationing, and price control, were of an emergency nature. 
Nationalization of the Bank of England, coal, power, and 
transportation were generally accepted as necessary. The 
diversion of the Government's attention to social legislatio 
6. Woolf, Foreign Policy, p. 12. 
7. Cassels, John M.,ll, 1 ')'Anglo-American EconQmic Relatitohns".,~. int 
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has been repaid through the cooperation and support of the 
trade unions and the nation as a whole. Only one hour per 
worker per year has been lost in industrial disputes, as 
compared with one day per worker per year in the United Stat 
Industrial peace has been of inestimable value to the coun 
The Government's policy of a planned economy for full 
employment is highly favored in England and the people pro-
bably will not tolerate any interference with it. While 
Americans criticize aspects of British plans for socialism, 
there seems to be little substantiation to claims of Ameri 
domination on the sphere of local problems. At the least, 
tying up with the American economy does not mean being 
swallowed up as it would under similar conditions with the 
9 
Soviet economy. 
The other difficulty seen is the use of economic help 
by the United States for political reasons, specifically to 
prevent Russian or Communist control of the smaller nations, 
which entails for Britain a commitment to the American side 
of the conflict between the two super-powers. In other 
there is a fear that economic domination will 
American domination in other spheres, taking from England 
lQ. 
power to act as a free agent in international relations. 
However, this problem is not acute to people in the American 
II Camp for cultural reasons (as outlined above) for they have 
• 
8 
il·,l 8. Cassels, .QE. Cit., p. 73. 
9. Crossman.l R. H., "Foreign Affairs and Home Prosperity", 
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already accepted the American, democratic side as preferable 
to totalitarian socialism. Furthermore, there is a wide 
latitude of freedom allowed by the United States in many 
instances. There is disagreement in such cases as the World 
Food Organization, Palestine, and the Japanese mandated is s. 
The Commonwealth and Empire are one of the most cheri 
inheritances of the British people, Socialists, while they 
realize that portions were obtained by nefarious means, ac-
cept the Empire as a reality, a responsibility, and an asset 
Moreover, it must be remembered that the Empire always 
figures in the minds of Englishmen in an evaluation of int 
national situations as an important factor. England's 
geography and physical resources alone require that this be 
so, for stripped of the added strength, resources, and 
strategic value of the Commonwealth and Empire she would be 
very small indeed. 
The socialists have developed far-reaching plans for 
purpose of raising the status of dependent peoples within 
the Empire in the hope of furthering the ideal of the Common 
wealth, in which England is first among equals. The problem 
is to accomplish this without alienating the various nation-
alities from the United Kingdom, and at the same time seeing 
that they emerge as social democracies in an atmosphere of 
freedom--as opposed to either communism or native ruling-
class capitalism. In pursuit of this aim the Labour Govern-
ment saw to it that the protectorate over Egypt and the 
'I 
I 
I 
I-
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
mandate over Iraq were relinquished, while India, Burma, and 
Ceylon were "trained 11 for self-government. Although there 
was hesitation about withdrawal, this was not due to "im-
perialist" reasons, but to a fear that leaving too fast 
might mean civil war and anarchy. 
In this case also the American Camp tends to support 
Government action. W. N. Ewer states that the Government's 
decision to withdraw from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon was 
justified. However, in Palestine withdrawal was more of a 
failure since the gap between the Arab and Jewish groups 
was very great. While he feels that it is easy to criticize 
the Government's handling of tb.1s .. s1tuation; in 1jh.e end it 
was a wise one, for the problem was international in nature 
and belonged with the United Nations, from whence the Britis 
11 
right to be in the area derived. 
It seems that either these areas must remain under per-
manent foreign administration, or be transferred to native 
rule. This is a part of the whole problem of transferring 
colonial areas from European rule and control, while at the 
same time ensuring security, stability, internal freedom, an 
economic prosperity. The main responsibility for the succes 
of this virtual revolution lies with the Eastern peoples 
themselves, but the responsibility for transferring the 
reins of government is the task of the former rulers. The 
i 
11 darkest spot appeared to Mr. Ewer to be in the Southeastern 
II 11. Ewer, ~. Cit., 
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part of Asia where a pattern similar to that in Eastern 
I 
II 
I 
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II 
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Europe could be foreseen, inspired by the dual motives of 
Communism and Russian nationalism. He feels that the British 
Government, seeking stability and peaceful evolution, has 
12 
everywhere come into conflict with violence and dynamism. 
However, the Empire and Commonwealth mean more to the 
American Camp than a proving ground for gradual socialism and 
democracy. They are also a source of strength for the United 
Kingdom in international situations and make Britain a world 
power. Therefore, the Empire should be held until such time 
as the dependent areas are strong enough to join in the free 
association of the Commonwealth. This in turn means that 
British defenses extend over a wide area throughout the Far 
East, the Middle East, and Africa and require huge expenditur 
for military purposes. With the British economy as strained 
as it is such action becomes a difficult feat and requires 
much balancing of the budget so as not to detract from social 
legislation and other projects at home. In addition there is 
the aspect of the U.S.A.--u.s.s.R. struggle reflected in 
colonial problems which serves to complicate the matter of 
strategic defense forces and of the democratic evolution of 
backward peoples. 
... I In general, members of the American Camp point out that 
fl Britain is in a serious economic state which can be aided 
'II greatly by receiving goods and money from the United States. 
1
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In order to do this there will be certain political points 
with which Britain will have to comply according to 
of ruling groups in America. While these concessions may me 
hardship in one sense or another, the need is so urgent 
such expedients must be followed. For instance, in the 
of the Loan Agreement of December, 1945, Britain was c 
to sign the Bretton Woods Agreement, agree to "freer" trade, 
and to "nondiscrimination" against the United States--all of 
which are interpreted by Socialists as very harsh terms sine 
they severely limit the United Kingdom and place her at a 
13 
disadvantage in the competition for world markets. 
While the United States favors a policy of freedom of 
trade, the British would prefer at this point to have inter-
national economic controls. In the case of international 
navigation, Britain favored controls, but the United States 
could not agree to them. Hence there was no agreement at 
14 
the Ohioa.go Air Conference. But, as one Government Offic 
said in reply to a criticism of American restrictions, the 
agreements are always freely arrived at. Britain always has 
the alternative of not accepting. Incidentally, such 
would not be likely if it were the Russians doing the giving. 
Furthermore,it is probable that British policy toward t 
United States would be cordial regardless of which Party was 
in power, for the English people have many ideals in common 
Univers y, 
I 
I ~~th t:e~e:i:"ans, such as "the democratic way of life"--
the sanctity of the individual, a democratic form of govern-
ment, civil liberties, and so on. The two nations posses 
unity of purpose on fundamentals, and proceed to iron out 
differences from that point. The language factor alone is 
very important. One writer points out that using the same 
words does not necessarily constit~ the same language, but 
allowing for differences in idiom, it is generally assumed 
that there is a greater bond for understanding when two dis-
16 
tinct peoples use the same words. At least they become 
'17 
'hot.ao foreign." Thus, since there is a similar background, 
the two nations actually do not find difficulty in working 
together and understanding one another. Especially since 
this common civilization is challenged by Communism, it is 
logical that Britain should join forces with the United Stat 
to meet the challenge. While peace is one of the aims of a 
socialist foreign policy, the American Camp feels that this 
does not preclude security, independence, and prosperity, 
which might best be achieved by acting in close cooperation 
with the U.S.A. 
B. The Russian Camp 
I As viewed by the Russian Camp, the international sit-
~ 11 uation is such that a British socialist foreign policy 
I be oriented toward the Soviet Union. There are various 
I sector, composed of 
I. Britain'~ Future,Viking 
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communists, crypto-communists, and fellow-travellers, assumes 
that Russian policy is always right, while British and Amer-
ican policies are wrong. The Cominform line is followed in 
all situations. While Communist organizations and those sus-
pected of corr~unist leanings are barred from membership in 
the Labour Party, there are sympathizers in~ide the Party. 
They are called Crypto-communists, Communists in all but name 
and fellow travellers, people who for intellectual reasons 
believe in a form of communism, much as persons of similar 
background do in this country. One writer places K. Zilliacu , 
J. Platte-Mills, and D. N. Pritt, all Members of Parliament, 
in the class of crypto-communists, and G. B. Shaw, W. Lawther 
of the Unions, Schaffer and Raymond, editors, in the class 
18 
of fellow-travellers. 
While the number of people in this group is fairly small 
they exerted much influence over other Labourites, especially 
in the period between 1945 and 1948, when the state of inter-
national affairs was fluid. British socialists, mindful of a 
long-standing friendship with Soviet Communists, expected the 
Soviet Union to react in a friendly manner towards Labour 
Britain. Therefore, they stood for understanding and collabo -
ation between the two types of socialism. In fact, during 
1945 election campaign the idea that only a Labour Britain 
could get along with Russia was often reiterated. 
During the aforementioned period Russian policy was 
enigmatic, but socialist Britain had "everything to gain by 
18. Ellinius "Left-Wi_!!g Labourism in Britain, 11 fulli Views, =---~--=c - .... 'New Nr~, !Jec. 3I, 1:94 f , P. ·=r. · ·· · - - · - ·· 
with Moscow. Although he claims at times to be for an in-
dependent British policy, he finds little comfort in the 
solution sought by the majority of the Party. 
"Unhappily these alternatives (Communism or 
Capitalism) appear so distasteful and alarming to 
most of the Left in the Parliamentary Labour Party 
that they could not bring themselves to choose 
between them, and clung desperately to a third 
alternative, the illusion of a Western Union run 
by Social Democrats and independent of both the 
U.S.A. and the u.s.s.R.--what I call the policy of 
a little grey home in the West for pinks scared 
white by the reds. 11 21 
It is interesting that Mr. Zilliacus, who had worked in 
the League of Nations for many years, and who was, he claimed 
a loyal member of the British Labour Party, should have come 
to the particular conclusions he reached. He was intensely 
interested in international affairs and brought to the House 
of Commons many facts and figures which occasionally proved 
embarrassing to the Government. He claimed the Party leaders 
were unjust in accusing him of follm-ring the Communist line, 
that his actions and speeches were exaggerated by newspaper 
reports. Incidentally, Russian newspapers continually ap-
plauded him and he was well received on several occasions in 
Moscow. Labour Party offici~ls warned him that he was taki 
a view diametrically opposed to the aims of Labour and then 
brought him up for a trial or hearing before the National 
Executive Committee, at which time he was expelled from the 
Party. Mr. Attlee at that time called him as stubborn as the 
21. Zilliacus, K., Why 1 Was Expelled: Bevinism vs. Electio 
Pledges, Socialis% and Peace, London, ColletTS, 1949, p 
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I. L. P. was in insisting there was only one right way. 
(The I. L. P. is now to the left of the Left, and is putting 
its efforts behind a move for the socialist unity of Europe, 
called the United Socialist States of Europe, to which the 
22 
title Soviet could be added just as easily as not.) 
At the Labour Party Conference, Scarbourough, May 20, 
1948, Mr. Zillizcus issued a long manifesto of nine hundred 
23 
words, called the Gateshead amendment, in opposition to 
the official policy. In it he demanded the termination of 
the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and asked 
the Government to insturct Service Departments to frame their 
estimates and make t:J.eir stra.tegic dispositions on the as sump-
tion that Britain need not prepare for self-defense either 
against the United States or Russia and to reduce Britain's 
forces accordingly. .The resolution demanded the immediate 
withdrawal of British troops from Greece and stated that 
Russia should be invited into full partnership in settling 
the affairs of the ~Iiddle East through the United Nations 
including such matters as: international control of oil re-
sources, the Suez Canal and the Dardenelles; international 
economic developrr.ent schemes; and a United Nations police 
force for Palestine based on voluntary recruitment. However, 
on a card vote the Gateshead amendment was defeated by 
24 4,097,000 to 224,000. 
22. I. L. P. Publications: F.A. Ridley & R. Edwards, The Uni~ed 
Socialist States of Europe, 1946; Ridley, Unite or Per~sn., 1947. 
-~t-~;E~;tff1:~:~::r~- or_ the ~nnu~~-- ~~~:~~-~:~~~-~on~:-~~~~, 
The Russian Camp believes in a form of Western Union 
which would be ba,sed on a broad agreement with Russia. This 
group would atten!pt to form 'tri thin the United Nations a 
European Regional agreement for political and economic co-
operation between a Western European Group, led by the United 
Kingdom and France, and an Eastern European Group, associated 
with and led by the Soviet Union. By collaborating with the 
communists in each country in Europe for socialist economic 
reconstruction, Bri tc:tin and France would be able to reach 
political agreen:ents \vhereby they might be able to promote 
the furtherance of democracy and political freedom in Europe 
and create a "solid11 foundation for the solution of other 
problems, such as the Middle East and use of the Veto on the 
Security Council. 
Hovrever, there is a difference of opinion about this for 
of European cooperation among its supporters, as mentioned by 
25 
a Member of Parliament. While Mr. Zilliacus argues for a 
bloc of Western democracies based on arrangements with Russia 
on the basis of Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet Alliances, 
others in the group advocate a bloc without reference to 
Russia. 
To the majority of Socialists in the Labcur Party such a 
course does not seem 11 realistic 11 , for Russia has been operati g 
in the sphere of pure power politics. Both in treatment of 
the Eastern European States and in negotiations with Great 
25. Parl. Deb., 5s., H.C., Vol. 430, c. 552, Mr. Nally. 
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Britain, it has been concerned chiefly with enhancing its ow 
I 
power as opposed to the United States. The Soviet Union has 1\ 
been indiscriminate in forcing all countries aligned with it j 
to subordinate their policy to that of the U.S.S.R. and ther~ 
I 
seems to be little reason for believing that Britain or Franl 
will be given any different treatment. Under these conditioJ 
there would be no way of shaking off Soviet influence. Brit n 
would then be committed to the Russian side of the U.S.A.--
U.s.S.R. conflict, lrhich would be very dangerous in view of 
England's dependence upon imported foodstuffs and raw materi s, 
and American superiority on the seas. 
This objection to joining the Soviet side of the conflic 
is unequivocably amplified in the case of the economic situa-~ 
tion of England. There is no need to recount England's dif-
ficulties on the economic sphere. That she must have help is 
a foregone conclusion. As Mr. Bevin pointed out in his re-
buttal to the Gateshead amendment, even Mr. Zilliacus did 
26 
not oppose the need for Marshall aid. With the United Stat s 
alienated, the only place to turn would be the Soviet Union. 
However, the Soviet Union is engaged not only in repairing it 
war damages, but attempting to revamp the entire economic lif 
of the nation from the beginning. It does not have enough to 
go around so that it would not be able to give away any surpl s. 
other countries what it needs. 
II 1 26. Report of the Annual 1· ~. Conference, 1948, p. 196. 
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What is more, from the attempts made upon the Economic 
Recovery Program, Russian policy obviously has as an aim the 
division of the east from the west, and the weakening of pos 
sible elements of strength inside the west in order to furth 
the precepts of communism and Russian imperialism. Thus, 
there would be little to gain in following such a policy sine 
there are no signs of guaranteeing to Britain any further 
security by trying to cooperate exclusively with the U.S.S.R. 
and tying up with the Soviet economy. 
While there is not much evidence of what the Soviet Cam 
thinks about the British Commonwealth and Empire, it may be 
assumed that the extreme element would approve the Russian 
plan of spreading communism to dependent peoples. They regar 
the old-type British imperialism as a blasephemy which can be 
atoned by leaning towards "freedom" or Soviet imperialism. 
Mr. Zilliacus in the Gateshead amendment calls for "inter-
national economic development schemes", but remains vague 
beyond this. He probably would approve of some sort of Unite 
Nations trusteeship of bacb;ard areas. However, wha.t it 
mean to Britain to suddenly lose so important an element in 
its economy as the Commonwealth and Empire does not seem to 
bother these people. 
As for the United States, it is the arch-enemy of the 
people, the prototype of backward economic life, and an 
Imperialist Power. Mr. Pritt pointed out that Britain was 
continually abused in the American press, while in Russian 
--- --------· 
newspapers he did not find this abuse, but an honest 
Z7 
criticism of British politics. (He was questioned as to 
freedom of the press in the Soviet Union, however,) ~~. 
felt that the United States was interfering unduly with the 
British economy through strings attached to Marshall Plan aid 
28 
and brought up this point frequently in Parliament. Mr. 
Driberg, another member of this group, pointed out that all 
the common people in America want a war and are struck with 
"a wave of war hysteria." In the same breath he added that 
while the Americans scream for free elections in Eastern 
Europe, they have an "almost complete disfranchisement of the 
29 
negro in the Southern States. 11 The extent to which the 
feeling against the United States is directed depends upon 
whether the person believes in the inevitability of a confli 
between communism and capitalism. At any rate the members of 
the Russian Camp do not feel that socialist Britain should be 
too closely associated with capitalist America. 
c. The Independent Camp 
To most of the Leftists in the Labour Party both the 
American and Russian Camps are objectionable. In the first 
case British policy would be subordinated to American policy, 
placing her on the American side against the Russians. In 
the latter case British policy would be subdued to fit in 
with Soviet plans, putting her in Communist line opposed to 
they prefer a third alternative--
Vel. 427, c.1694. 
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a truly independent British policy which would be socialist 11 
in character wherever possible and which refused to be caught[! 
up in the power politics of the two super-pm-Ters. 1i 
In this camp also there are moderate and extreme groups 
who range in their demands from independence and impartiality!! 
to neutrality and isolationism. Their main thesis is that 
Britain cannot afford to fight another major war and must do 
everything possible to remain at peace. Since taking part 
in the shenanigans of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. would very 
likely lead to entanglement in a war between the two, it is 
regarded as most dangerous to be committed to one side or the 
other. While the interdependence of the modern world is so 
complex, and while Britain occupies a precarious perch in its 
economic life, Britain cannot completely withdraw from inter-
national life. But she can choose carefully her policy on th 
merits of individual problems of foreign policy as to whether 
she would back the policy of one or the other of the Great 
Powers. 
Leonard Woolf is one of the chief protagonists of this 
group and his ideas will be considered in detail. Others 
include G. D. H. Cole, R. H. Crossman, M. P., the "Keep 
Leftists" (a group of Labour I·lembers of Parliament who object 
to official foreign policy), contributors to such publication 
as the New Statesman and Nation and the Political Quarterly, 
and members of socialist societies such as the Fabian 
Society. 
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To this group the ultimate ideal in international rela-
tions is the "World Co-operative Commonwealth" which admitted y 
appears to be in the distant future. Meanwhile this end shou d 
be furthered by doing everything possible to strengthen the 
United Nations by eliminating some of its glaring short-
comings and abuses. However, the long-term policy required 
by British socialism must include the strengthening of the 
U. N. as a keystone. But in the interim a policy must be 
pursued which aims at "the greatest possible independence of 
British policy and dissociation from the power politics of 
30 
the U.S.A. and the U. s. S. R." 
The underlying assumption of British foreign policy 
should be, according to this camp, that there will not be an-
other war or at least that if such an eventuality comes about 
Britain will have no part in it. A positive declaration alo 
these lines would serve to placate the fears of the Soviet 
Union that the West was trying to destroy her. Under such 
conditions there would be a different attitude by all parties 
in negotiations. ~~. Woolf regards the economic field as the 
most amenable in which to attempt to reach an understanding 
with Russia. He would not be deterred by failure in 
an agreement on the Marshall plan but would "try and try aga fl 
• 
i 
if 
!, 11 The distrust of the west and of Britain by the 
)i Soviet Government may be insoluble even in the waters 
il of British sincerity and socialism, but if it is 
11 soluble, it can only be made so by the British Gov-
l
i ernment again and again showing that all it desires 
1
1 ~~o~~e~~to~1131:te with Russia for peace and a common 
---~--· _, ~~----''~· =w-ourr--, ¥02w---f?H-oy,-~-.=~ -
~, 31. Ibid, p. rr. 
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Further, he would make any concession which is reasona 
in the light of British interests, but stand firm behind them 
once made. As for the satellites, an improvement in economic 
relations with them would tend to ease tension between Bri 
and Russia. It is interesting t at 1!-ir. Woolf places economic 
questions in the category of politics where the Soviet Union 
32 
is concerned. 
33 
The Keep Leftists recognize that the world was divided 
into two blocs in 1945 because Anglo-American cooperation 
not extend to Russia, who refused to cooperate and in fact 
waged a propaganda offensive, exploited Persian politics, set 
up puppet governments in Eastern Europe, and refused to agree 
at the peace conferences. This iscalled by the Keep Leftists 
a disastrous diplomatic folly of Molotov, who apparently had 
felt American isolation would continue, so that he concen-
trated on undermining the weaker partner, Great Britain~ 
Actually, he succeeded in driving America and Britain into a 
defensive alliance and in splitting Europe into pro- and anti 
Communist factions. 
This group of M.P.s is not concerned over whether to 
have relations with America or not, for they do admit ~···~~~·~~~ 
dependence on American food and supplies, but over the terms 
on which relations are to be based: not as a financial de-
pendency and strategic outpost, but as an independent nation, 
free to deal with both the United States and the Soviet 
Woolf's foreign polic 
s am t 
s 
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To begin with they feel that Britain can no longer affor 
extravagances in foreign policy because the British Isles 
would be indefensible in an atomic war--if against the U.S.A. 
she could be easily starved, while against Russia, she could 
not stop a sweep up from the Continent. However, the Keep 
Leftists assume that although both Powers are capable of war, 
they have reasons for not wanting one. To them Britain's 
position concerning security is comparable with that of Franc 
in the 1920's. They do not want to see England become an 
outpost of the United States or supply America with a means 
of defense which will not require the use of Arr.erican troops 
except in a liberating action. 
II 
They say also that a system of collective security again t 
Communism such as was advocated against Hitler is a fallacy 
because Hitler Germany had different motives from those of 
Stalin's Russia. While Hitler supplied employment by means 
of rearmament and conquest, Russia needs to reconstruct and 
consolidate its position at home. In addition, Russia has 
good cause to suspect the Western Pm-rers who invaded Russia 
in 1918, permitted Hitler to re-arm, and sent him to Russia. 
Collective security would only be regarded as an attack. 
What is more, aligned with America, in the name of dem-
ocracy, Britain would have to support undemocratic regimes, 
as in Greece and China. The conflict is only made sharper by 
joining the American side against Russia. The Keep Leftists 
feel it should be Britain's task to save the smaller nations 
-------------- ~]- -'---~=~='-~---=~~~~~~occc==cc~~~ ~'~~--=~c=c·c 
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and heal the breach between the United States and Russia, / 
34 
without becoming an ally of either. 1 
Much of G.D.H. Cole's thinking reflects the majority 
35 
point of view. He feels that the foundations of Labour's 
foreign policy should be realism and morality in internationa 
affairs. This means to him a limitation of commitments, 
soundness at the center through a consolidation of home re-
sources, and democratic consent by recognition of the moral 
attitude of the people. A socialist foreign policy should 
also aim at strengthening liberal socialism in Western Europe. 
and the rest of the world. He would attempt to relieve ten-
sions between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the only tv1o Great 
:?oHers, by making the United Nations work, developing close 
understanding with both, and by Britain's consituting herself 
spokesman for the militarily weaker nations. To him the 
unity of Western Europe should be the first objective of 
British foreign policy in order to displace Soviet fears that 
the West is a bulwark of United States capitalism, and to 
lessen dependence upon America. 
The union of Western Europe is the most important point 
in the foreign policy advocated by this Camp. Having con-
cluded that Britain is already a second-rate power who cannot 
compete with the continental power of the Big Two with their 
tremendous productive capacity, vast populations, and paten-
ability to become an autarky, the group looks toward Western 
34.See Appendix IV for 10-Point Keep Left foreign program. 
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Europe as a third force which lies between the U.S.A. and t 
U.S.S.R. and for which Britain can supply the leadership. 
While the fact of a divided Europe is bemoaned, it is accept 
Professor Cole enumerates the characteristics which he beli 
qualify a country to be included in the Western way of life 
as follows: 
1. Respect for the individual. 
2. Toleration of differences. 
3. Free speech, writing, association, and criticism 
of the government up to the same limit. 
4. Free discussion in settling policies and programmes. 
5. Free elections which give minorities some represen-
tation. 
6. Social behavior which does not discriminate on 
political and religious differences. 
1. Minimum standard of life through welfare and social 
security. 
8. Education. 
9. Legal safeguards for the individual against the 
government, if necessary. 
10. A belief in morality which is binding on states as 
well as persons.36 
Professor Cole believes Italy is on the margin of this 
group, but would exclude Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Wi~4~-~~~~~ 
this sphere the nations must cooperate to break down tariff 
and currency barriers, to develop international transportati 
systems, and to work out a plan for industry and agriculture. 
As for the political structure of Western Unity, he sees no 
need for a constitution, parliament, and such institutions, 
but thinks it should be based on treaties and agreements for 
close economic cooperation with political machinery no more 
extensive than a Western European Congress to debate policy. 
Among the rights of members are included the following: 
36. Cole, World ±Q Transition, pp. 303-4. 
• 
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freedom of movement inside the area, equal citizenship every-
where, conventions on patents, Trade Union rights, libel laws 
naturalization, and social insurance, minimum conditions of 
work, common currency, and a policy of full employment. 
Agreement between France and Britain seems to Mr. Cole 
to be vital to any solution to problems of Western Unity. He 
believes the prime obstacle to collaboration between the two 
countries is the French Communist Party. Therefore, a pro-
gram would have to be evolved \vhich would appeal to a maj ori t 
of French people--so as to avoid a squeeze etther to the left 
or the right. Since Germany is the major problem to France, 
something would have to be done to solve that problem. The 
unity of Germany, minus the areas already alienated to Poland 
and the Soviet Union, is a necessity. The people of a united 
Germany must have at least the bare means of civilized living 
which will allow them to produce industrial exports, above 
reparations, to get their needs abroad. The Ruhr and the 
Rhineland are key areas. Cole would internationalize them 
at least in the economic aspects. 
Since unity li'i th Eastern Germany seems impossible, he 
would prefer temporary partition as an alternative to economi 
slavery, but base the Western part of Germany on foundations 
of liberal socialism. So as not to close the door to agree-
ment with Russia, Cole proposes that there be an Internationa 
Commission of Development and Control for Germany. This body 
should have no common political institutions with the rest of 
Germany, although there should be a seat on the Commission 
for Germany, and Russia as well. Since the International 
Commission would be a concession to French demardson the Con-
tinent, France should reciprocate in respect to colonial poll y 
by abstaining from forceable retention of Asiatic empires. 
He realizes that the lack of resources to retain them will be 
an important factor, but feels there would be more political 
justice in recognizing the new forces of nationalism and in-
dependence in those areas. 
SinceBritish power is now limited, there should be a 
consolidation of both manpower and economic resources instead 
of maintaining armies at the ends of the earth which only dra 
from these. It is time the Dominions provided for their own 
defense, especially since it is too expensive for Britain to 
do so. Besides, Professor Cole feels that it will not be pos 
sible to get on good terms with the Soviets if they are ir-
ritated with militarism. However, he does admit that the 
Russians do respect strength and regard conciliation as con-
37 
scious signs of weakness. 
The Keep Leftists state that the British must now realiz 
they are Europeans and should work for the unity of Europe, 
and in the long run for a Federation of East and West Europe. 
For the present it is necessary to work on trade and try to 
coordinate national plans so as to avoid competition in expor 
markets. They believe that the Americans do not really want 
37. Cole, World in Transition, p. 603. 
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free trade because or their high tariffs. Since a world-wide 
free trade is impossible at present, then the British should 
develop their own free trade area with neighbors in Europe. 
They do not feel any European nation will be safer by taking 
refuge in either the American or Russian bloc, but rather 
that European security depends upon preventing the division 
of Europe into exclusive spheres of influence. 
They would limit starr discussions to Europeans only 
and plan a sort of joint defense system, framed in the Europe n 
regional system, according to the United Nations Charter, 
designed to deter aggression by Germany, or any non-European 
Power--a sort of expanded Anglo-French Alliance. 
"A united Europe, strong enough to deter an 
aggressor, but voluntarily renouncing the most 
deadly offensive weapon of modern warfare, would 
be the best guarantor of world peace."3ts 
Since the key to European recovery lies in the German 
problem and since Russia, the u.s., and France all fear a 
united Germany, Britain should break the deadlock in finding 
a way of reconciling the French demand for security with the 
economic need for putting an end to zonal administration. 
They l'lOuld replace the Potsdam Agreement by a new one com-
patible with Europe's needs based on the integration of Ger-
man's economy into that of her neighbors. There should be a 
flow of goods and services to replace monetary reparations, 
plus a limitation on the heavy steel and chemical industries 
so that they de ell ruainly in finished products. 
38_! Keen Left, ___ E! _4=1=·~-=== 
Mr. Woolf advocates building up a "system of co-operatic 
3 
with states anxious to stand outside the new pov1er poli tics 11 
which would follow up the Marshall Plan conference. He be-
lieves that this is the best way for Britain to contribute to 
international peace and recovery. The aim of Western Union i 
to gather together economically and politically the smaller 
powers who want to stand aside from any U.S.A.--U.S.S.R. con~ 
flict so that they may join forces and use their combined 
weight and efforts to influence international politics in a 
manner none of them could do alone. However, he would com-
bine with this third power the Commonwealth--and regards the 
Dominions as more important to Britain than France. While th 
states of Eastern Europe probably would not be included, it 
would be a long-term aim to work with them. He believes the 
interests of those smaller states to be quite similar to thos 
of Britain, the Commonwealth, and France, in respect to eco-
nomic recovery, the U.S.A.--u.s.S.R. power struggle, the clou s 
of war, and the outcome of the United Nations. 
The purpose of the new group of states is "to build up a 
common international policy among" themselves, which can be 
achieved if France, Britain, and the Dominions all agree on a 
common policy and then lead the rest of the smaller powers 
40 
"on a basis of equality." The Marshall Plan conference demon 
strated what could be done by working together on economic 
problems and it is likely that political and defense question 
39. Woolf, Foreisn Policy, p. 17. 
--c-· _49•._ Ibid, P_~ ~B. 
can also be settled by cooperation. The strength of the grou 
would come from its collective power, which would be consider 
able, and thus capable of moving independently between the tw 
super-powers. Because this group will be peaceful in its in-
tentions and prove this to Russia especially in the field of 
economic cooperation, then "it might eventually become the 
mediator bet·vteen east and west and break the deadlock of 
power politics which is establishing itself between the U.S.A 
41 
and the U . S . S • R. " 
Thus, the Independent Camp has simplified the internatio al 
situation to represent two evils so horrible that the only 
path left for good, peac~oving, small states is virtually to 
ignore those evils. This is to be done by "joining forces" 
of all the powerless countries in order to influence the gian s 
to mend their ways. It is a naive approach to international 
affairs, but is widely held in Labour's Left Wing, neverthele s. 
One of the most powerful motives for which the British 
Camp desires so strongly to establish an independent third 
force is the economic situation facing Great Britain. The 
result of following such a policy is seen as a disentanglemen 
from economic domination by the United States because it im-
plies a consolidation of the resources, not only on the Con-
tinent, but also throughout the territories controlled by the 
various European powers. If Britain and other European natio s 
were thus banded together, they could depend upon each other, 
41. 1Q!9;. 
including colonial resources, as a market which would be in-
sulated against the inevitable capitalist slump expected of 
the United States. 
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~~.William Warbey, Labour M.P., proposes that- Britain 
should take the lead in forming a sort of "Regional Trade Clu ", 
taking in as much as possible of Europe, the British Dominion ~ 
Canada probably excepted, and Europe's overseas territories. 
The objects of this Club were expressed in the following term : 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
To maintain a fair price for both primary products 
and manufactured goods. 
To provide each other with guaranteed markets for 
exports over an agreed minimum period of, say, 
three years through a series of trade agreements. 
Generally to maintain full employment and pro-
duction throughout the region. 
To form Joint Purchasing Commissions to buy 
products from outside the Club, ~3deled on 
British bulk purchasing methods. 
Mr. Warbey feels that Americans would not like such an 
arrangement, but in the eventuality of a major depression, 
which he expects will occur in the u.s., they could not re-
taliate by cutting off European Recovery Program aid. He als 
believes that the countries of Eastern Europe would be able t 
enter the Club, for there would be nothing in the objectives 
which would involve interference in home affairs. 
"If the Russians could be made to understand 
that the formation of the Club involved a move away 
from, rather than towards, the American camp44they might permit their Eastern Allies to enter. 11 
There are several other aspects of the economic situatio 
which bother the socialists in this group. For one thing, 
42. Warbey, w.~ Can Britain Recover? A Survey of Forei~ 
Economic ~oiiCy, Research Series No. 12(, Fabian PU 1., 
and V. Goilancz, London, June, 1948. 
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44. Ibid, p. 20. 
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they are obsessed with the idea that the United States is 
riding for a major depression and therefore Britain should do 
everything possible to insulate herself against this inevit-
able event. G.D.H. Cole prepared a chart tracing the results 
of the capitalist boom and bust cycles. Through it he proved 
that since 1870 depressions occurred first in the United Stat s 
with Britain following on its heels. Each depression increas d 
in severity and was more crippling upon the British economy. 
While it is true that boom cycles returned, they came first 
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to America and then to Britain. The New Statesman and Nati n 
refers to the situation continually in such phrases as: 
11 If we had any reasonable assurance that the 
U.S. would never have another slump, would refrain 
from trying to export any of the unemployment which 
her immense productive capacity is apt to create, 
and could increase her domestic consumption suf-
ficiently without hamstringing the acquisition of 
surplus value by which her social system is powered"--
then the Government might have been justified in 
signing the Washington Agreements which in effect 
made Britain4the 
11 junior partner to American 
capitalism. 11 6 
Mr. Warbey, however, figures that the coming depression 
will be of the 1920 variety because of the backlog of demand 
for capital equipment in the world, but is sure it will come 
because the United States is unable to take adequate preven-
tive measures. For this reason Britain needs "markets for 
her goods which were protected against American competition." 
45. Cole, G.D.H., World in Transition: A Guide to the Shifti 
Political and Economic Forces of Our Time, New York, 
Oxford Univ:-Press, 1949, pp. 377~ and Table 44, p.379 
46. Editorial...l "Defending the Last Ditch", New Statesman and 
Nation, uec. 15, 1945, p. 397. ---
c,=-~~'=· ~=M~-=~~-~J<,i t .• ~.=cJ1~~8...-·-----===------·-----~----------·--
7 
Along this line of thinking, some socialists fear that 
the United States is now interested in international trade in 
order to dump surpluses and export unemployment. Underlying 
all of this feeling is the realization that the United States 
is the chief competitor of Great Britain in seeking markets 
for international trade. The following is a good summary of 
the problem: 
"Britain, with her comprehensive program for 
domestic reconstruction and her decreased means of 
buying the imports which are necessary to her sub-
sistence, must expand her exports of goods by half 
or more. She is not willing to take any unnecessary 
chances on the ability to do so. The United States 
is pressing for greater freedom of international 
trade, with removal of tariffs and other barriers, 
and for multi-lateral comrrerce on the basis of com-
petitive private enterprise. Britain would probably 
be willing to agree to this program if she could be 
sure of two things. First, she wants to be certain 
that the United States will not engage in unfair 
competition for exports, by subsidies or other means 
of selling more than it buys. Second, she wants to 
feel confidence that the United States will not ruin 
her export markets by experiencing an economic col-
lapse which will impoverish Britain's foreign cus-
tomers. If the United States evinces a tendency to 
do either or both of these things, Britain will be 
compelled to try to safeguard her purchasing power 
and her export markets by barter agreements, ex-
change control, tariff and quota systems, and other 
devices which will tend to insulate th~8members of her system from the American economy. 11 
This feeling is again reflected in the New Statesman .and 
Nation which states that it hopes the United States will 
11 refrain from exploiting its strength" as a creditor in an 
attempt to prevent unemployment after the first post-war boom 
is spent 11 by 'forcing' exports financed by loans, and thus 
48. Soule, QE.Cit., pp. 217-8. 
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capturing markets on which we depend for sale of British 
49 
goods." 
Mr. Warbey further expresses the fear that the American 
hand-out program, i.e., the Marshall Plan, tied loans to 
Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, the Point-Four Program, 
Britain or any third party seeking markets is placed at a 
distinct disadvantage. While the need for such a program 
during a crisis situation is admitted, the effect on Britain' 
long-term position is deleterious. Although the Americans 
clamor for free (unplanned) world trade with all comers as 
equal competitors, they do so knowing they have "a corner" on 
the market. The only alternative for Great Britain is to 
place the markets for British goods in a sphere protected 
against American competition. There are two places to which 
Britain might turn--the Commonwealth and Empire, and a Eur-
opean Union, described above. Mr. Warbey sees them as not 
50 
mutually exclusive. Actually, the Government, as well as 
the Independent Grou~have stressed the former with positive 
emphasis on the Sterling bloc and Imperial Preferences, while 
efforts toward European Union have gone ahead or languished 
alternately. 
Beyond this, the answer to Britain's economic problems 
lies in increased production and trade.in accordance with the 
nation's legitimate economic aims--full employment, consider-
able volume of goods imported and exported, furtherance of 
49. Editorial, "Britain and World Trade", N.S.& N., p. 414. 
50. Warbey, ~ ill_~_L pp. 1:5~16. 
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Socialist aims in nincreased EllllilaSis not only in Britain it-
self, but also in the under-developed or hitherto exploited 
parts of the Empiren, and the necessity of securing vital. 
51 
supplies in case of war. 
The first World War dealt a serious blow to England's 
economic position, the world-wide depression of the 1930~s 
was al.most disastrous, but because of World War II Great 
Britain had to face the most serious unbalance of trade she 
had ever experienced. To prevent a drop in the standard of 
living to a subsistence level and to revive the export trade 
Britain had to maintain an export target of 175 per cent of 
52 
1938 levels, or at the least 140 percent of those figures. 
No capital re-investment had taken place for many years so 
that industrial plant was old and ine~t. Internal dis-
investment, including physical destruction due to the war 
equaled a loss of 10 per cent of the national wealth. Gov-
ernment expenditure and personal consumption from 1940 to 194 
amounted to 113 per cent of the national income. This was 
done through "disinvestment11 --i.e. bl,ll8,ooo,ooo worth of 
foreign capital assets were sold during the war; there was a 
net reduction of gold reserves by ~152,000,000; debts to 
Commonwealth and foreign countries increased by ~2,879,000,00 ; 
and 1:.49,000,000 was 11unallocated11 loss. Total external dis-
investment equaled b4,198,ooo,ooo. Including internal losses, 
25 per cent of British total capital was sacrifice~n the war 
51. Ibid, pp. 5~. 
52. Ibid, p. 16. 
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Due to these losses British economics came to the point 
54 
where it i'l'as necessary to "Export or die." Britain had to 
55 
produce more in order to be able to sell more. The Govern-
ment sought to meet this problem of production by means of an 
"aueterity11 program, and later devaluation of the pound sterli g, 
in order to reduce home consumption and to produce more for 
the export market. 
The socialists in the Independent Camp lauded such a 
program, but lamented the extent to which it was carried. The 
felt it could have been carried even further despite the hard 
ships upon Britain and the British people in order to decreas 
dependence on America. The New Statesman and Nation believes 
that giving in to the American political demands in exchange 
for economic help is lining up Great Britain as a "junior 
partner of the U.S.A. That will be the price they demand for 
56 
our cigarettes and our films." If Britain stops importing· 
tobacco, cotton, and films for a while, America will be 
clamoring for this market. 
Obviously, this argument ignores more vital products 
which have to be imported from the New World in order to get 
the British economy going. It also does not take into accoun 
the declared aim of the Marshall Plan--to make Europe a going 
concern by 1952. 
Further objections to Marshall Plan aid by this group of 
socialists are found in the political objective of insurance 
54. Brinton; C., The United States and Britain, Cambridge, Ha 
~~~:"1l!i!~f;rlS;~~fE!ig~;,;~3~~:--a. -194~--p.- 383. --~ 
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against Communism (which became an open political weapon in 
Italy during 1948) and the American hope that E.R.P. will en-
able its recipients to keep the door open for free enterprise, 
particularly American private enterprise. They dislike the 
implied condi tiona for receiving Ivfarshall aid--support of the 
system of multi-lateral, non-discriminatory trade as embodied 
in the Draft Charter of the International Trade Organization. 
This brings us to the issue of freedom vs. control of 
world's economy and of international trade which colors 
U.K. economic relations~ The United States is in a position 
where a policy of unrestricted trade is preferable, but Brita 
is not and favors instead a policy of international control. 
For instance, in the case of international air navigation, 
I 
Britain favored controls, but the Unite~tates could 
to them. The result was no agreement at the Chicago Confer 
although it is conceivable that in the future the United Stat 
will have to reciprocate in order to obtain the needed forei 
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bases and stations. To socialists this issue is meaningful 
for control represents an extension of socialist principles 
to a wider field as well as an insulation against American 
capitalism. 
57. 
58. 
"We must fight in the last ditch to prevent the 
export to these shores of American unemployment and 
to insulate ourselves from the same fate as befell 
that debt-burdened German Republic which once sought 
to build its castle on the shifting sands of American 
finance capital.u5ts 
Cit., p. 141 
efending the Last Ditch" , N . .§ .~ N. , Dec. 15, 
' 
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Nevertheless, the u.s. and the U.K. have many common aims in 
international economic affairs, although they may differ as to 
means. Both countries joined forces to support the establish-
ment of the International Trade Organization, but differed as 
to the relative importance attached to certain functions it 
should have, and as to the rigidity with which various princip es 
were to be applied. At the Geneva Trade Agreements Conference 
they both recognized the advantages of freer trade, but Britai 
was reluctant to give this issue top priority. While tariff 
adjustments were effected in a friendly fashion, on the questi 
of imperial preferences, both sides were quite stubborn. The 
American approach is that imperial preferences are a violation 
of nondiscrimination agreements as set out in the Lend-Lease 
and the Loan Agreements. The British interpret imperial pre-
ferences as a means of maintaining close economic relations 
between Britain and the Commonwealth, which although not con-
tiguous in territory, are politically united to the extent tha 
lower tariff rates are justified without violating the general 
principle of nondiscrimination in the trade among independent 
59 
nations. In any case,the people in the Independent Socialist 
Camp desire to see socialist principles in terms of an int~­
national controlled trade become the pattern which the world 
follows. 
The Independent Camp wants disentanglement from United 
States economic domination because the people in this group 
59. Cassels, Q£. Cit., pp. 75-78. 
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fear an inevitable capitalist slump from that quarter. They 
would therefore attempt to insulate Britain from it by buildi 
as strong a system as possible with the Commonwealth and with 
Western Europe. They also fear the u.s. as Britain's chief 
competitor and want to find markets, especially in the two 
areas above, which will be protected from such strong competi-
tion. In these interests they favor a policy of controlled 
international trade, which also represents an extension of 
socialist principles. The group supports Government policy 
when it follows these lines, but still is distrustful of the 
Cabinet 1s close economic relations with the United States~ 
The Commonwealth and Empire are of great importance in th 
plans of the Independent Camp, for they also provide a cushion 
against American domination and provide an opportunity for 
extending social democracy. Since the British Isles cannot 
become an autarky in any real sense, sources of supply for an 
industrial economy are necessary--hence, there is an emphasis 
upon obtaining from within the Commonwealth and Empire such 
materials. 
Actually, inter-Dominion trad.e accounts for a major porti n 
of British trade, which serves to bind together the Commonweal h 
far more than the obvious loose political association. The 
Dominions have played a large part in serving to reduce the 
dollar deficit of the sterling ar~ just as they helped with 
loans during the last war. The Anglo-Canadian wheat agreement 
was of much help to Britain and reduced some of the dependence 
====== -------------------=-~--=======-·=···===-===' 
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on the United States. Suggestions. have been made to use 
Egyptian and Indian cotton and other products from within 
the Commonwealth. 
The Empire serves as a source of raw material~ such as 
rubber from V~laya. In addition there are plans for developi 
the backward areas by building power projects such as the 
T.V.A., or by promoting likely products--such as ground-nuts 
in Tanganyika. By supporting these prospects through devices 
like the imperial preferences scheme the British, together 
with their Commonwealth and Empire friends, can be strong in 
the economic sense and thus independent from America. 
Besides, there is a chance to try out the theories of 
social democracy in the treatment of the backward areas. The 
countries in the Commonwealth have grown to their present 
status through transformation to industrial economies which 
places them on more equal footing with England. However, ther 
is room for improvement in the status of the peoples in the 
Empire. The forces of nationalism and independence have been 
stirred in the Far East and it is a challenge to Britain to 
help the people there to reach their full stature and become 
self-governing. 
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The Keep Leftists advocate extending the plan used in 
the cases of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, but careful judgment 
is required in not letting the new nations fall under stress 
of civil war or con;munist invasion. Therefore, care has to b 
but ensures democracy by handing the new economy to the people 
not native counterparts of the capitalists, for that would onl 
defeat the purpose and lead to communist criticism and accus-
ations, and possible aggression. The race problem is another 
challenge to which they feel social democracy can find an 
answer. 
By building up these backward areas it will be possible t 
create new markets to fit in with British needs for an expand-
ing world economy. This too would create a demand for English 
goods beyond the influence of an A1r.erican depression, it is 
hoped. 
In the realm of defense of the Corun:om<Teal th and Empire, 
the Independent Camp is most outspoken. On the whole, these 
people would withdraw British forces to a bare minimum, or let 
the Dominions and Colonies take over their own defense. Accor -
ing to Professor Cole, since British power is now limited, the e 
should be a consolidation of both manpower and economic resour es 
instead of maintaining armies at the ends of the earth which 
only draw from these. It is time the Dominions provided for 
their own defense, especially since it is too expensive for 
Britain to do so. He also believes that with less militarism 
Russian fears might not become irritated so that relations wit 
61 
that country might improve. 
The Keep Leftists also urge an emphasis upon cultural and 
economic values as opposed to the military value of the Common 
61. Cole, Foreign Policy,PP· 31-36. 
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wealth. iVithout control of the seas as in the past the strate 
gic unity of the Empire is also lost. This group would allow 
the Dominions and Colonies to provide for their O\fn defense 
since Britain needs her manpower at home to bolster the labor 
shortage. 
Mr. Woolf, while he essentially agrees with the attitude 
as stated in the above paragraph, has worked out a scale of 
values as to v1hich areas deserve the attention of British 
forces. In working this out, he has three dangers in mind: 
first, that the area concerned might become the location used 
in the U.S.A.--U.S.S.R. struggle for power; second, in the 
case of the Far East, that Japanese militarism might be revive ; 
or thirdly, that a militarily second-rate power might attempt 
an attack. In the first case, he would simply stand aside, 
for it would be hopeless to fight against either of the Powers 
To deal with Japan he -vrould have a regional authority under 
the United Nations on which the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Britain, 
China, Australia, New Zealand, Holland, France, and all indepe -
dent Far Eastern Governments were represented. However, he 
thinks such a scheme is utopian and for the time being the 
British Government has to allow the United States to do as it 
wishes in Japan. In the event of an attack upon a Dominion, 
as for instance,Australia, by a militarily minor power, it co d 
provide its own defense. He regards Hong Kong and Singapore 
as 11 strategic pawns" which could be given up as tokens for 
similar action by Russia and America. At all times, however, 
======-----
he believes in consultation with the Dominions and does not 
suggest that the Government adopt policies without this prior 
action. Bases in the l\~editerranean should be kept pending a 
United Nations security system to prevent aggression by a 
smaller power. On the whole, the defense of the British Empir 
and Colonies would require but small, highly efficient, milita y, 
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air, and naval forces. 
At the point where military power is required the Indepen 
dent Camp first loses sight of the basic factor of internatio 
relatio~-that power is in the final analysis military might. 
To think otherwise is to forget reality. Of this the British 
Camp is guilty, for in its deliberations this group is guided 
by an idealism which is beyond the scope of present internatio 1 
conditions;.. 
There is a "strategic interdependence" between the U.K. 
63 
and the u.s. Britain is reliant upon the resources of Ameri a 
and cannot win a war without American assistance. British 
bases are of prime importance to the United States. Canada 
lies within the orbit of the U.S. defense system. Australia 
and New Zealand, who looked to the United States for defense 
and protection during World 1tlar II, will have to continue to 
64 
look in that direction, at least as much as to Britain. 
To go a step further, British interests in Europe, the 
Mediterranean, the Near East, the Middle East, all require tha 
that the Americans be interested in them as well. One author 
62. Woolf, Foreign Policy, pp. 21-24. 63. Chatham House, British Security: A Report by a Chatham Ho se 
__ _ . Stud¥-~..QUP+=R, I. I .A~Lorul~946~.__ a:2._ 
64. Corbett, QE. Cit., Chapters 2-3. 
has listed three areas of common interest from the point of vi 
of mutual security: the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Medite -
ranean. In the first, an area from Greenland to Brazil, 
ing the coast of Western Europe, is considered important as a 
line of defense. Britain may be regarded as an outpost of 
American defense and would relieve the American Navy. In the 
Pacific the lines would be drawn from Alaska to the Philippine 
and would require the cooperation of Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and to a lesser degree India and South Africa. The 
thirde area requires Anglo-American cooperation, for the Unite 
States alone cannot defend commercial interests in the Middle 
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East without the use of British bases and cooperation. Anoth r 
point of common interest is the prevention of the domination 
of the European continent--or the world--by a single power, 
whether by the Kaiser, Hitler, or the Soviets. 
The subject of the United States in relation to a sociali t 
foreign policy brings out varied emotions and logic in the 
Independent Group. A little poem from the Ne'tT Statesman and 
Nation illustrates one of the typical attitudes. 
66 
Debtor Diplomacy 
Says Halifax to Keynes: 
11 It seems to me quite funny 
That we've got all the brains, 
But they've got all the money. 11 
Says Keynes; "I own it's rummy, 
But still the fact remains 
That we can't get their money 
In spite of all our brains.n 
65. CherrJ,,J ~, .. ALl':t.ne Cards dn.the Table,Loncion,M:useumPress, 48, 
66. Signed, O.K. Dec. 1, 1945, p:-365. pp. 87-89. 
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Obviously there is a resentment against the new position of 
Britain in relation to the United States, termed by Professor 
Brinton in the Freudian language of child-parent relationship, 
where the former British colony has outstripped its mother 
67 
country. 
G.D.H. Cole emphasizes the differences between the ¥alues 
and ways of life of Western Europe and America. In Western 
Europe are found old, settled peoples with long national tradi 
tiona and with scarce resources. In America there is a new 
people, of mixed racial composition, impa~fectly fused, scat-
tered over a vast continent with almost boundless resources. 
He feels that this is possibly an explanation for the differ-
ences between European socialism and American capitalism. He 
further states that the Russians are in some ways like the 
Americans, in that they possess vast resources and go in for 
things in a big way, but their society rests on the foundation 
of an old, autocratic state, and the people are used to dire 
poverty. They have a need for vast planning, but the Russians 
insist on uniformity, not only of goods, but also of men--whic 
is possible in a primitive people, for diversity must come 
gradually. Thus, because of the basic differences, Professor 
Cole would want them accomodated--perhaps by a zoning of world 
affairs if that seems necessary, but by working through the 
68 
United Nations. 
67. Brinton, QE. Cit., pp. 244-45. 
68. Cole, World in Transition, pp. 310-11. 
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It is also interesting to note that in Mr. Woolf's plans 
for a socialist foreign policy, while he calls for impartiali 
between Russia and America, the examples he chooses to explain 
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his plan would call for a stand similar to Russia's. He 
repeatedly states wherever admission is necessary that when 
Britain does follow a policy which backs up the United States, 
it is compelled to do so because of the great economic depen-
dence. This negative attitude is generally prevalent among 
the people who prefer an independent British policy. 
Nevertheless, during World War II Anglo-American collab-
oration through various joint military and civilian boards and 
committees proved that the two peoples can work well together. 
There have been many proposed schemes for either an Anglo-
American, Anglo-Saxon, or English-speaking peoples alliance or 
union, such as the ones advocated by Clarence Streit and Walt 
Lipmann. Probably the one that caused the greatest sensation 
among the Left in Britain was that of Winston Churchill, pro-
posed in his famous Fulton, Missouri, speeck of March, 1946. 
One hundred and five Labour Members of Parliament signed 
an unsuccessful Motion of Censure placed by Mr. Warbey, in the 
following terms: 
"World Peace and Security.--That this House con-
siders that proposals for a military alliance between 
the British Commonwealth and the United States of 
America for the purpose of combatting the spread of 
Communism, such as were put forward in a speech at 
Fulton, lv1issouri, U.S.A., by the right hon. Gentleman, 
the Member for Woodford, are calculated to do injury 
69. Woolf, Foreign Policy, p. 15. 
to good relations between Great Britain, the U.S.A. 
and the u.s.s1R., and are inimical to the cause of world peace." 0 
The Keep Left pamphlet strongly denounced the Fulton pol-
icy as one which American strategists would use to secure "a 
system of forward defenses against Russia, manned by non-
71 
American forces.n Mr. Zilliacus (in the Russian Camp) des-
cribed it as "a policy of the United States fighting to the 
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last Englishman and the last Western European." At the 
Annual Conference of the Labour Party in 1946 a resolution was 
put forward which was designed: 
"To repudiate Mr. Churchill's defeatist proposal 
to make the British Commonwealth a mere satellite of 
American monopoly capitalism, which will inevitably 
lead to our being aligned in a partnership of hostility 
to Russia. tt73 
-
The resolution was defeated, but in the discussions much 
feeling against the United States was expressed. 
The line of reasoning held by the Left on the problem of 
Anglo-American collaboration is that such cooperation will 
to the rest of the world like a proposal for Anglo-Saxon 
domination, as if Britain and America were "ganging up 11 on 
Soviet Union. Since the United States is so much stronger t 
Britain, it is feared that eventually Britain will become a 
sort of dominion or junior partner of Ameria. The Independen 
fear dollar imperialism, regarding Churchill's plans as 11 tyin 
us to the chariot-wheels of American imperialism ••• American 
imperialism is heading for a 'boom and bust•nwhich cannot be 
>~e~~.•~-~lt~P2" ~-::~~~::.::~t:;~~ Zilli 
tion by Mr. E. Cook, p. 157. 
70. Parl. Deb., 5-s., H.C., Vol. 464, c. 2024, quoted by Mr. 
· Ch\irchill. 
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escaped and if "we tie up to America the more certainly shall 
we suffer in the next world slump ••• America is a great gigant 
imperialism, absolutely wild, chaotic, and uncontrolled. Eve 
President Truman cannot control his own Congress, and the two 
74 
are fighting together. 11 They tend to emphasize economic 
differences between Britain and the u.s., misrepresenting 
America as a militant country 11bashing its way into the vario s 
capitals of Europe and forcing the people to accept dollar 
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credits, dollar food, dollar tobacco, and dollar petrol." 
One of the factors contributing to misunderstanding by 
the British Left of the United States is the fact that there 
have been few connections between Labour and the American Lef • 
American Socialism never amounted to very much. American 
unions resolved their problems within a framework of capitali 
and it is significant that John L. Lewis was among those who 
most strongly wished the removal of price controls in 1946. 
Constructive Left opinion swung behind Roosevelt, the New Dea , 
and the Democratic Party, while the Socialist Party dwindled. 
Even New Re:Qublic intellectuals have little in common with 
their British counterparts. In fact, American Leftists tend 
to be anti-British because they are pro-Russian and against 
76 
British Imperialism. 
11We have on the one hand, Left wing opinion in 
this country suggesting that we are being dragged 
at the heels of American Imperialism, and on the 
74. Ibid, pp. 157-58. 
75. Parl. Deb., 5s., H.C., Vol. 446, c. 509. 
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other, Left wing opinion in America suggesting that 
they are being_dragged at the heels of British 
Imperialism."Tf 
Thus, the Independent Camp advocates a policy which will 
lead to independence from economic domination by the United 
States, which involves emphasizing British unity with Europe, 
especially Western Europe, and with the Commonwealth. To thi 
group the formation of a socialist foreign policy is of utmos 
importance, and in fact, it has supplied the major portion of 
opposition to Government foreign policy. The most relevant 
factor in an Independent socialist policy is the balancing 
by Britain of the potentially explosive U.S.S.R.--U.S.A. con-
flict in order to prevent a new, general war, which would 
certainly prove disastrous to the country as well as to socia 
democracy• However, many of the suggestions made by various 
spokesmen are idealistic, and even utopian, as for instance, 
Leonard Woolf's considerations on British military responsi-
bilities~ While their abiding faith in human nature is laud-
able, such is not suitable foundation for a viable foreign 
policy• 
D. Conclusion 
There are five major problems in the formulation of a 
socialist foreign policy for Britain. Each of the three 
"camps" considered as the Labour Party's Left for the purpose 
of this thesis has a different analysis of the problems as 
a whole and individually. However, the solutions are not 
77. Parl. Deb., 5s. H.C., Vol. 427, c.l614, Mr. Pargiter. 
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mutually exclusive. Rather, a true socialist policy may 
require a syntaesis of the several components with a view 
towards socialism in the realm of reality. 
In general, the American Camp is most nearly realistic 
in its formulation of policy, and is, in fact, almost identic 1 
with Government policy. It takes into consideration the actu 1 
international situation since 1945, i.e., the povrer politics 
antics of the tv;o largest nations, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R , 
and concludes that Britain has more to gain by siding with th 
United States, although not exclusively, than by tying up wit 
the Soviet Union. Once this decision is taken, the other fo 
problems of foreign policy fall into a proper perspective. 
TD join Western European Union amplifies the strength of the 
West and of Britain in three ways--militarily, economically, 
and ideologically. Accepting economic help from the United 
States offers no moral problem concerning socialism and cap-
italism, for economics are subordinated to the general politi 
cal question of democracy vs. communism. The Commonwealth an 
Empire tend to add ftuther to the strength of Britain's positi n. 
Britain's relationship with the United States ceases to be a 
problem, but becomes an integral part of a foreign policy whi h 
offers the utmost in security, prospecrity, peace, and inde-
pendence. 
On the other hand, an orientation of policy toward the 
Soviet Union is contrary to the best interests of Britain, 
despite the British predilection for socialism. Nevertheless 
the Russian Camp believes that the path to peace will be 
brightened by emphazising economic democracy, which both 
Britain and Russia look forward to. This group sides with 
Russia in case of a dispute between the U.S.A. and the u.s.s .• , 
and follows the Communist line, making no independent analysi 
of Soviet motives or methods. Western Union is approached on 
the basis of a.greement with Russia and trade vlith the satel-
lites. However, somemembers of the group do at this point 
doubt Russian motives concerning the independence of states 
aligned with Russia. While this faction approves closer 
economic relations with the Soviet Union, it does find diffi-
culty in the positive needs of Britain for aid which Russia 
cannot supply, and in the degree of probable subordination to 
Russian policy because of such dependence. The Commonwealth 
and Empire might serve as an illustration of communist pro-
fessions about national and economic independence for backwar 
peoples. However, the grave consequences to both the colonie 
and the mother country are overlooked. Because of America's 
preference for capitalism, the Russian Camp does not believe 
Britain should be too closely associated with the United Stat s. 
The Independent Camp wishes to follow yet another course 
It is inspired by an idealism which would steer Britain betwe n 
the Scilla and Carybdis of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Such 
course is attractive to the majority of Labour's Left Wing. 
The primary aim of this group is to prevent war, or at the le st 
to keep England out of war if one should break out. To do 
---------·----=------~---------------=------------- -=-=· =-=--=---=-= 
this, Britain must stay independent of the U.S. and try to fi d 
a means of getting along with Russia. Western European Unity 
is emphazised by this group as an instrument of attaining 
sufficient strength to become independent of America and as 
a spokesman for peace. Combining the strength of Britain and 
the Continent might mean sufficient balancing so as to throw 
off economic dependence upon the United States by providing a 
market for British goods protected from American competition. 
The Commonwealth and Empire are also stressed as means of 
providing a cushion against dependence upon the United States 
since they are both a market and a source of raw materials fo 
British industries. In addition, the Empire is a ready provi g 
ground for theories of socialist freedom. There are several 
factors which lead the Independent group to prefer independen e 
from the United States, but they ignore the vital 
problem of the strategic interdependence of the United States 
and the United Kingdom. 
Thus, we have seen the views of the three groups repre-
sentative of the Labour Party's Left Wing on five major pro-
blems of British socialist foreign policy. At this point it 
is appropriate to delve into the various differences and 
conflicts which have arisen between the official Party and 
Government policies and those of the Left~ 
90 
CONFLICTS AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LEFT: 
AND OFFICIAL VIEWS 
The Left has not shown any signs of shyness. Indeed, 
the factions described in Chapters II and III have clashed 
openly and vigourously with those who establish government 
and party policy on several signal occasions. Various repre-
sentative subjects have been selecte~ since far more has been 
said and printed than can be recorded within the limits of 
this paper. The most important and significant phase took 
place within the British Parliament, where rows between the 
Government and Back Benches have occured during Foreign Affai s 
Debates. Indications of the disagreement arise at the Annual 
Conferences of the Labour Party. Presumably, the arguments 
extend throughout the Party and party meetings, but the 
Re:g9rts of the Annual Conferences are the chief sources avail 
able in printed form. Other sources are books, pamphlets, an 
periodicals written by proponents of the various schemes. 
A. Parliamentary Conflicts 
The dissatisfaction with the Government's foreign policy 
came to a climax when a group of Labour M.P.s introduced an 
amendment to that section of the King's Speech dealing with 
foreign affairs. On the fifth day of debate, November 29, 19 , 
R.H. Crossman introduced the following paragraph, signed by 
fifty-eight Members, which they believed should be added to 
the Address. 
"And express the urgent hope that His Majesty's 
Government will so review and recast its conduct of 
International Affairs so as to afford the utmost 
encouragement to, and collaboration with, all nations 
and Groups striving to secure full Socialist plan-
ning and control of the world's resources and thus 
provide a democratic and constructive Socialist 
alternative to an otherwise inevitable conflict 
between American Capitalism and Soviet Communism 
in which all hope of World Government would be 
destroyed."l 
The Amendment was regarded by other Parliamentarians as a vot 
of censure upon Mr. Bevin's foriegn policy, but the backers o 
the Amendment did not wish it to be regarded as either a spli 
in the Party or a source of weakness to the Foreign Minister, 
then at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New 
York. 
The backers of the Amendment were certain that the Gov-
ernment was lined up with the United States as opposed to the 
Soviet Union. In support of this thesis, one of the M.P.s 
pointed to the private meetings between Mr. Bevin and Secreta y 
of State Byrnes at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel during the Counc 1 
of Foreign Ministers in New York. This group of M.P.s was 
upset about close relations with the United States because su h 
action would appear to the Soviets as an aggressive move, thu 
leadmg to a solidification of the world into two hostile bloc • 
They believed that in doing this the Government was abandoni 
socialism in its foreign affairs, contrary to its election 
promises to stop the Tory drift into two blocs by mediating 
fairly between the u.s. and the U.s.s.R. 
These people also objected to the welcome reception of 
Mr. Bevin's policy by the Conservatives and felt that it was 
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a continuation of the foreign policy of the Coalition Govern-
ment, the Tory Party, and the Foreign Office. Mr. Crossman 
declared that as the Government drifts away from its promised 
role of mediator between the two blocs, 
"the more enthusiastic has been the support of 
the Tory Party for the Government 1's foreign policy, 
until at last we get the impression, on this central 
issue, that not only is there a complete and exclusive 
Anglo-American tie2-up,. but a tie-up between the two front benches~ 
In addition, Mr. Crossman accused the Government of a 
de facto alliance with the United States because of staff con 
versations between the armed services Of the two countries, 
and the standardization of arms. If these proceed, it will 
mean that Britain provides soldiers to man American guna. 
Mr. Crossman knows that British production cannot stand pro-
ducing arms and spare a large army at the same time. 
While Mr. Crossman realized that no Government could lay 
down a full blueprint of foreign policy befb~nd, he did 
think the Government should stop the drift into war-. He 
acknowledged that Communist ideology is destructive of demo-
cracy, but thought that the ideology of anti-Communism was 
dangerous to both democracy and socialism, for it destroyed 
democracy in the name of free enterprise. While neither of 
these ideologies could be suppressed by force, something 
better (British democratic socialism) might be substituted so 
that the world would not be faced with the 11 bleak and blank 
alternative of American free enterprise or Russian Communism. 3 
2. Ibid, c. 527. 
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Mr. Crossman accused the Government of favoring the 
United States because while it reb~ed the U.S.S.R. for its 
penetration into Eastern Europe, nothing was said about simi-
lar action on the part of the u.s. in its relations with Chin 
the U.S.-China trade agreement. Although the Government jus-
tifiably protested Russian designs on the Dardanelles as a 
violation of Turkish independence, at the same time it did no 
speak out against the American declaration to retain Japanese 
bases, regardless of a United States trusteeship. 
The blame for the drift into blocs is not laid to Britai , 
but to the two countries involved. It was the Russian diplo-
matic and propaganda offensive against the British Empire and 
Commonwealth that forced Britain to join the American side. 
Since "there are no powerful, progressive forces left at the 
moment in America, as an effective check on the Administratio u, 
and America is heading for a depression, Mr. Crossman prefers 
to stay clear of the U.S. He does expect that as a result of 
the anticipated slump America will eventually work its way 
around to "where the rest of the world is going", but in the 
meantime cannot be expected to cooperate in the economic sphe e. 
Four reasons were given as to why it is 11 tragic 11 to line 
up with the United States. (1) Joining the American bloc 
means a perpetual armistice, but no peace, because collective 
security is not justified against a former ally. (2) An 
Anglo-American bloc tends to destroy parties of the Center a 
4. Ibid, c. 535. 
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Center-Left in Europe. (3) The weight of military commitment 
is too heavy for Britain to bear and might create another 
"Maginot" type of security. (4) It is the fear of aggression 
in both America and Russia which makes them more and more 
anxious to prepare against aggression rather than for peace. 
Since America is the only country capable of aggression, but 
a democracy "prevents a preventive war" in its nature, Russia 
is too weak, and Britain is incapable of waging war, the 
Government should assume that there will not be one. Theref 
it shoulddesist from staff conversations outside the Common-
wealth and put every effort into building up Socialism. 
"We believe that a Socialist Britain which puts 
into effect an independent British policy and refuses 
to join any ideological bloc is the only power which 
can break the present deadlock and save the country 
and the world. 11 5 
Mr. Crossman's-arguments illustrate clearly the attitude 
of the Independent Camp when it decided to organize a campai 
for a socialist fore~policy, as opposed to the one pursued 
by the Government. By following his line of reasoning in the 
speech the motive for an independent British policy becomes 
evident. The existence of two hostile blocs is a potent 
threat to world peace and any hope of achieving World Govern-
ment, which are essential to Socialist Britain. Since col-
laboration with either capitalist An:erica or con:munist 
is tantamount to the destruction of social democracy and 
' 
only add fuel to the conflict, British policy should be to 
positively build up socialism 1-fherever it ex__j...sts, to act as 
.-~c~-o~.-"=--'·-"'=cc.j~c~~C~~¥t;.W.~~~::=:::~=c~====--=====-==-=-=======~L------------
a leader of the other smaller powers who cannot afford anothe 
war, and thus build up a third force which will act as med-
iator between the blocs and break up the threat of war. 
The Russian Camp joined with the Independent to support 
the Amendment to the Address. The main difference in their 
arguments froffi those of the latter group is a positive emphas s 
on close friendship with the Soviet Union. Mr. Silverman (wh 
was in the Russian Camp in 1946) interpreted the complaint in 
the Amendment as the point that a socialist foreign policy 
means a vtorld government, which in turn means ma,intaining the 
alliance between the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the 
United Kingdom. He did not believe the deterioration in the 
alliance was all Russia's fault because the U.S. and Britain 
always joined forces against Russia. He feared that tying up 
with America would produce the same results as the 1930's 
when 
" ••• from 1929-1931 free enterprise in Wall Street 
brought down the whole economic fabric of the civi-
lized world ••• " for the crash leg to unemployment, 
the rise of Hitler, and World War. 
Mr. Silverman went on to say that there would be no 
chance for economic planning for the world or international 
control of the world's resources if Britain were committed to 
the American economy. While he had the utmost respect for th 
political liberties of capitalist America, the war could not 
have been won without the socialist achievements of Russia, 
where political liberties exist in the future through the roa 
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of socialism and economic planning. Free elections are not a 
panacea and do not necessarily indicate democracy. There is 
no divine right of the multi-party system. Therefore, it is 
inconsistent to demand these empty signs of democracy from 
places which do not have any basis for them, as in Eastern 
Europe, and to continue relations with other places which do 
not have them, as Spain and the Soviet Union. 
~~. Zilliacus commented that giving democracy to Eastern 
7 
Europe is comparable to giving whiskey to a child. 
Mr. Driberg pointed to the disfranchisement of the negro 
in the southern states of the United States as an example of 
unfair electio~s and a lack of freedolli of expression. He 
further pointed to the "worship of Mammon" in the U.S. as an 
unhealthy aspect of civilized living. Although the British 
Commonwealth is not entirely free from racial intolerance 
either, in the U.S. "worship of the dollar and in~perialism, i 
its evil as distinct from its purely philosophic sense, and 
8 
racial intolerance are most acute and most widespread." His 
object was to point out the differences between America and 
Britain vrhich are not propitious to collaboration. He con-
tras~ the economic chaos and soaring prices in the u.s. to 
the relative stability in England. In politics An;ericans use 
inter::1a tional issues as "bargaining counters between the part es 11 , 
while the English judge them on the individual merits of each 
issue. Mr. Driberg stated 
7 • Ibid. c • 246 • 
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" ••• the people of this country simply will not 
follow •.• (I-1r. Bevin) •.• to war, now or in five 
years' time, against Soviet Russia, in partnership 
with the barbaric thugs of Detroit and the ¥~mmon 
Imperialists of Washington and Wall Street.";~ 
The American Camp was not silent during the debate and 
rose to defend the Government's policy. It felt, however, th re 
was "something wrong" in a Government foreign policy which 
drew cheers from the Opposition and little enthusiasm from th 
Government back benches. The Conservatives were suspected of 
cheering the Government in order to embarras supporters of th 
Amendment. 
Mr. Nally stated that while the Government should be 
criticized on many aspects of its foreign policy, he did not 
find it to be wrong in its over-all objectives of policy. 
although mistakes were made in carrying out certain parts of 
it, namely, Germany, Greece, and Spain. In any case he be-
lieved such things should be ironed out inside the Party, 
especially when, as in this case, the Amendment could be inte -
preted by foreigners as a party split on foreign policy, 
10 
creating a false impression. 
The Prime Minister himself rebutted the arguments of the 
supporters of the Amendment. He found their problem to be a 
fundamental misconception of the nature of international re-
lations. At home a Government with a majority can carry out 
a program subject only to limits of time and conditions ob-
tainable. But, foreign policy "can be carried out only in 
9. Ibid. c. 366. 
lO.Ibid. c. 550-55. 
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11 
conjunction with other nations." While it is possible to 
formulate a policy, it cannot be carried out often because 
other nations have different views. Then the question comes 
up, "Sl:'ell I compromise on this point, or shall I refuse co-
operation and break?" for every statesman. He maintained tha 
"Compromise is the inevitable basis of an international rela-
- 12 
tionship. 11 The Amendment overlooked the fact that more tha 
several nations must be considered in drawing up foreign poli 
Another fallacy contained in the Amendment is an over-
simplification of the problem, that there is a "cut-and-dried' 
distinction between nations Britain should and should not 
collaborate closely with, because of ideology. The Prime 
Minister reminded the back-benchers that there actually is a 
wide range among nations and co~promise is necessary in order 
to get along, even if we know our own policy is more sound. 
His approach to foreign policy and the application of princip es 
is to act not as "representatives of an ideological abstracti n, 
13 
but as representatives of the people of this country.n Thus 
he saw no reason to be distrubed that the Opposition supporte 
the Government on some points. The Government opposed groups 
Left, Right, or Center. 
Mr. Attlee stated further that there are other factors 
which comprise a foreign policy, such as the geographical 
position of England and the Commonwealth, which a General 
Electio~oes not alter. 
11. Ibid., c. 579. 
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The Left grcup which supported the 
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Amendment had a theory--that the United States and the United 
Kingdom are ganging up on Russia--and accepted only the facts1 
which square with that theory. Mr. Attlee asserted that sue 
was not the case. Although ~~. Warbey pointed out Byrnes-
Bevin talks, he did not mention those between }ilolotov and Bev n. 
In the United Nations the Government was not ganging up with 
one country only, but decided on a matter because we think it 
is right or wrong intrinsically, not because the U.S.S.R. is 
for or against it. 
The Prime Minister went on to discuss the complaints 
about United States cooperation in economic matters. He sai 
that actually the U.S. is the natural place to which 
for help in setting Europe on its feet. Russia was unable t 
help, but the United States contributed seventy-two per cent 
of the U.N.R.R.A. fund. Large amounts of this went to Easte 
Europe. Now this is being called imperialism. The attack o 
the U.S.-China trade treaty was unwarranted because it is the 
same as any other corr;merical treaty made by either Britain or 
Russia. 
The United Kir~gd.om did not contemplate an exclusive 
military alliance with America. Collaboration with the an 
General Staff was only natural since the troops of both 
occupy Germany. In fact, the Government attempted to get 
similar arrangements with Russia too, but the Soviets had not 
picked up the offer. 
British policy, according to the Prime Minister, is base 
on "the need for world economic planning for prosperity." 
is recognized by America as well. Mr. Attlee stated that so 
Socialist Policy has been to support the various internationa 
organizations which promote that end and try to deal with the 
underlying causes of war. The Russians have not come into al 
of these organizations, but that should not preclude Britain' 
joining them. He claimed that by cooperating in these social 
economic organizations the Government is carrying out Socialis 
policy. While he and the Foreign !·:inister had encouraged Soc 1 
Democrats in Austria, Germany, and Italy, no Government can do 
so exclusively, in accordance with democracy. The people mus 
choose for themselves. It would be disastrous if each Great 
Pmver -vrere to choose a party corresponding to its own party 
and sponser it as a protege, for then it is not an expression 
of the people, but an instrument of the occupying power. 
:Mr. Attlee then went on to say that Ivlr. Bevin has the fu 
confidence of His Majesty's Government, as well as of a great 
majority of people of all parties. The Foreign Secretary is 
busy getting results and not satisfying dialectical triumph. 
The present Government is devoted to peace among all nations-
which cannot be achieved by dividing nations into sheeps and 
goats, having relations with one and not the other. In askin 
that the Amendment be withdrawn, the Prime Minister concluded II 
II that it was based on a misunderstanding because 
I 
II 
1\ 
\i 
li 
li 
I! II 
I 
" ••• we are today pursuing in the international 
sphere the policy of this party, which is based on 
international cooperation for peace, social justice, 
and freedom for all nations."l4 
In his policy Bevin keeps in mind ordinary citizens. 
"He puts forward the views of our party, which 
are both Socialist and democratic. He represents 
the characteristic British method of approach. He 
is not the slave of abstract theory. He is a 
practical man of affairs seeking to get things 
done."l5 
Mr. Crossman moved that the Amendment be withdrawn, but 
this was not voted. However, when it was brought to a vote, 
it was unanimously defeated, although many of its supporters 
abstained. 
Nevertheless, the ideas expressed by the Independent 
Group in the debate described above took root, and the Keep 
Left group was organized among back-benchers, which was dis-
cussed in Chapters II and III. The Keep Leftists were active 
in the House of Commons, speaking in behalf of the ideals 
they professed. However, with the coming of such events as 
the Marshall Plan, the Dunkirk Treaty, the Brussels Treaty, 
and the increased aggression of Russian communism in Czecho-
slovakia, they tended to emphasize the Independent Third For 
of Western Europe and the Commonwealth, instead of all-out 
cooperation with Russia, although this idea was not given up 
completely. 
During the Foreign Affairs Debate of January 22-23, 194 
a change in their thinking 
14. Ibid, c. 589. 
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was noticeable. Although they 
'I !I 
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!I 
suspicious of the motives of the United States, they did ap- II 
prove of the general aims of the Marshall Plan, being gratefut' 
for the measure of assistance received. Closer association I 
I 
li 
with France and the Benelux countries was approved as well. 
The issue of this Debate was Western Union, an expansion of 
the O.E.E.C. into a political organism. The Keep Leftists to~k 
issue on the matter of seeking to work with and support social 
democratic parties on the Continent. They pointed out that II 
I 
the social democrats on the Continent had been "squeezed out" !i II 
il by communism and capitalism. li 
The Russian Camp became more outspoken in its distrust ot 
the United States. In that Debate Mr. Zilliacus alleged thatjj 
I 
the Americans were interfering with the British economy. He i: I 
based his charge on a Marshall Plan order~~o cut British ship~ 
building. He also objected to a union limited to the Wester: 
countries of Europe. 1 
Mr. Hector McNeil, Minister o:f State, refuted Zilliacus •!I 
I! 
point in behalf of the Government, pointing out that the pro-ii 
posed cut in shipbuilding was not a condition of the Marshallll 
Plan, but a suggestion by the Harriman Committee. He said I 
I 
that allegations about some of the conditions were quite wit ut 
foundations. He reminded critics that the 
" ••• Government's activity in this respect is not 
dictated from abroad ••• that whatever conditions 
may eventually be attached, no one is compet5ed 
to come into the scheme or accept its aim." 
16. Parl. Deb., 5s., H.C., Vol. 446, c. 509. 
II bei~ 
lj 
!I 
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II 
II 
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lvlr. Bevin was quite colorful in attempting to allay the IJ 
II fear of United States economic penetration held by some of hisl 
II 
colleagues. 
11 Now I want to say a word about the United States, 
which seems to be a sort of bogey in the minds of a 
good many people. Everybody has the idea that the 
United States has a great fund of dollars which it 
is trying to hurl at everybody for some ulterior 
motive. All I can say is that if anybody follows 
the hearings in Congress to try to get these appro-
priations, I do not think they bear that interpre-
tation. They are a democratic country trying to 
look where they are going, and what responsibilities 
they are undertaking ••• The power and resources of 
the United States--in deed, I would say the power and 
resources of all the countries on the continent of 
America--will be needed if we are to create a solid, 
stable, and healthy world. 
"When I speak of the United States, I am not 
thinking of the country misrepresented in propaganda 
as a sort of shylock of Wall Street, but a young, 
vigorous, democratic people. It is a country not 
only of great wealth and great resources but one 
whose people are moved by a goodwill and a generosity 
which many of us in the Old World are ap~ to take for 
granted. American policy, like the policy of all 
great countries, must have regard to American inter-
ests, but it has been so often traduced as purely 
selfish that I think it is time to pay a tribute to 
the great heart of the American people which found 
expression in the European Recovery Program. I was 
quite convinced and I am now, that there was no pol-
itical motive behind the Ivla.rshall offer other than 
the valuable human motive of helping Europe to help 
herself, and so restore the economic and political 
health of this vrorld. That is, of course, an Ameri-
can interest; but it is everybody's interest, it is 
not exclusively Americif• This does not make the 
offer less unselfish. 11 
-
:1 
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1
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The Debate on the North Atlantic Pact, May 12, 1949, mark d 
another turning point in the ideas of the Left, for the Inde-
1 
pendent Group did not oppose it, as one might have expected. 1·1~ 
Apparently, the Left believed that once the Government was co~ 
I 
: 
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mi tted to the policy it was following, a natural consequence I, 
!i 
was the new treaty, which supplied arms for European defense !I 
H 
from the arsenal of America. ij 
li 
At this time the Russian Can;p was most vociferous in pro- if 
testing the Pact. Mr. Zilliacus felt it was absurd to think II 
II that the American people and Congress would spend money to :1 
il ,, 
defend Europe. Besides, such an arrangement could be regardedll 
by Russia only as a sign of aggression, and therefore would 
certainly lead to war. 
"The idea that the United States, which is 
already paying sixty-five per cent of its budget 
on the Marshall Plan and its own rearmament pro-
gram, will pay eighty-five per cent or something 
of that sort in order to rearm Western Europe is 
a proposition which Con~r~ss seems extremely 
reluctant to entertain.•l 
!I 
II 
:I ii ,, 
!I i: 
i! 
I' 
II 
,I 
II 
!I ,, 
I' 
" il 
il ,, 
iY.Lr. Zilliacus , who '\vas expelled from the Labour Party in II 
I, 
1949, followed the Communist line during the Debate. He argue4 
II 
that the Atlantic Pact was inconsistent with the Charter of th1 
United Nations on several accounts. For one thing, the politii 
II 
cal assumptions of each are at variance. The Charter assumes I 
the Permanent Members of the Security Council can always reachf 
I 
agreement in the end by peaceful means and will agree on major! 
issues, while the Pact assumes that the Soviet Union is poten-
tially aggressive and therefore the United. States and Western , 
Europe must organize force to contain Russia and deal with her 
in terms of power. He charged that the Pact repudiates the ;[ 
!i 
I United Nations and marks a return to balance of power politics~ 
I, 
18. Ibid, c. 2074. 
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According to his interpretation of the Charter, although 
regional arrangements are allowed to exercise rights of self-
defense, they are subject to the supremacy of the Security 
Council. Thus, under Article 53 parties to regional arrange-
ments may not resort to enforcement action without Security 
Council authorization. Further, under Article 53 a_ction may 
not be taken against acts of aggression without authorization 
of the Security Council, except against ex-enemy states. 
He argued that therefore, if self-defense is prohibited 
under Article 53, how can you claim that action is allowed 
under Article 51 
11 
••• unless you take the view that the action not 
allowed under a regional agreement is permissible 
under a world-wide agreerr:ent. In such case, we 
would have to reverse the historic argument of the 
young lady, who pleaded that, as it was only a 
little one, it was therefore, O.K. In this case, 
action becomes legitimate because it is on a world-
wide scale."l9 
Er. Zilliacus vrent on to say that if you should still choose 
to act under Article 51, on a plea of self-defense, then you 
must not act so as to limit the authority of the Security 
Council, for you rr.ust not 11 create an accomplished fact of sue 
magnitude and gravity that the Security Council is not able t 
20 
deal \vi th the resulting situation. 11 \'Then questioned as to 
. 
1 whether the aggressor was to be allowed, he stated that the 
11 aggressor would be dealt with by the Security Council. Howev r, 
II 
I' he ignored the fact that the aggressor would s-t;.ill hold the 
li 
1
':,' -cower of a veto on the Security Council. ~Ibid~ c. 2077-78. 
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"Article 5 of the Treaty proposes that a vrorld II 
war be started on a self-judged view of self-defense, li 
and the belligerent Great Powers on both sides are 11 
then to meet in the non-existent Security Council in 11 
order to agree to tell each other and themselves to i 
stop fighting. It is quite obvious that the action 'i 
enjoined by Article 5 would not only affect the autho- ;,
1
 
ri ty of the Security Council, bU:t \-Tould destroy that il 
body, shatter the United Nations, and split the world, !I 
and plunge humanity into war. It is fantastic that 'I 
that rigmarole should be put up as being in accordance il 
\<Tith the purposes, principles and obligations of the II 
Charter, as well as being contrary to Labour Party · 
policy and the Labour Party's mandate to make peace.u21 1/ 
Zilliacus' arguments make resistance to aggression the !I 
u 
crime, rather that the aggression, and take away the right of 
collective defense. This view would seem quite 
1 
I' 
unrealistic inj 
I' 
tl 
the light of military facts, for Russia has the largest mobil-l! 
I 
ized army in the world and the greatest numbEr of reserves. 1 ( 
' li His analysis of the political arguments for the Atlantic Pact !I 
II ,, 
are necessity, defense, and a more advantageous position for il 
bargaining with Russia. He disposed of these, saying that 
there was not the necessity since ''all methods of reaching 
agreement (with Russia) have not been exhausted." What looks il 
like self-defense to one side, to the other looks like some- II 
II 
thing quite different so that an arms race and a balance of II 
li 
I 
power \-TOuld result and lead to liar. As for bargaining positi~n, 
he feels that "the more we arm the more we increase fear and \\ 
22 !1 
suspicion." 11 
However, the Government's view is that Russia's policy /; 
ii 
appears aggressive, in 1-Thich case it vvill do no harm to attemtt 
to deter aggression by making it known that the act will be 
·i 
21. Ibid, c. 2078-79. 
22~. ~. I~id., .a. 2081 .. 
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met by the concerted efforts of the West. 
ttThe absence of the Atlantic Pact did not stop 
war in 1914 or 1939, and I suggest that if a pact 
like this had existed, and the potential aggressor 
had known what he would have to face, those wars 
might been avoided. 11 23 
That a majority of the Labour Party and other parties stood 
behind the Government is evidenced by the vote of 336 to 6 in 
the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty by the House of 
Commons on May 12, 1949. Thus, British policy tm'fard Russia, 
although it is willing to leave the door open to further dis-
cussion and agreement, is one of containment. Actually, the 
group who wrote ~ Left did advocate that the Vlestern Europe n 
countries strengthen a collective defense system against any 
possible aggression, but did not believe the United States 
would back such a move. 
One other point will serve to illustrate the views of 
the Left, as opposed to those of His Majesty's Government. 
That is the difference between the Left and Official reactions 
to the Council of Europe, which was signed on May 5, 1949, as 
the Statute of Europe. The Government joined with other memb 
nations in agreeing to it, and sent representatives to the 
first council meeting in August, 1949, at Strasbourg, its per 
manent seat. As members of the Government, the Labour Party 
officially approves of the Council and has commended it as a 
logical step in the direction of Western Union following the 
procession of events from the economic groups set up among 
23. Ibid, c. 2015, Mr. Bevin. 
i 
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II 
various European countries, the Treaty of Dunkirk, the Organ-
ization for European Economic Cooperation, the Brussels Treat , 
and the North Atlantic Treaty. The basis for such moves was 
"the acceptance of common principles of conduct and common 
24 
conceptions of vlhat is right." 
However, the Left of the Labour Party has been rocked by 
the decision, for it shudders at the prospect of having to 
deal with mostly reactionary governments. Representatives of 
the Party at Strasbourg joined forces with other social 
democrats there and found themselves outnumbered. 
to be content with the lot of an Opposition Party. 
They had 
Therefore I 
British cooperation on the Continent seemingly hit an ideolog -
cal snag at this point. 
In addition, the Independent Leftists cannot trust such 
an organization because Winston Churchill sup:oorts it. They 
prefer to wait until a truly socialist organization is possib e, 
for they do not want to get entangled in an organization whic 
opJoses the ideals of British Socialism and which might for 
the sake of unification attempt to take away some of the 
socialist gains in England. 
Although Bevin said that the approach to European unity 
should be through Governments and not private bodies, the 
Daily Herald (the official newspaper of the Labour Party) 
states on April 29, 1948 that Socialists have their own organ' 
izations to deal with these questions. 
24. Attlee, Quoted in B.I.S. pamphlet, ID944, Nov., 1949, 
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ii The Russian Camp, as might be expected, denounced moves :I 
II for the unity of Western Europe altogether on the pretext that! 
II 
II 
ii 
they are directed against Russia. 
B. Party Differences 
At the Annual Conferences of the Labour Party where the 
!I 
I[ 
I! 
11 
II 
ji 
'I 
ali 
representatives of the rank and file of the Party vote on 
aspects of Party policy, there has been much discussion on 
phases of foreign policy. As a rule, the proposals of the I! 
Government are approved by overwhelming majorities since the !l1 
rank and file does approve of them. Very often representativ~ 
j! 
of the trades unions speak in support of resolutions offered il 
II 
by the Cabinet or by the National Executive of the Party, and Jl 
introduce resolutions '\vhich have the prior consent of those 
bodies. 
ii 
The socialist minority, w11ich is numerically small, is [i 
vociferous in its demands for a more openly socialist foreign II 
policy. Points on which they violently disagreed with Offie1~~ 
policy include Greece; Spain; Palestine; cooperation with the I! 
II 
:I 
United States, as opposed to Soviet Russia; socialization of !i 
Germany; the peace treaties; and certain points of policy in l 
the Middle East and the Far East; among others. Feeling ran li 
move, at its highest during the 1948 Conference when Zilliacus 
25 
his Gateshead Amendment. 
At the conclusion of a debate on foreign policy one of 
the 1•1inisters summed up the Official view. Very often Hugh 
25. c.f. Chapter III, p. 52. 
II 
'I 
II 
li ,, 
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Dalton has done this. At the 1949 Conference he began by 
that there was an almost complete absence of criticism of 
Ernest Bevin, which was a new feature, since there had always 
been some from one angle or another, even though the policy of 
the Foreign Secretary and Governr;;snt \tas alitmys endorsed by 
overv-Thelming majorities finally. He attributed this to the 
unity of policy and purpose which comes as the Labour Movement 
26 
advances. (Incidentally, Zilliacus was not present at this 
Conference, and other objectors were not chosen as representat ves.) 
The Leftists took particular delight in criticizing Mr. !i 
1! 
Bevin for following a Tory policy and illustrated this by 
pointing to the Foreign Office, where the old staff was still 
employed. In answer to these accusations the Foreign Kinisterll 
reminded his critics that the Foreign Office recruits its staff 
from the Civil Service on a career basis, that he had to keep 11 
the older people on because there was no one with sufficient I 
experience to replace them, and besides, he was not against I 
I 
the universities. He added that he was responsible for sendi 
labor and corrm:ercial attaches to the staffs of each consulate, 
and for giving women an equal opportunity in the Foreign Offi 
In all fairness, he did keep and promote career diplomat , 
not out of perversity to socialists who demanded wholesale !I 
changes, but because these diplomats convinced Bevin they wer~l 
• 
II 
men of extreme perception and selfless devotion to the intere~jts 
of their country. After attending a f~w diplomatic functionsJI 
26. Report of the Annual Labour Party Conference, 1949, p.l97J! 
~ ?T· Ibid, :Lgli6, p. :L64; .. .. . 1[1\!, 
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he decided that they were too stiff and formal, so he had the II 
clerical help from the Foreign Office come to them too in orde1 
I, 
that visitors coula. see and talk with ordinary Britons, and 11 
28 tl ii observe democracy. :1 
'I The demands of the Socialists amounted to advocating j1 
II 
either intervention or non-intervention, as the case required, !J 
'I in the interests of furthering social democracy. In 1946 they/! 
asked for intervention in Spain to help the Republicans over- IJ 
II 
throw the black Fascism of Franco, in memory of help promised \i 
'I them during the Civil War when the Labour Party was out of \
1 
II 
power. They urged breaking off diplomatic relations and ap- I' 
·I I, 
I' plying economic sanctions. 11 
,I 
The arguments against this case stated that the Governme~t 
I' 
was not prepared to intervene in the internal affairs of Spain~ 
Gettin~ rid of Franco was a problem for the Spanish people /i 
themselves. The resolution calling for economic sanctions was)l 
:j 
II 
defeated since they mean further hardship for the working- \J 
people, and when sane ti ons are started, they must be followed IJ 
!! 
up by preparation for war. As for recalling the Ambassador, ,j 
II 
Mr. Bevin did not see that such an unimportant gesture would [' 
change any country's policy. I 
In the case of Greece, a policy of non-intervention was \ 
,I 
demanded. The Leftists objected to Bevin's policy of continuifg 
the policy of the Coalition Government which pledged Britain 
to try to rehabilitate Greece and to hold early elections. 
28. Evans, T., Bevin of Britain, New York, W.W. Norton Co., 
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People in the An::erican Camp even challenged this aspect of [! 
,, 
I! foreign policy because in pursuing it Bevin tended to support li 
il 29 
rightist elements, and a civil war broke out after the electi9ps. 
At the 1948 Conference a resolution called for the immediate !1 
ii 
recall of all British troops stationed in the area of Greece. il 
i II 
:I Bevin replied that the number there had been reduced fro~' 
I! 15,000 to 3,000, which also would have been taken out, but fo~l 
,, 
the fact that the United Nations Commission disclosed that thell 
II 
northern neighbors were organising under l·1arkos. 
"I was not going to desert democratic Greece 
while neighbours on the other side were seeking to 
make another Czechoslovakia of her immediately we 
had gone ••• I cannot ignore the terror that is 
going on, and one lift of a fin~e0 from a place you know would stop it tonight.'3 
ij 
:i 
At the 1946 Conference a speaker suggested that the Midd~~ 
,, 
East ought to be made a matter of international concern, to 
ivhich Mr. Bevin replied, 
" ••• I am not going to be a party to voluntarily 
putting all British interests in a pool and every-
body else sticking to his own."31 II 
II 
Most of the Left groups do admit a genuine British interest i~[ 
jl 
that area because of British shipping, oil (which does not re1l 
quire dollars), and social experin:ents and industrial developJI 
ments so that the wealth of that part of t~e world flows back \1 
to the people to raise their standards instead of going to a II 
small clique. Another demand was for the internationalizatio1 
of the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal. But, it was pointed ourt 
1/ 
Party Conference, 1948, pp.l89~90. 29. Report of the Annual Labour 
30. Ibid, p. 199. 
31. I"bcid,.n1947., p. l7P-.. 
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that such schemes are not feasible until the l.J:ili tary Commi ttef;l 
of the United Nations or some regional settlement reached in 
conjunction with the United Nations could carry it out in ac-
cordance with a general defense scheme. 
il 
The issue over which most feeling was evinced was Palestine~ 
The Left wished to keep Party promises to the Jewish people to 
provide a National Homeland and blamed Bevin's perversity and 
stubborness for this election pledge not being carried out. 
The only part of the whole businessWhiOh the Left in England 
could applaud was Bevin's strorsreproach to the Americans on 
their criticism of the matter without being willing to take 
responsibility for settling it. Bevin's view was that Great 
Britain did not have the power to give the Jews permission for 
unrestricted immigration, and that there vras also an obligation 
to the Arab states. In general, the tension over this problem 
subsided when it vras referred back to the United Nations, sinai~ 
the Nandate had come from the League of Nations. 
While it would be possible to continue indefinitely on the 
;i 
conflict bet~rreen the Left and Official Party views on foreign , 
poliq)f, the above exan:.ples suffice to illustrate some of the 
points where strong feeling existed. The criteria of the Lef~, 
the Independent Group especially, is the promotion of the goa~s 
of socialism in the British sense, vrhich on occasion is dif-
ferentiated from Continentql socialism. British policy in 
Germany has been criticized from all quarters, but the Left of 
the Labour Party disliked the delay in introducing socialized 
- - ----_---:-·---_- ---~-_-- -_-_-_- --------=-
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industry, which it feels the British could easily sponsor in 
its Zone of Occupation. The Official reply is that while the 
I•lili tary Governments 0\"ln G·erman industry, it has been agreed 
to transfer it as far as possible to German hands, which the 
British Government is doing. "But the issue of what form 
'32. 
m<Tnership should take should be left to the Germans to decide." I 
c. The Conflict Published 
The conflict is not limited merely to Parliament and the 
Annual Conferences, but is carried on everywhere that Leftists' 
can voice an opinion--whether in the press, in Left magazines " 
and periodicals, on the platform, or in their 'i;-Tritings. !v1any 
prominent men send letters to the editors of newspapers who 
publish them. For instance, there is hardly a major newspaper·, 
to which I-Ir. Zilliacus has not sent a letter in order to get 
his views printed. 
The weekly, the New Statesman and Nation, is outspoken in 
its editorial and feature articles on English politics in be-
half of the Independent Group. Leonard Woolf is on the edi-
torial staff and his views can very often be detected in the 
editorials, which are unsigned. Kingsley Martin, another 
editor, appears to take sojourns into the Russian Camp from 
i 
time to time. R.H.S. Crossman is a regular contributor to ther 
New Statesman and Nation. 
The Political Quarterly is a more scholarly publication, 
but also presents the vie\vS of the intellectual Left on British 
32. Ibid, 1948, p. 197. 
:; 
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I 
politics and international relations. W.N. Ewer, who takes a i[ 
Right view on foreign affairs, writes articles for it, as do II 
Mr. Woolf, Y~. Crossman, and Mr. Martin. 
In addition, the Fabian Society conducts lectures for 
its members, which are delivered by prominent people in the 
Socialist Movement. Some of these have later been put in book 
form, such as Programme for Victory, What Labour Could Do, and :I 
- II 
The Road to Recovery. A partial list of these authors include$ 
H.J. Laski, Harold Nicholson, M.P., Ellen Wilkenson, M.P., j, 
II 
!I 
G.D.H. Cole, Philip Noel-Baker, M.P., Dr. Julian Huxley, Kings*ey 
,, 
Some of these people have indepe~-
ii 
Martin, and R.H.S. Crossman. 
dently written books and pamphlets about their own views and ! 
findings. G.D.H. Cole has written pamphlets and several 
volumes which cover foreign policy. A few examples serve 
illustrate the conflict of the Left with Official foreign 
in the medium of the press. 
large;; 
!l 
t q 0 !I 
ii 
poli~y 
! 
II 
The New Statesman and Nation is very critical of American lt 
;i 
policy and of Bevin's tendency to lean towards the United Stat~s. 
,, 
'I 
As early as 1945 the att~ude of the editors was set and revealtd 
in an editorial about the Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting' 
The conclusion is that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are grabbing \1 
'I 
II 
all they can. 
"American policy is equally egotistic and, 
indeed in the Far East, openly Imperialist• Japan 
is regarded as an American base, to be exploited 
by u.s. Business and maintained as a military 
asset."33 
33. Editorial, New Statesman & Nation, "Agenda Adjournment", 
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It is stated, however, that in a showdown Britain would be apt' 
to go with the United States. 
"But in fact we stand bet·.-1een Russia and America. 
We are a European people, conscious of our economic 
and cultural ties with the Continent and ready, if 
the Soviet Union would believe it, for cooperation 
with Russia in rebuilding Europe. The United States 
cares little about Europe, tiD Americans are increas-
ingly impressed with the efficiency of German machin-
ery and the prospect of acquiring industries."-'4 
The hope is expressed that through common policy of economic 
welfare both Russia and Britain might develop Socialism in 
Europe. 
"Mr. Bevin, hov1ever, seems far too ready to 
continue the Churchillian policy of backing American 
ambitions in exchange for American support of an 
old-fashioned conception of British Imperial 
interests. "35 -
Their vieii of the Anglo-American Loan Agreement is that 
36 
"Congress is out for its pound of flesh." Britain requires 
"a revived Europe ••• and a reconstructed Germany ••• as a 
37 
market for her exports." 
It is also felt that to demand parliamentary democracy 
in southeastern Europe is wrong because conditions there are 
not ripe for it. Only in Western Europe can parliamentary 
democracy be supported and at the same time build up a social~ 
ist economy. To demand this of the states in Eastern Europe 
is to antagonize Russia and obstruct economic and socialist 
reconstruction. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid, 
37. Ibid, 
"America's Terms 11 , Dec. 1, 1945, p. 360. 
"After Potsdam", Aug. 11, 1945, p. 87. 
j. 
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Often the New Statesman group refuses to admit the facts 
of a case where America is involved. Here is a typical argu-
ment: British and French interests differ from those of Amer~ca. 
ii 
TvlO things are vital to England and France--a negotiated set-
lement of atomic disarmament and a German peace treaty. 
Mr. I, 
Bevin should reply to J:.1r. Churchill's proposal that Germany b~l 
rearmed along these lines: To rearm Germany means accepting 
the division of Europe as a fait accompli, which can only be 
I' 
li 
il 
II 
I: 
!i 
changed by a shooting war. To impose German comradeship on 11 
1: 
France would mean driving thousands of patriotic Frenchmen in~p 
I' the Communist Party or might 1vell precipitate a Gaullist coup :; 
and dictatorship, while in Eastern Europe German rearmament 
would destroy any national Conm-,unist tendencies v-rhich 11 are th~l 
chief points of resistance to Russian imperialism11 , for then 
Titoism would be crushed and Russian domination would be 
accepted by the Slavs as a lesser evil. 
11 The fact is that Anglo-French Conditions of 
Peace ~ust differ fron. tlwse of the U.s .A. The 
Americans may survive an atomic vmr: we cannot. 
They may prosper despite the permanent division of 
Europe: our prospects of d.oing so are insignifi-
cant. Lastly, to rearm Germany, and then to seek 
a settlement ,,Jith Russia is tantamount to demanding 
unconditional surrender. This may possibly be 
regarded as a policy compatible 1vith American in-
terests. It is not compatible with the interests 
of France or Britain. Our survival depends to-day, 
as in 1945, on the neutralization and permanent 
disarmament of a united Germany under a peace treaty 
signed by the Four Fm-rers, just as our military 
survival deuends on a convention forbidding the use 
- 1138 of weapons of mass destruction. 
I' 
38. ~~~lr. Churchill 1 s Challenge 11 , unsigned, New Statesman & Na~,ion, 
April 8, 1950, p. 392. 
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G.D.H. Cole is more critical of Russia. Therefore, he 
condones many of the Government policies vrhich the ~ Statesm~n 
group cannot. One point he brings up is very interesting-- ' 
the Russian view of British policy: To the Soviet leaders, 
Great Britain is still an imperial power trying to retain its 
empire and lines of communication, and preserving its ability 
to exploit the backward nations. Thus, Russia interprets 
India's independence as a sign of weakness on the part of Great 
II 
Britain, because India was conciliated when it could no longer :J 
be held. They also interpret British policy in the Near and 
Middle East as an attempt to safeguard the Suez Canal and the 
oil routes from the Middle East by maintaining military and 
'I !I 
I) 
air bases there and by making the Eastern Mediterranean, if no1 
a British, then an Anglo-American lake. For these reasons 
Britain supported black reaction in Greece and prevented the 
il 
!j 
li 
I' II 
Soviet Union from obtaining any bases on the !v~editerranean or li 
an exit from the Black Sea. In the Far East the Soviets assum~ 
that Malaya would again become an area for capitalist exploita+ 
tion, while the Dutch in Indonesia, the French in Indo-China, 
and the A~ericans with the aid of Chiang Kai-Shek in China, 
would do the same thing. 
Professor Cole feels that such an account is mainly true, 
but it would look quite different when explained by Mr. Bevin, 
for he vrould probably argue that if the Russians want to play 
upovrer politics 11 , it leaves him no choice but to play 
His assumption of England's position would be 
il 
II 
li 
i' -
i 
II t 
••• no as a tired imperialist exploiter trying to 
salve as much as possible of its ill-gotten gains, 
but prepared to give its subject peoples as much 
self-government as is good for them."39 
In this case he would ask why he should not do everything pos-
sible to defend British interests in the I·Iiddle East and to 
restore British rule in Borneo and Malaya. He could not help 
but be angry when the Soviet statesmen, instead of acknowledgi~g 
his right to act accordingly, 
" ••• did everything they could to make things 
awkward for him, though, in his view, they were 
themselves following a much more aggre~sively 
imperialist policy in Eastern Europe."40 
-
While Bevin believes Stalin is playing "power politics", 
Sta~in believes he is liberating more peoples "from the 
capitalist-imperialist yoke. 11 'vh.ereas Stalin sees Bevin as an 
upholder of capitalism and imperialism and as a member of the 
American campaign against the U.S.S.R., Bevin sees himself as 
the 
II • • .defender Of \'Testern democracy and Of liberal 
reformism in the colonial world against a totali-
tarian Communism w~ich threatens all the soci~t 
values of Western civilization with eclipse." 
Mr. Cole thinks that if Stalin and Bevin were to pursue 
this debate, they might be able to corr;e to terms, but 
" ••• there is to every one of t~eir discussions a 
third party--The United States--to most a fourth--
France--apd to some a chorus--the United Nations as 
a whole. "42 
Whenever I~r. Bevin has been in a position of having to 
choose between backing the United States or Mr. Molotov, in 
39. Cole, World in Transition, p, 597. 
40. Ibid, p.597. 
41. IOJ.CI.~p-.600.-
42. Ibid. 
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nine, if not ten times, out of ten he comes down on the Americ~n 
side, for two main reasons, leaving aside the consideration !i 
!I 
that !vlr'. :Molotov has been unreasonable or unaccommodating in 
pushing the Soviet policy. First, in accordance with his polidy 
of gradualism, Mr. Bevin tries to defend British interests all ,, 
over the l'i'Orld, including British capitalist interests, which 
he is not in a position yet to discipline or replace, and 
second, his conception of political democracy is much closer 
43 
to that of t~1.e Arr:ericans than of Vw. Molotov. 
D. Conclusion 
The Left has not hesitated to exclaim itsfiews. In all 
fields of political discussion the evidences of the conflict and 
differences between the Left and Official foreign policies are: 
found. 
In Parliament each of the three general groups discussed 
in this study has expressed its ideas. The Allierican Camp gen-
erally supports the Government and defends Official policy. 
The Independent Camp, organized as the Keep Leftists, is critical 
of Government policy whenever it believes socialist standards '' 
are being abandoned. For this reason the King's Speech was 
challenged in 1946. The Russian Can~p follows the Cominform 
line, thus opposing moves toward the unification of the West, 
such as the North Atlantic Treaty. 
At the Annual Conferences of the Labour Party the discus-
i 
sian continues in much the same way--the Ar:.erican Camp lending.: 
43. Cole' The Intelligent ManIs Guide to the Post \•lar vrorld' 
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support to official policy, which \'las from time to time chal-
lensed by both the Independent and Russian Camps. The greates!t 
amount of feeling was evinced in the cases of Palestine, Greec,e, 
Spain, Near and !·riddle Eastern policy, and relationships vTi th 
both the United States and Soviet Russia. HOi'lever, the views 
of the extreme Left were silenced so that by 1949 there was not 
so sharp a divergence of ideas on foreign policy. 
These differences are also projected beyond the formal 
arenas of the House of Commons and the Party Conferences. The\ 
vie\'IS of the Left are widely publicized in newspapers and other 
periodicals, such as the New Sta~esman and Nation and the 
Pol~1ical Quarterly. Intellectual groups, such as the Fabian 
Society, sponsor lectures, pamphlets, and books disseminating 
the ideas of the Left on foreign policy. 
On the whole, the Left has found itself yielding to offiq,ial 
policy, despite sharp, vituperative words of criticism on Hia · 
~ajesty 1 s foreign policy. In fact, the extreme Left finds :: 
:: 
itself outside the Labour Party. 'I The reasons for this situat:i,~on 
., 
lie partly in the actual dangers facing Britain and the impor..;: 
tance of unity within the nation. But, a large part of the 
answer is to be found in the larger problem of idealism ~· 
realism. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The most valuable contribution made by the Left on 
British foreign policy is the thinking out of principles of 
political action and evolving ideals towards which statesmen , 
aim. As a rule, the Left is superior intellectually, but 
lacks the practical experience which comes from contact with 
1 
reality. The following problems will be discussed in this 
chapter: the assumptions of the Left on international rela-
tions, the attitudes of the Left and of the Government towards 
power, the views of the Left on the difference between a 
Socialist and a National foreign policy, and, finally, an 
evaluation of the influence the Left produced on British 
foreign policy. 
A. Left Assumptions on International Relations 
The basis of the Left analyses of British international 
policy lies in the desire for a peace which will distribute 
social, economic, and political justice as envisioned in 
social democracy. The Left further assumes that no country 
wants war, that all want peace. Proceeding from this premise,[ 
the Left has built up a logical case for idealism--one to 
which the rest of the Labour Party can aspire. 
International cooperation, embodied in a World Cooperatiye 
Commonwealth, is the next ideal of the Left. While the con-
ceptions of this Commonwealth far surpass the reality of the 
1. Carr, E.H., The ~wenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, London, 
Macmillan & Co., 1942, first edition, 1939, p. 26. 
- ,,_ 
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United Nations Organization, the Left can agree that the 
United Nations is a reasonable starting point. By supporting~· 
this institution the Left hopes that one step further will be 
taken towards a more even distribution of the world's resourcts 
and a more democratic way of life. 
The British Labour Party worked out its ideals of inter-
national relations during 1vorld War I, the ultimate goal of 
which was to be the "World Cooperative Commonw·ealth. n The 
leading thinkers in the field of foreign affairs were moti-
vated by high ideals for a Utopia based on universal justice 
and permanent peace. But, they did not have a proper regard 
to the realities of power--which cannot be ignored in working 
out a practical form of political action. 
The Leftist critics of the Labour Party today seem to be 
repeating the lessons taught them by Attlee and other party 
2 
leaders in the 1930's. At that time, while members of the 
Party realized that a war was imminent, they continued to 
hold onto ideals and principles vrhich the reality of the sit-: 
uation did not warrant. Believing that Britain should depend
1
, 
for security upon true collective security, the Labour M.P.s 
continued to denounce and vote against appropriations for 
the armed services until Hitler had proven time and again 
that his intent was aggressive. Thus, they were party to 
lowering British defenses to a dangerous point. 
2. Brogan, c., .Q}g: New I"1asters, London, Hollis & Carter, 19481:, 
Chapter 3. 
:·, 
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2 !I 
'I 
'Ylhile the international situation differs in particulars/! ,, 
nevertheless, Labour 1 s Left generally follows a sin:ilar line /1 
H 
1\ today. For instance, proposals such as that of the Keep Left!; 
lj !, group, that England is indefensible in an atomic war and 
II 
'I therefore should not try to defend herself illustrate the un-/! 
I' 
reality of this sort of argument. I! Being unprepared does not " 
mean per ~ that a country will be left out of the arena of 
atomic warfare. These people fail to perceive that one of 
the primary duties of a state is defense--on the domestic or 
on the international plane. Apparently, the optimism raised r, 
II d 
by hopes of permanent peace and disarmament in the inter-war I: 
period made many people lose sight of this fact. i\ It is as li 
II 
ridiculous to say that if you have no arms, you cannot fight ,li 
'I 
i! 
and if you cannot fight there 1tTill be no war, as it is to saylr 
II 
"the medical profession has a vested interest in illness; wit~-
li 
therefore abolish the[i out it the doctors lose their incoffies: 
3 
doctors and nobody v-Till be ill." 
Leonard Woolf advocates the consolidation of British 
resources. However, in carrying out his plan, the entire 
British orbit would be so weakened that it would become a d I 
,! 
virtual !i "power vacuum"--an invitation for some other Power to1, jl 
II 
I 
'I 
step in. He argues, too, that Britain is already a second-
'I participate! 
,, 
rate Power, in the sense that it cannot afford to 
in an atomic war. Therefore, 
3. Cherry, QE. Cit., p. 51. 
·-· . - __ ,.,..., __.,., __ -~c--~-:---.. ~7e~=o==---~---~-- ·- -125" - --o-=~-,-==~-
" ••• if we do admit it and make our policy conform 
to it, we shall have taken the one step which will 
ensure that Britain and the Commonwealth remain, in 
everything but milifary strength, a first class power."4 
But, this does not square vvi th one of the first precepts of 
5 
international relations, that power means military power. 
The Keep Leftists opposed bills in Parliament on appropri 
ations for the armed forces and. questioned the Government poli y 
of maintaining a comparatively large peace-time Army both at 
home and overseas. They claimed that too much of the nation's 
resources were being diverted to military purposes instead of 
being applied to the need for prosperity, and toward making 
socialism work. However, in order to have a socialist Britain 
the Government must first make sure that there is a Britain. 
To follow the course advocated by this group is to abandon 
reality, for until an effective international police force is 
organized, there can be no reduction in the size of British 
military forces. 
G.D.H. Cole also proposes that British Armies be removed 
from the ends of the earth and that the Dominions provide for 
their own defense. He feels that by maintaining large armies 
the West will only succeed in provoking the Russians and ir-
ritating them with militarism, thus starting a new arms race 
and evenutal war. However, he presents himself with a dilemma 
for he states that the Russians respect strength and look upon 
conciliation as a sign of weakness. 
4. Woolf, Foreign Policy, p. 26. 
5. Morgenthau, H.J., Politics Among Nations, New York, Knopf, 
c-.=-"'7.7"~=--==-~ c.c·· -- -.-c-c.--- -l-94-9-T-'PJ}.-~--l.S.o=·=cc-=··~=·==-=-7=o.o·c=-=cc"=~-_. ---------- __ ... --=- =o~o=-c-c.-c·.=-~ 
... 126 
The fallacy in the Left premise about war and peace is 
that perhaps some one or few nations do not desire peace. 
Since this fact has become increasingly more apparent, the 
substance of the Left proposals is no longer tenable. In fac , 
upon reviewing the international situation recently, the Keep 
Left group decided that its proposals on foreign policy were 
outdated by two things, the Marshall Plan and Molotov's walk-
6 
out from the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers~ Although 
the group states, "what we reject utterly is the Russian explo t-
ation of communist parties and regimes for extending the Sovie 
7 
Empire," and does approve Gorvernment efforts to resist 
imperialis~nevertheless, it still regards democracy as the 
8 
first line of defense, and arms a secondary means. It 
still that the only solution in the long run is "full employ-
ment, fair shares, and social and racial equality on a world 
9 
scale~' While these are admirable aspirations, they are no mor 
than that, unfortunately. 
The "practical politicians" who attained office in the 
Labour Government of 1945 had learned the moral of those lesso s 
of the 1930's. It is significant that they find it 
10 
to refer to such phrases as "proper equilibrium", 
necessary 
"balance o 
11 
political force", 
12 
and "a measure of collective security." 
While these men also assume that peace and a world organizatio 
6. Keeping~' by A Group of M.P.s, London, New Statesman 
Pamphlet, January, 1950, p. 18. 
7. Ibid, p. 44. 
8. Ibid, p. 23. 
9. Ibid, p. 25. 
·.~~.-.c·c~~c-=--o"C. · ·· c-lD~~in! .... - .... .-.c-c-,c..·cc.~.~==oo~.·-~.. .• ..... .. -- ........... . 
ll.HcNeil. 
12.Noel-Baker. 
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are very important ideals, they find it necessary to regard 
the actions of all other nations, while taking steps towards 
the ideals. 
B. Power 
That the Left does not fully consider power is obvious 
from the foregoing section. While the Left will admit that 
such a force exists, it refuses to concede that military power 
is still the final arbiter of international relationi. In the 
final analysis, this refusal is fundamental to the position of 
the Left, i.e., all nations want peace and prosperity. There 
is, on the other hand, an undue emphasis on the importance of 
the ideological, or psychological, phase of power, since the 
Left hopes to persuade by its ideals, and by a demonstration 
of the successes of social democracy other natlonsto follow t 
path of British Socialism. 
While British Labour hopes to inspire other countries to 
adhere to socialist policies, the majority of the Party does 
not go so far as to say that only Socialism will produce peac 
as some of the Leftists say. 1J:r. Attlee wrote that British 
socialists do not adhere to ideological imperialism or forcin 
all other nations into a common mould. "The ruling principle 
is not to enforce uniformity but to give individual freedom." 
Accordingly, in external affairs a Labour Government recogniz s 
" ••• the right of each nation to regulate its own 
affairs according to what it considers desirable, 
provided that in so doing it does not conflict \vi th 
the general interests of the human race."l4 
,-,-:-L~ A_tt1 eP!Jc~he~~bo_ur,-Part-z __ in P~X:~E~~t~ve, P. 119. 
14. ~. p. 117. 
12 
A definition of the Government's attitude toward power 
spelled out by Ernest Bevin in the Foreign Affairs Debate in 
the House of Commons on January 22, 1948. In his plea for 
European unity he stated: "The issue is whether European uni 
cannot be achieved ·vri thout the domination and control of one 
great power." British policy in this regard is based on three 
principles: (1)' 11 no nation should dominate Europe", (2). "the 
old-fashioned conception of the balance of power as an aim 
15 
should be discarded if possible" and (3): "there should be 
substituted Four-Power co-operation and assistance to all the 
states of Europe, to enable them to evolve freely, each in its 
16 
own i'iay. " 
The Labour Government indicates in the first principle 
cited in the above paragraph that it cannot reverse a centurie 
long policy, for Bevin goes on to declare that "if a policy is 
pursued by any one po1ver to try to dominate Europe by whatever 
means, direct or indirect--one has to be frank--one is driven 
to the conclusion that it will inevitably lead again to anothe 
world war." 
"No British government, however friendly to the 
Soviet Union, can withdraw from Europe and leave the 
nations of that continent to the exclusive tutelage 
of Moscow. Opposition to any one-power domination on 
the Continent is a firmly established tenet of 
England's foreign policy and the safety and liveli-
hood of the British people are still closely tied up 
with developm!fts across the Channel to permit its 
abandonment." 
As regards the "old-fashioned balance of power", the 
Government pledges that it 11will not use smaller powers as 
instruments of policy to produce difficulties between the 
larger powers", but no mention is made of abandoning a search 
for security in a balance between the East and the West. Fur-
thermore, the Government cannot stand by while one Great Power 
"proceeds to impose its political and economic system on the 
smaller states." While Britain does not seek to duplicate its 
own type o~ government in Europe, domination by Fascists or 
I 
Communists cannot be allowed. In particular, the British obje1 
to the "police state", which is incompatible with den:ocracy. 
Occasionally, Russophiles make excuses for Soviet tactics 
and hostility towards Labour Britain, saying Russia believes 
England is in the camp of the anti-communists. These people 
would concede to the Soviets as long as they acted in the 
direction of "true Socialism." They would write off the dif-
ferere.es between British evolutionary and Russian revolutionar 
Socialism as due to the different experiences the countries 
historically. In this case they would see to it that since it 
is impossible to stop Russia, then Russian-type socialism shou d 
18 
be diverted to countries where revolution is most justified. 
The grouping of countries which Licinius made is very interest 
ing: Evolutionary countries outside present (1947) Russian I 
zone--Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium, and inside--Czechoslovaki , 
and part of Austria. Revolutionary countries inside Russian II 
I 18. Licinius, ~ ~ gi, London, St. Botolph Publ. Co., 1947, J 
-.·. "" ··---"~- .--- -•c- ·-ppr:<1>-~ .. -· ---~~,-~~--~--~-~~---··~·-~-· - . --· ~ 
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zone are Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and outsid~3:rel ~"-· --~~= 
Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. l 
Throughout the arguments by the Left the importance of \ 
power has been under-estimated, and practical difficulties putl 
aside. It is one thing to say the Iron Curtain can be lifted 
19 
with trade, but quite another to effect such a policy. In 
KeeE Left an expansion of the Anglo-French Alliance into a 
European security pact is advocated on the basis that a unite4 
Europe which denounces the atom bomb would be a deterrent to j 
any aggressor. This is really wishful thinking, for how coul, 
an aggressor with the bomb be deterred by a victim without one 
There simply is no real hope of security in such a European 
system, for it is also difficult to believe that just because 
Europe is united, which, incidentally, has never hap-:lened 
in history, it can 11 tip the balance against war." 
Mr. Attlee once said that all government rests ultimatel 
20 
on force. He also said that he could not accept the views 
of the "optimistic" pacificists who dislike war as a crime, o 
of the 11 pessimistic 11 pacifists v1ho would appease in order to 
escape the horrors of war, because this gives the forces of 
21 
tyranny a free hand. 
When the Labour Party took over international affairs, 
the answer made to a Labour critic by Neville Chamberlain 
began to make sense: 
19. Kee£ Left, p. 38. I 20. Attlee, QE. Cit., • 
21. ~ 
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111V'hat does the Hon. 1-~ember mean by foreign policy? 
You can lay down sound and general propositions. You 
can say that your foreign policy is to maintain peace; 
you can say that it is to protect British interests, 
you can say that it is to use your influence, such as 
it is, on behalf or the right against the wrong, as 
far as you can tell the right from the wrong. You can 
lay down all these principles, but that is not a policy. 
Surely, if you are to have a policy you must take the 
particular situations and consider what action or in-
action is suitable for those particular situations. 
That is what I myself mean by policy, and it is quite 
clear that as the situations and conditions in foreign 
affairs continally change from day to day, your policy 
cannot be stated once and for all, if it is to be 
applicable to every situation that arises.u22 
Thus, the leaders of the Government have come to the con-, 
elusion that if it is impossible to attain an ideal immediatel , 
the next pest possible will have to be done. Since the United 
Nations did not afford Britain adequate protection, she had to 
seek other means--unity of \vestern Europe, reliance upon dip-
lorrjacy, and identification of United States policy with Bri tis' 
at critical points. If universal collective security was not 
attainable, then the strongest possible collective security, 
the North Atlantic Pact, was obtained. While 
11 
••• it is true that it is less healthy than a 
workable world-system in ~<vhich all the Great Powers 
agree to cooperate, a conception which will con-
tinue to retain our national sympathy, but in the 
absence of such a system and in the presence of a 
major political malady, the formation of exclusively 
defensive regional organizations is not a matter for 
regret. For, once we have got our balance of poli-
tical force right, once there is an appearance of 
stability, we may be ab~~ to begin to solve the 
political differences." 5 
22. N. Chamberlain in the House of Commons, Nov. 21, 1937, 
quoted in Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 27. 
23. From a speech by ~inister of State, Hector McNeil at a 
~ u~ ---=-~~~-i-efl~YBe=l9=.-=~94a_,=lh-~,. _Pa.mnbJ,et_, ID 
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c. Leftist Views on the Difference between a 
Socialist and a National Foreign Policy 
One conclusion 1-rhich can be drawn from the material con-
sidered thus far is that present British foreign policy is to 
a great measure a bi-partisan policy, for there is more criti-
cism of Government policy from Labour back-benchers than from 
the Opposition bench in Parliament. The Leader of the Conser-! 
va ti ves, l•Ir. Churchill, said: 
"On the whole, the Government have maintained a 
continuity in foreign policy with that pursued under 
the National Coalition Government of which I was the 
head, and of which my right hon. Friend the Member 
for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) was Foreign 
Secretary. We have, therefore, tried to give them 
all possible help, and thus keep the foreign policy 
of Britain outside the area of party controversy."24 
In fact, in speaking on the North Atlantic Treaty, he stated 
that 11 the only opposition to it is expected from that small ba d 
25 
of Communists, crypto-Communists, and fellow travelers." 
The Leader of the Liberal Party, Mr. Clement Davies, 
I, 
also/ 
spoke in favor of the Pact: 
"The Liberal Party, for v1hom I am speaking, have 
never been a war party; no one has ever accused us 
of being in favor of war ••• We have always been in 
favor of peace. The accusation usually brought 
against us is that we have not been sufficiently 
active on the defense side in promoting large arm-
amements. To us, the paramount purpose of the agree-
ment is the furtherance of peace, the prevention of 
war, and the collective security of the free peoples 
in defense of their form of democracy, their heritage, 
and their way of life. On behalf of all Liberals, 
not only in this House, but outside, I welcome and 
support this Pact. • • u26 
24. Parl. Deb., 5 s., H.C., Vol. 446, c. 550~ 
25. Parl. Deb., 5 s., H.C., Vol. 464, c. 2025. 
26. Ibid, c:-2034-35. 
I 
I 
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While pleading for a united Europe above party divisions, 
Mr. Churchill was reminded by a Labourite (Mr. Scollan) that 
he thought it was impossible to do this in England, let alone 
Europe. To this Mr. Churchill replied: 
"vfe have very great unities in this country. 
The vast majority of the people of this country are 
united on fundamentals both in regard to constitu-
tion and freedom. They are also united in resistance 
to continental forms of totalitarianism and also 
united in their pride of their past and will I ~7ust 
become united in their hopes for their future." 
-
Actually, as far as British policy towards the United 
States is concerned, the Conservatives feel more comfortable 
about close cooperation and Churchill first proposed a common 
policy for the English-speaking nations. Mr. Churchill urged I 
the joint use of bases, common staff arrangements, and a close 1 
integration of foreign policies throughout the English-speakin 
world, keeping in mind the overriding and supreme status of 
the United Nations. 
Even Mr. Zilliacus believes 11 there is virtual national 
unity in foreign policy. 11 He adds, however, 11That national 
unity has been achieved by the simple method of the Labour Gov 
ernrnent throwing overboard the election pledges of the Labour 
Party and taking the Tory line." 
While the Government, particularly 1-'l:r. Bevin, welcomes 
Opposition support of foreign policy as a sign of the strength 
I 
I 
of British unity to the outside world., the Leftists seem to 
feel that this is a point for criticism rather than praise. 
27.Parl. Deb., 5s., H.C., Vol. 446, c. 556. 
I' 
I 
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At Party Conferences the Government has to answer charges that 
the Foreign Minister is trying more to please the Opposition 
than his own party. 
It is interesting to note that the first point of the 
Keep Left program on Foreign Affairs states "no truck with 
Churchill. 11 These people refer to him as the arch-enemy of th 
Labour Party and seem to enjoy cultivating a hate-Churchill 
attitude, making him the symbol of all that is evil in capital 
ism, imperialism, and the Tory Party. To some extent also the 
Left seems to have made a scapegoat out of America on v.J"hich to 
heap criticism, due to a lack of finding anything better to 
blarr.e for certain shortcomings. Churchill shares the honors 
with An.erica as a part of the target--and to a lesser degree, 
so does Bevin. Disappointed that Den.ocratic Socialisrr: has not 
taken as strong a hold on Europe as they had hoped, the Leftis s 
blame the failure on capital ism being restored by the Uni t.:o:d 
States, i:1stead of recognizing that if the Europeans went 
28 
reactionary, they sin~ply "v·ranted to react. 
Government leaders stated from time to time that it 'V'Tas a 
source of eiLbarrassment or loss of prestige in dealing \vi th 
other countries v.J"hen a vociferous group at home 1vas denouncing 
its actions. The im_.:Jortance attached to this is perhaps in-
ciicated by the expulsion of such 11 subversive" eleri!ents from 
Vle Party as Er. Zilliacus, and the care taken in winning over 
to the Government point of vie.v those 1vho Here under the influ nee 
of such men. As a matter of fact, in the 1950 election the 
Official Labour ?arty put out its O'IJ·m candidates in the con-
stituencies from "<Thich these people came, resulting in a loss 
for the ?arty in three-cornered fi::;i:1ts. 
In a recent issue of the NevT State~ and Nation the 
loyalty of back-benchers is discussed. The writer argues tha 
the Government might consider the value to the Party's disci-
pline of a policy H:1ich the Conservatives would seriously 
29 
The editors of this periodical feel that Mr. Bevin 
is working at ''cross-purposes" with the Party, referring to a 
settlement of outstanding debts bet\,reen Israel and Britain. 
They advised, 
"If Sir Stafford is right in his assumption 
that Israel is a sound British investment, then 
the Foreign Office should be told to desist from 
its vendetta and to pay some regard to British 
interests and to cabinet policy."30 
The New Sta~esman and Nation is critical of the Governme t 
because lv1r. Churchill has always taken the initiative--at 
Fulton, at Zurich, and now in the recent speech on arming 
Western Germany--and feels that a positive alternative should 
be offered by 1-Ir. Bevin, 11 if Nr. Churahill is to be proved a 
false prophet", because for the first time since 1945 the two 
are in conflict over a major issue. However, the editors are 
not at all certain \ihether "l"Ir. :3evin 1 s objections are to the 
principle or to the timing of the proposal." Although he 
29. -Swingler·, Stephen, New Statesman and Nation, April 8, 
1950, p. 391. 
30. Editorial, Ibid, p. 389. 
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appeared to reject Churchill's conclusion, he did not offer an 
alternative, but merely said, "We cannot move without our 
31 
allies." 
1 
This complaint typifies the thinking of the Left on inter 
national policies. While the Leftists object to any proposals! 
made by Churchill and feel it necessary to criticize Mr. Bevin 
the~ are unable to offer any practicable alternative policy. 
They think in terms of high ideals, such as disarmament, Euru-1 
pean unity, and expressions of universal peace, but i<Tithout I 
due consideration to the dynamics of power as a basis upon whi h 
major states have always relied in relations with one another. 
Surely, it is preferable not to have international relations 
rest on such a base, but, on the other hand, it is folly to 
ignore reality. They underestimate the inflexibility of Com-
munist doctrines and the police state as a threat to the poli-
tical freedoms which they profess are very important. Element 
of both Utopia and reality are necessary in political thought-
political action must be based on a coordination of morality 
32 
and power. 
D. What Influence Did the Left Produce on 
British Foreign ?olicy? 
Yet, the ideals of the Left in themselves are the most 
important contribution which the Left has to make, for they 
supply goals toward which to work. Without them there would 
be little hope for a better life--or means of translating 
31. 11 Mr.- Churchill's Challenge", Unsigned, Ibid, p. 392. 
32. Carr, Twent;y Years' Crisis, Chapter 14. 
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day-to-day politics to the people, whose support has become ani 
essential in the conduct of modern international relations. 
\vhile Ivlr. Zilliacus has claimed that the people would show 
their objection to Government policy by passive resistance, 
a thing is not likely when they know the direction in which 
Government is aiming. Nationalism is still a potent force, 
above and beyond that they will not sacrifice principles and 
ideals which are held inviolable. 
Socialism implies an economic approach in dealing with 
various problems--domestic or international--since one of its 
I 
objectives is to produce economic well-being for all the peopl'~ 
In doing this for people at home, a socialist government, in 
accordance with its principles, cannot create such ideal con-
33 
ditions for its own people at the expense of other peoples. 
Unless there is a rise in the standards of other peoples and 
a virtual decrease of hunger among backward nations, the gainsj 
of socialist Britain might be nullified by an uprising or revo t 
by them. In addition, socialist Britain could not comfortably 
exploit these peoples since to do so would be to renounce the 1 
I 
core of socialism• Thus, the Labour Government bas done what I 
it could to secure international economic stability by attempt ng 
to balance exports and imports, by cooperating with as many I 
nations as possible, and by promoting international controls 1 
which will help establish a viable economy. On this point the·l1 
Left approves and supports Government policy and actions. ,
1 
33. Attlee, QQ. Cit. tl 
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Empire provide for the :bo I The British Commonwealth and 
Government a vast area with dependent peoples in which to begi 
I 
its work of raising them to a higher status economically, pol- I 
itically, and socially, in accordance with the ideals of socia -
ism and democracy. It is doing much to educate the natives fo 
I 
democracy and eventually for a status of self-government--as il 
India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. Care is being taken that the com on 
people rather than just the upper classes benefit by investmen • 
Great development programs for utilizing available resources a e 
I 
under way with a dual purpose of helping the native people andJ 
' II of improving Britain s ovTn economic needs. In the United Nati ns, 
Britain has looked for an extension of the trusteeship princip e 
as another means to help these areas. Through these means the 
goals of a Socialist foreign policy are being effected, as farj 
as practicable. I 
I 
The Government, defining a socialist foreign policy as on 
which follov;s the old Socialist maxim--From each according to lj 
his capacity and to each according to his need--has attempted o 
tap the reservoir of -vres,lth, resources, and productivity of th 
United States to help its poorer relations. One example of th s 
vtas the U .N .R.R.A. program, to which the United States contri-
buted seventy per cent of the funds, and Britain also gave 
34 
i:,l55,000,000, for tLe purpose of giving relief aid to devas-
tated areas in Europe, including Eastern Europe, and to 
34. Figures from speech by P.I>-1. Attlee, Parl. Deb., 5s., 
Vol. 430, c. 584. 
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l One of tte prime objects of British foreign policy follow 
1 ing the war was to prevent a reversion to isolationism by the 
United States. The Foreign Secretary went to work immediately 
follov1ing l·:r. Harshall 's statement of July 5, 1947, at the 
Harvard Commencement exercises to form the 0 .E .E. C., vrhich 
worked out details for the European Recovery Program to be con 
sidered by the United States Congress. The Labour Government 
has not ceased its efforts to establish the World Food Organi-
I 
zation in the United Nations, or to support the various social 
and economic committees of that body because through this func~ 
tional approach to world unity it is hoped that a sounder basi~ 
for the "World Cooperative Commonwealth" will evolve. 
On the subject of economics the Leftists have a blind spo 
regarding the United States. They take note of the high tarif s 
and in all righteousness state that as long as these remain 
intact, there is a barrier to international trade. But, they 
ignore the fact that something is being done to remedy this 
situation in the United States through the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements. These people tend to emphasize and generalize on 
the rightist elements in the United States, while gliding over 
more liberal influences and social legislation. The Left is 
unjust in '\vri ting off American desires to help Europe get back 
on its feet as a purely selfish, imperialist designed affair. 
Actually, the United States is doing what it can to ease Europ 
into a united economic unit and free trade area through stipu-
lations in the Marshall Plan and looks with as much favor as 
i4o· --1·-
:::·f::: ~::o::~n any effort to attain political unity among I 
What is more, while Russia and Communists have consciousl 
attempted to delay economic recovery and political unity, the 
Americans have applauded and actively assisted Europe in her 
attempt to attain these ends. The Left apparently does not 
appreciate the self-control exercised by most Arrericans in 
trying not to interfere with the internal economies of Europea 
countries--although they do want to be sure that the money wil 
be directed for the general purposes behind v~rshall 
In fact, it could be pointed out that the socialists 
Plan aid.l 
are pro- I 
jecting their own feelings about economics and exclusive soc-
ialist international organizations into this aspect of America 
foreign policy, assuming that America will want to deal with 
other capitalist states only. 
I 
I 
an economic! 
approach, as the name of Social Democracy is a more appropriat 
British Socialism is not, however, limited to 
one for the objectives of British Labour. 
"Here, in this country, \ve have a chance of 
giving a great lead because we are showing how 
what amounts to a social rGvolution can be brought 
about by peaceful and democratic means. We are 
shov:ing how we can get an over-all economy with-
out sacrificing human rights and liberty. That is 
the work ive have before us today ."35 
For this reason the Labour Party has identified itself with I 
countries which profess similar moral values regardless of ! 
I 
economic differences--the United States and the Western democ~ 
35. Attlee, Parl. Deb., 5s. H.C., Vol. 446, c. 622. / 
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Whether this is right or wrong lies in the realm of value 
judgments, but given the conditioning of Western Civilization, 1 
there is no alternative. The Left, the most idealistic part o 
Labour, appears to have lost sight of the fact that only by 
aligning strongly with the democracies and nations which best 
represent its ideals, can it attain them~ Being optimistic 
about the intent of all nations, the Left has been guilty of 
being willing to appease part of its ideals, for to give in to 
an apparently insatiable Communist imperialism is to sacrifice 
the essence of those ideals to an inescapable totalitarianism~ 
To hold onto those goals, the Left, along with the rest of the 
Labour Party, must seek the strongest friends and allies possi 
I 
in order to survive• Aiming for a truly democratic interr~tio 1 
government in a world filled with peace and plenty, the 
Government is keeping faith with the Left. 
Labour /J 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX II 
LABOUR'S FOREIGN POLICY 
BY 
ARTHUR HENDERSON 
1935 
1. The Central Object:--to abolish War by organizing Peace. 
2. Peace must be organiSed through the League of Nations; 
the League is the pivot of Labour's policy. 
3. The Labour Government should pass a Peace Act of 
Parliament making it clear that this country will 
(a) Settle all disputes by peaceful means. 
(b) Never use coercive measures except to resist 
aggression and when the organised community of .. 
nations has recognised that their use is unavoidable~ 
(c) Take part in world-wide economic action to restore 
peace by isolating the peace-breaker. 
4. The Labour Government will strengthen the Peace system 
by:--
(a) Completing existing obligations not to resort to 
force. 
(b) Perfecting the means for preventing and stopping the'! 
use of armed force, settling disputes peacefully and 
promoting peaceful change. 
(c) Drastic Disarmament by rapid stages and through 
international agreement. 
(d) Early abolition of the weapons of aggression 
forbidden to Germany. 
(e) The suppression of Private Manufacture of Armaments. i
1 (f) The Internationalisation of Civil Aviation. 1 (g) The limitation of Budgetary Expenditure on Armaments~ 
(h) Constructive measures of "Moral Disarmament." !i 
5. Economic and Financial Co-operation and Planning on a i: 
world-wide scale:-- ,, 
(a) To combat economic nationalism, particularly tariffsa 
(b) to increase consumption; and !l 
(c) to organise world production for the use of all ll, __ 1l· 
instead for profit of the few. 
6. Friendship and co-operation with the United States, il 
particularly in questions of peace and war. !l, 
7. Development of friendly relations, commercial and 
Political, with Russia and the conclusion of a Treaty !1 
of Non-Aggression and Conciliation. il 
8. \iorld action to uphold peace and law in the Far East. I! 
9. Full co-operation with the International Labour !I 
orsanisation by:-- 1: (a) The adoption of a General Convention for the 40-hour!· 
week. ' 
10. 
(b) Other measures to meet the problems caused by 
rationalisation, machinery and mass production 
Industry and Agriculture. 
Fulle~publicity in all international dealings. 
No secret alliances, treaties or engagements of any 
ti 
in !i 
'I I, 
q 
kind~ 
I; 
I" 
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APPENDIX III 
A SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY 
as Proposed by 
LEONARD S • WOOLF 
1. United Nations--the keystone of the long-term policy. 
Act by--
a. Refusing to participate in wrangles and recriminatio 
in both the Security Council and the General Assemb 
b. Protesting them when they occur, but remaining a sil 
observer until the misuse stops. 
c. Not bringing questions to the United Nations which i 
cannot handle. 
d. Extending the spheres of the United Nations, especi-
ally economic. 
e. Consulting with the Dominions, France, the middle an 
small powers to improve United Nations machinery. 
2. Economic independence--disentangle ourselves from economi 
domination of the United States. 
3. No power politics--act on the assumption that there will 
be no war and if there is, Britain will have no part in 
Policy toward the U.S.S.R.--
a. Find questions where the two can agree, especially 
economic. 
b. Improve and extend British relations with the 
satellite nations. 
4. Build a Western Group with the aim of establishing the 
economic and political solidarity of the smaller powers 
so they can use their weight to influence international 
affairs. Within this group the Commonwealth can be 
important, as is France. It should act independently of 
the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., and in that way might be 
able to break the deadlock. 
5. Reduce armed forces to a minimum consistent with national 
obligations. The United Nations today is a farce and oa 
be ignored in considering military commitments. The 
amount of arms depends on the major objects of foreign 
policy, which should be to avoid fighting another war--
a. The Government should stop all research on atomic 
bombs and agree to pool all knowledge connected 
with it. 
b. Armed Forces should be on a modest scale. 
c. A large Navy is no longer needed to keep the sea 
lanes open. 
d. Determine the size of Forces by requirements for 
internal security at home, in the colonies, and in 
territories for which British administration is 
responsible. But bear in mind that there is no 
defense for the home islands in an atomic war. 
• 
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SOCIALIST BRITAIN'S OBLIGATIONS: 
Far East--Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, India, Burma, 
and Ceylon. 
Middle East--Palestine, other strategic spots, and economic 
needs, including oil, but not to the extent of 
supporting Turkey, rather working for inter-
nationalization of the Dardanelles. 
Mediterranean--Retain bases there, including Malta, as vital 
to shipping. 
Africa--In Sudan and the colonies remember obligations to th 
inhabitants, i.e. raising their economic and politic 
status so that independence will eventually be possi- e. 
America--The West Indies. 
Europe--Work for the establishment of an independent group, 
at first on economic lines, then for defense, and ~ 
possibly a political association. 
Germany--Although it is very expensive to remain there, it i 
not possible to withdraw because that would be re- 1 
garded as a desertion of international responsibili • 
Zonal fusion commits Britain to the American side 
and to counteract this Britain must insist on 
nationalization of major industry (which a majority 
of Germans approve of) and try to get the Americans 
1
. 
to provide more of the food for the Germans. In 
addition work for a common Four-Povrer policy and a I 
reasonable peace treaty. 
i: 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX IV 
TEN-POINT PROGRAM FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
by 
KEEP-LEFTISTS 
1. No truck with Churchill. 
2. One World, not hostile blocks. 
3. Friends not satellites of America. Reduce debts. 
4. Socialist rivalry with U.S.S.R. They treat colored 
peoples as equals. 
5. Our European destiny--regional security system. 
Renounce Staff conversations with non-European Powers. 
Renounce manufacture of atomic bombs. 
Submit at once to United Nations inspection. 
6. Germany and Europe--economic integration with Europe. 
1. Middle-Eastern Oil--take initiative by--
Announcing time-table for withdrawal of British troops 
from Greece, Palestine, and Egypt. 
Proposing defence of Dardanelles and Suez be a United 
Nations responsibility. 
Begin discussion of an Oil Agreement between Britain, 
France, Russia, and America, who need oil, and 
Middle East States which produce it. 
8. Develop African colonies--in cooperation with the French~-,, 
decrease dependence on the United Sta tea. 11 
9. Continue good work in the Far East. il 
10. Seize opportunity for leadership in the United Nations-- ii 
use British strength to tip balance against war and ,! 
lead the way to world government. ' 
,, 
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.ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to deterrrine the effect 
the "Left" of the Labour Party upon the official foreign polio 
of the British Labour Government since 1945. In addition, thel 
I 
suggestions of the Left groups are evaluated against the cri- II 
teria of reality in international relations. Careful consid- I 
I 
eration is given to each important sector of opinion within 1 
the Left liing of the Party and to a contrast of these with I 
Government policy. 
One of the most important problems the British people hav 
I 
to face is the redefinition of their nation's world status in 1 
accordance with power realities and with ideological prefer- I 
ences. Since the Labour Party is at the helm of the ship of 
state, it bears the major responsibility for setting out on th 
waters of international relations. Members who are to the lef 
I 
of the main body of the Party are concerned that the Governmen 
is not following through in its foreign affairs the Party idea 
of Socialism. However, a socialist foreign policy is admitted y 
indefinable and nebulous. The announced aims of the Govern- I 
ment's foreign policy are 
and peace--none of which is an exclusively socialist aim. The 
Left adds the ideals of lasting peace and a truly internationa 
government to the goals of a socialist foreign policy. 
In Chapter II there is an historical development of the \ 
foreign programs of the Labour Party, as well as of the major I 
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i Leftist groups. There are two traditions which permeated 1/ 
Labour's foreign policy before World War I--the foreign policy /1 
of the Liberal Party, and international socialism. By 1918 II 
I 
several aims and principles were evolved, including peace, I 
democracy, justice, collective security, limitation of armamen~ , 
and international government. During its two periods of offic, 
the Labour Party attempted to follow through these high idealsl 
However, the rise of Fascism in the 1930's brought a new atti-! 
tude to the Party. Instead of pacifism, there was a demand fo 
war against totalitarianism. Since World War II several diver 
I gent views on socialist foreign policy came to light within th 
Labour Party. Each tries to evaluate what British policy shou 'd 
be in accordance with the u.s.s.R.--u.s.A. conflict. Sympathi ers 
for an orientation of foreign policy toward the United States 
emphasize the similarities in democratic institutions between 
the two n~tions, and their economic and strategic interdepen-
dence. Those \vho favor a policy directed tovrard the Soviet 
Union feel that socialist Britain has more to gain by co-
operation with a Government that has made great strides in the 
objective of socialism than with capitalist America. A third 
group wishes to retain independence of action rather than 
subordinate policy to either Power. It would side with the 
one it believes right in individual c9.ses and would reserve 
England leadership of the smaller nations toward the goal of 
social democracy. 
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I In order to illustrate the views of each of the three I 
factions there is in Chapter III a discussion of the solution 
1 
each group offers for five basic foreign policy problems. The 
"American Camp" is the most realistic in its formulation of 
policy, which, incidentally, is similar to Government policy. 
Having analyzed Russian motives as being aggressive, this grou 
concludes that Britain must side with the United States to pre 
vent Soviet domination of Europe and the rest of the world. 
With this decision made, the other problems fall into a proper 
perspective. Joining Western European Union strengthens the 
West and Britain militarily, econon.ically, and ideologically. 
Accepting economic help from capitalist America produces no 
moral qualms for these socialists. The Commomfealth serves to 
increase the resources available to Britain. United Kingdom- I 
United States collaboration ceases to be a problem, but become 
a vital part of the foreign program advocated by this group. 
The 11Russian Camp" does not attempt to analyze Soviet 
motives or methods, but follows t~1.e Corr:inform line on inter-
n3 tional questions because it believes that t:1ere is rriost to b 
gained by emphasizing the economic democracy factor in Social-
ism, which to Soviet Union professes to do. Western Union is . 
approached on the basis of agreerr;ent 1rith Russia, although theJe 
is some doubt as to t::-lc. d:..:sree of independence allowed states II 
aligned to the Soviet Union. Although closer economic relatio s 
with Russia are advccated, it is not revealed how the U.S.S.R. 
could sup;ly British economic needs. The Empire might serve 
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j Official policy whenever it believes socialist standards are Jl 
I being abandoned, as in the case of its challenge to the King's 11 
1 Speech in 1946. The Russian Camp follows the Cominform line, 
II opposing British collaboration lfith the West and America. The i. 
debate continues in much the same way in the Annual ConferenceJ 
of the Labour Pary, with much heated argument evinced in such 
cases as policy toward Palestine, Greece, Spain, the Near and 
I 
Middle East, the United States and the Soviet Union. However, I 
the views of the extreme Left were sufficiently silenced by II 
1949 so that there was no longer a sharp divergence on a forei~n 
program which Labour could support. The viei-TS of the Left are 
also widely publicized in newspapers and other periodicals, su h 
as the New Statesman and Nation and. the Political Quarterly. 
In addition, intellectual grups, such as the Fabian Society, 
,, 
II 
I sponsor lectures, pamphlets, and books which disseminate the 
ideas of the Left foreign programs. In general, the Left has j 
1!
11 
had to yield to Official policy because of the importance to 
the nation of virtual unity in the face of danger, and also I 
because of the importance of reality as opposed to idealism in 
international relations. 
In concluding, it can be stated that the contribution of 
I 
the Left to British foreign policy is the thinking out of 
principles of political action and the evolving of ideals 
toward which statesmen aim. vlhile the Left has built up a 11 lo~~c;a: _c_a."~ for _idealism 1~ =:.or~i~._l'~l=~.".'._=t--i-~ i:val~~ __ -I· _ _ 
II 
I 
I 
because it is hssed Ui_Jon ··dishful thinking. T:!e Leftists des 
a vrOl''ld full of peace, economic ::::·.nd social justice, and demo-
cracy, and they assume all others want those conditions. 
people also refuse to concede that po~·rer means, in the final 
analysis, military p01ver. Althou~h it is adn~irable to hope t 
there \vill be peaceable settle1wej1ts to all differences bet\veen 
states, experience has proven t:1-:;.t l)OHer is still a potent 
factor in the relations between nations. Furt~ermore, it can 
be concluded t::1::t t t~e Leftists do not fully consider the fact 
of a bi-partisan or national forei;n policy, w~1ich is possible 
and desireable since there are permanent components which 
determine a particular country's forei3n policy. NevertD.eless 
the ideals of the Left are in thei,:selves important, sh1ce ele-
ments of Utopia, as well as of reality, are necessary in poli-
tical thought and action. By aiming for a democratic inter-
national go'rernment in a vrorld. of :.:eace and plenty, while at 
the same time balancing day-to-day international political 
realities, the Labour Governwent is attempting to fulfil the 
promises ofdemocratic socialism. 
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